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Food for thought

For the last couple of months, majority of us at AI, including me, were busy with a survey of around 450 government schools spread across 4 districts in 2 states. The objective of the survey was to track the flow of food grain and flow of funds to schools under the Cooked Mid Day Meal (CMDM) scheme. The fieldwork is now complete, and the survey sheets are in the process of being readied for data entry.

The CMDM scheme is supposed to provide cooked mid day meals to all children in government and government aided schools. If implemented properly, the scheme can potentially play an important role in attracting kids to schools thereby reducing the number of out of school children[1]. By improving the nutritional intake of the children, it can have positive effects on their health and cognitive abilities. But my experience, albeit lasting only a few days, tells me that all is not well when it comes to implementation. I came across a number of schools where CMDM was not provided, not just on the day of the survey, but also for long periods ranging from a week to a month, in the past.

In order to get a sense of why this might be the case, I started looking at the monitoring mechanisms put in place in these districts/ states. Here are my preliminary thoughts on existing monitoring systems, and how they can be improved.

Currently, there are two ways in which data on CMDM delivery is being generated. Every school maintains an MDM register.  The head master (henceforth, HM) or the concerned teacher are supposed to record quantity of food grain received and spent during the month, number of kids benefitting every day (and hence in a month). In addition, states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have also initiated an Interactive Voice Response System (IVRS), wherein an automated telephone call is made to the HM on each working day, who keys in the number of students who benefitted from CMDM on that day[2].

The first method has an obvious drawback- since the registers are maintained manually at the school level, information about a particular school or the block/ district is not available in real time. This problem is solved through the IVRS. However, the key problem in both cases is that the information is collected from the HM/ teacher in charge of CMDM, whose actions are likely to be governed by their own incentives. And hence, even if the IVRS says that 100 kids were given the CMDM in a particular school on a particular day, there is no guarantee that it actually happened. In fact, fudging of data at the school level is a major problem, and none of the above methods can deal with it. The only way it can come to the light is when the block/ district officials visit the school. But even then, how will they verify whether school actually provided meal to whatever number that has been stated in the MDM register or through IVRS, for say, the last week? No way!!

So we need a system which allows us to collect data in real time, and more importantly, from the ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. kids or their parents.

Let’s consider an IVRS system, which makes telephone calls not only to the HM but also to randomly selected parents of children enrolled in every school in the state, and asks the following questions:

a)      Did your child attend the school yesterday?

b)     If yes, did your child receive MDM yesterday?

If the MDM menu for the day before consisted of roti, daal and green vegetable, the next set of question can be as follows:

c)      Did he/ she receive roti?;

d)     Did he/ she receive green vegetable?

e)      Did he/ she receive daal?)

All these questions can be answered as either YES or NO. The respondent can accordingly, key in the numbers.  Consequently, data is made available in real time and more importantly, from the beneficiaries and not from the service providers. Further, data is available for every school, from which aggregate (say, block, district or state) numbers can be easily computed.

This system has a number of advantages.

a)      The responses of HM and parents can be compared to see to what extent they differ from one another.

b)     Since calls are made to random parents every day, collusion between HM and a select group of parents (say, School Management Committee members) becomes difficult.

c)      Since information is available for every school, one could devise a rule which specifies which schools are to be monitored more closely. Just to give an example, a rule could be formulated which says  that a school where more than 50% parents reported not receiving MDM for two days in a row should be visited by the block official.

d)     Putting in place such a rule will also make it easier for the district/ state officials to evaluate the performance of the block/ district officials.

e)      The system won’t cost a dime to the respondent (either in money or time spent in responding). Further, as mentioned, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have already set up an IVRS, so for them, there would be hardly any additional fixed costs. And my sense is that the marginal cost of making calls to parents as well as of storing additional data is unlikely to be prohibitively expensive.

It goes without saying that the entire data should be available in the public domain, so that everybody knows which schools is doing a good job, whose performance have deteriorated etc.. Putting the information in the public domain will help the press, civil society activists and local representatives to build pressure on the administration to take action against non-performing HM/ block official/ district officials.

One possible hindrance in implementing such a scheme is lack of connectivity, especially for poorer parents. But Census 2011 numbers reveal that more than half of the households (rural and urban combined) in India have mobile phones- 47.9% in rural areas and 64.3% in urban areas. And with the central government planning to give cell phones with Rs. 200 worth talk-time to all the Below Poverty Line (BPL) families, this problem might just disappearJ.

[1] See http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/conference/dec_10_conf/Papers/RajiJayaraman.pdf. In fact, research shows that providing cooked meal might be more beneficial than providing rations. See http://www.isid.ac.in/~fafridi/doc/mealsandparticipation.pdf

[2] http://www.accountabilityindia.in/article/policy-brief/2404-case-study-interactive-voice-response-system-based-daily-monitoring-system

Juvenile Justice?

Numerous schemes on education are rolled out with much fan-fare, with the most well-known being the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan(SSA), and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE) which aim to universalise elementary education in India. Numerous reports however highlight that child labour is still rampant in India.1  Here, I am going to highlight how sometimes certain actions taken by the state in the child’s “best” interest can become counter-productive.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act 2000 (henceforth, JJ Act) permits state intervention in cases where children are in need of state care and protection.2 If a child is working, begging, being ill-treated, performing acrobatics, the Act deems his/her parents unfit to bring up the child and seeks to provide for a system which will protect the interest of the child. Once the child is caught in the system, it becomes a long and arduous task for the parents to get them out. Often, they are unable to prove their identity as parents.3 Any police officer, government employee, social worker, public-spirited citizen, Non-governmental organization (NGO) can produce a child before the Child Welfare Committee(CWC), constituted under the Act. The complainants can bring instances mentioned above, to the attention of the CWC, stating that the child is in need of care and protection.

The CWC’s constituted in each district under the JJ Act are required to complete an enquiry (to establish the identity of parents and deem them fit to take charge of their children) within 4 months, albeit with some exceptions.4However, this “exception” provision has permitted most cases to languish in the system much beyond 4 months, some-times for years.5 In many cases the enquires remain pending beyond the stipulated period because the committees have no means to determine who the parents are because the child is unable to identify his complete address. According to the Ministry of Women and Child Development the problem becomes compounded as some districts, and sometimes all districts in a state haven’t constituted CWCs.6 (The JJ Act stipulates transfer of the child to a CWC with jurisdiction in the area where the child originally hails from; but at the same time it merely stipulates that State Government may make rules to ensure effective linkages). This lack of institutional capacity results in inordinate delays. These problems can be alleviated if we have a centralized data-base of CWC’s and of the children picked up under the JJ Act. It should be password-protected to prevent misuse but should be accessible by an authorised CWC member from the district under their jurisdiction. A centralised data-base would also help those parents who do not know where their children are.7This simple use of technology could save many parents and children the agony of being separated for prolonged periods.

In the period between the enquiry and the submission of the final report, the child is entrusted to the care of an over-crowded “home” which serves as an interim shelter.8   Since this is a temporary measure, children have nothing to occupy themselves with, as more often than not, formal arrangements to educate children in care are not provided.9 The Central RTE rules provide that wherever a birth certificate under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Certification Act, 1886 is not available, an Anganwadi record,an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife(ANM) record, or a declaration of the age of the child by the parent or guardian would be deemed to be proof of age. This would facilitate the enrollment of the child in an age-appropriate class.10 In those cases where the status of the parent itself is questionable children mostly get left out of school. On who does the onus of the child’s education lie? The RTE mandates that no child be left out of a formal elementary education for want of documents and states it is the responsibility of the parents, guardian or local authority to ensure the child goes to school.11 Which party is to be hauled up under the RTE if the child is not going to school in such a case is not clear. The JJ Act itself has not made it mandatory for any party to ensure that the child is enrolled in school. The Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) and the State Education Departments do not even have data with respect to this category of children, let alone a strategic plan in place to address related concerns.

Moreover, the standards of the “homes” that the children are kept in, is appalling. What kind of development can we expect for the child, when some don’t have basic facilities like a bed and children sleep on the floor ?12 But there are more unspeakable horrors than poor infrastructure. These homes meant for “protective custody”, are to be supervised by CWC’s. According to a report published by the Ministry of Women and Child Development a mind-numbing 70.21% of the total children in these homes, reported having faced physical abuse. In the same report a shockingly high 47% reported having faced sexual abuse.13 Are we justified in separating them forcibly from their parents and putting them in such places? Who is responsible for helping these children overcome the trauma they suffer at such a tender age? Moreover, the abuse faced by them in institutions may antagonize them further and their attitude towards society might become more hostile, making their rehabilitation more difficult.

The parents should be given a deadline to enroll the child in a school of their choice if found violating norms of RTE after which the child will be put in a school by the local authorities. We should not simply snatch their children away, leaving both the parents and children completely bewildered and helpless in the face of a mismanaged system which doesn’t have the time or sympathy for their plight. In the best case we are forcing a child to live separately, go to school and study in an alien environment when he is pining for his parents. Migrant children often do not understand the local language. Some speak in different dialects and communication becomes difficult, even for those who know the language of the state. The children end up having a broken education if at all and the purpose for which the child is put under state care, is defeated. Isn’t it too much to expect the child to understand what is taught in school (if he/she is even put in one) if he cannot understand his surroundings?  Can he be expected to learn anything if he is always treated as an “outsider” in that school ?14 The social stigma of having no one to talk to and constant humiliation when teachers scold him for lack of comprehension, may leave the child scarred for life. Such a child may develop a deep-seated fear of the institution of school and may not resume his education even if he is re-united with his parents and put in a school where he can comprehend the language. There are too many issues regarding migrant children in state care under the JJ Act and they need to be addressed.

“So long as little children are allowed to suffer, there is no true love in this world.”

References:

1. The International Labor Organization has found that India has 12.6 million labourers between the ages of 5 and 14, with roughly 20 % working as domestic help. Other groups place the figure at 45 million or higher. UNICEF has said India has more child labourers than any other country in the world.

2. http://www.childlineindia.org.in/CP-CR-Downloads/JJAct2006.pdf

3. Of the estimated 26.2 million people born in the country 7.6 million reportedly go unregistered.

4. http://wcd.nic.in/childprot/jjact2000.pdf

5. http://www.educationworldonline.net/index.php/page-article-choice-more-id-3176

There is no official data on how long the transfer of a child to his parents takes place. This is an unofficial data gathered by correspondents posing as social workers because the homes are unwilling to share data.

6. http://www.indg.in/social-sector/women-and-child-development/the_integrated_child_protection_scheme_icps.pdf

7. www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2834936.ece

8. http://nipccd.nic.in/reports/dsmdata.pdf

9. In one home the probation officer admitted to no formal education being provided in the home although a “full-time teacher” had been appointed to “teach the alphabet and numbers, and conduct storytelling, games and other activities”.

10. http://www.ssa.tn.nic.in/Docu/Framework%20final%20approved.pdf

11. http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/free_and_compulsory09.pdf

12. http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-10-16/mumbai/28242298_1_orphanages-suo-motu-shelter

13. http://wcd.nic.in/childabuse.pdf

14. http://www.create-rpc.org/pdf_documents/PTA28.pdf

 

 

Too little, too late?

In the few months that I have been assessing the relationship between government and businesses, several grey areas have emerged that have often left me wondering, wandering, and wanting, to dig deeper. Information is power, it is said. Information, however, presents a deep paradox. In one sense, it empowers people to demand their rights, to access the services promised by the state and to hold their elected leaders accountable for any mishaps in service delivery.  On the other hand, for some, information may lead to more vulnerability and greater insecurity.   The intensity and the degree with which horrific incidents against civil society members and even prominent government officials (for knowing too much and for taking action against those in power) have increased is mindboggling.  If you have been following the news in the last few weeks, you may have read of at least one such incident (At the end of this post, you will find a list of some not-so-well known incidents that have been captured by the media).  A central theme that runs through these incidents is the occurrence of inept or in most cases, refusal of action (a report by the Asian Centre for Human Rights captures this theme).

There are two main points that come to my mind:

1) Despite several efforts from the government to make documents and scheme-related information more accessible, (be it e-budgets, mobile VAS to update and access records, employing officers as Public Information Officers for the RTI etc) a common person is usually unable to access enough information/ facts that may give them the confidence to demand high quality public services. Reasons for this are many- income disparities, location, information not communicated properly to the beneficiaries and in some cases, missing information at the government level itself (please refer to Avani Kapur’s blog).

The Right to Information Act has brought in some relief in this regard. It has not only laid provisions regarding the ‘obligation of the government to publish information

proactively, as well as to respond to requests’ but also to disseminate information in a manner which is easy to comprehend and accurate[1]. Earlier this year, the number of RTI applications against central government public authorities went over 3.74 lakh (filed during 2011-12).[2] This is no small feat. However, even the RTI Act faces several challenges that cannot be removed so easily (of these there are many, but this blog isn’t about these challenges. To know more, please refer to this article by Shibani Ghosh).

It is obvious that when people do not have valid proof to hold against politicians who are involved in dubious, wealth-creating projects, it provides these politicians with ample incentive to go down the rent-seeking path.

2) The second challenge, something that has been gnawing at my patience, is the problem faced by those individuals who unearth evidence to implicate politicians in power. They not only come to know of the extent to which resources are being misused but also usually find the people who are at the core of these scams. However, while going public with their findings, they not only face the incessant scrutiny of the government in proving the authenticity of claims, but also have to deal with problems of safety and security for themselves, their families, friends and colleagues. The RTI Act does not attempt to set up safeguards/ protection for the individuals filing the application.

The RTI route is not the only means to uncover facts- there are also those who expose politicians/ bureaucrats from within the system and they are also extremely vulnerable. Examples come in hundreds, be it the attack on a Karnataka government official (S.P. Mahantesh) and an environmentalist in Chhatisgarh (Ramesh Agrawal) in the same month or other such cases around the country.

While violence against these individuals as well as individuals using the RTI is on the rise[3], the legal safeguards are still in limbo. A recommendation by The Law Commission of India in 2001 for the protection of whistleblowers and the government notification made after the death of Satyender Dubey in 2004[4] led to the rise of The Whistleblower Bill (Public Interest Disclosure and Protection for Persons Making the Disclosure Bill, 2010), which is yet to be passed.[5] The Bill, in short, “seeks to protect whistleblowers, i.e. persons making a public interest disclosure related to an act of corruption, misuse of power, or criminal offence by a public servant”.[6] It was tabled at the Lok Sabha on 26th August, 2010. It seems, however, that the legal provisions assigned for their safety are still sitting in the Rajya Sabha catching dust.

The Central Vigilance Commission is the recognised authority within The Whistleblower Bill to accept and review applications but their role in providing recourse to the applicants is at best, minimal.[7]

1. The Commission does not seem to possess any penalty-seeking authority- ‘filing recommendations’ will be a long drawn process of little help to the whistleblower

2. The Commission can disclose the identity of the whistleblower if it wants to- this can immediately jeopardize the safety of that individual.

3. If the Commission is ‘of the opinion’ that the case requires no further inquiry, it can shut the case- to what extent will this opinion be transparent? Will the person who makes a disclosure be given the reasons for dismissal? (If anyone has more information on this aspect, do let me know)

4. Chapter IV (16.) states that ‘Any person who makes any disclosure mala fidely and knowingly that it was incorrect or false or misleading shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend up to two years and also to fine which may extend up to thirty thousand rupees’. This has been under debate for a while now(read link). This not only puts more pressure on the whistleblower, but can dissuade them completely from coming forward.

5. There is a clear dismissal of the private sector under the Commissions purview regarding this matter

Though the specifics of the Whistleblower Bill are still to be debated and improved upon, it is only when it comes into effect that a wholesome discussion on revisions can be made. Why is there a constant misuse of time? If given the green light, and if implemented from the word ‘go’, this Bill could have a greater impact that one can presently envision. But the question remains, if the system is so paralysed in the analysis stage itself, what is the level of expectation that whistleblowers should maintain when it finally comes around?

Information can be a weapon. However, fear, death and facing the wrath of criminals (many of which, sadly, are part of our political system) puts most of whistleblowers in our country at critical crossroads. However, the problem of terminal indifference, over-analysis and lethargy in the system that has led to the number of lives lost is definitely worth more than a thought. Good intentions will not save lives and doing nothing is not an option.

Links to a few recent incidents

1. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/karnataka-officer-pays-with-life-for-exposing-land-scam/1/189555.html

2. http://www.uttarpradeshlive.com/2012/01/nrhm-scam-accused-officer-dies.html

3. http://content.ibnlive.in.com/article/09-Jul-2012india/army-officer-dies-during-probe-family-claims-torture-270175-3.html

4. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nrhm-scam-missing-up-health-department-clerk-found-dead/1/173899.html

5. http://www.ndtv.com/article/cities/activist-who-tried-to-expose-pds-scam-allegedly-shot-dead-by-police-232751

6. http://www.timesnow.tv/2nd-Chief-Medical-Officer-killed-in-UP/videoshow/4369508.cms

 

[1] World Bank. Governance Working Paper Series. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC/Resources/DarbishireProactiveTransparency.pdf

[2]The Economic Times. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-16/news/31726954_1_applications-central-public-authorities-central-information-commission. May 16th, 2012

[3] RTI Activists: India’s sitting ducks. http://www.achrweb.org/ihrrq/issue3-4/India-Sitting-Ducks-2011.pdf

[4] http://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/2011/06/17/standing-committees-recommendations-on-the-whistleblowers-bill/

[5]Whistleblower Bill is captive to high-profile Lokpal debate. The Asian Age

http://www.asianage.com/interview-week/whistleblower-bill-captive-high-profile-lokpal-debate-740. July 29th, 2012

[6]PRS legislative brief. http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Public%20Disclosure/Legislative%20Brief%20-%20Public%20Interest%20Disclosure%20Bil.pdf

Enhancing Governance in Education

Over the past few months, observations during several field-visits to our PAISA states[1] have led me to consider more deeply the quality of governance in our education system. At the school-level, we found problems of pervasive teacher absence and lack of motivation, with teachers not only being called away on other official duties or taking casual leaves, but teachers also busy with other non-teaching jobs, such as running their own hotels or holding their own private tuitions (to cite but two examples). Another major reason for teacher absence observed was inaccessibility, especially during the monsoon – lack of all-weather roads in a number of backward, remote areas rendered many schools shut as teachers didn’t show up. At the block-level, we’ve met officials who feel as if they are being bypassed or overlooked, as principals and the district administrations oftentimes interact directly. Community participation and management, long recognised as a mechanism to enhance the quality of education, was negligible in the majority of schools I’ve visited. At the same time, however, I also came across schools where the confidence and performance of students was a joy to see; where teachers made optimal use of constrained resources; and, of their own initiative, ensured regular involvement of parents and the community at large. Such schools were unfortunately few and far in between. This throws up the question, how best can we create a well-governed education delivery system that facilitates an enabling environment for teachers and administration officials alike – motivating them, holding them accountable for their actions (or rather, inaction), and ensuring that the interests of all stakeholders are aligned?

Before delving further into governance in education, it’s useful to have better sense of what is meant by “good governance”? A widely-accepted definition was proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003), who define it as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” for the common good of all.[2] Since 1996, they have been measuring governance with the following aggregate indicators: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. However, such indicators are not sufficient to properly evaluate governance in education. Rather, education governance entails an assessment of performance; of the interactions and incentives of policymakers and service providers, as well as their relationships with the beneficiaries and other stakeholders; and of fiscal performance – that is, how resources are allocated, managed, and actually used. For gauging education governance, Lewis and Pettersson (2009) suggest a framework that encompasses performance indicators based on four pillars: standards, incentives, information and accountability. According to the authors, each of these pillars, outlined below, is necessary to improve performance in the education sector:

  • “Standards – transparent and publically recognised criteria or benchmarks which inform education policy, provision and performance
  • Incentives – financial or non-financial factors that motivate a specific type of behaviour or action, and can be positive or negative, i.e., encourage a certain behaviour or deter it
  • Information – in the form of clear definitions of outputs and outcomes combined with accurate data on performance and results collected at regular intervals, enables sanctions to be imposed when specified standards are not met
  • Accountability – refers to the act of holding public officials/service providers answerable for processes and outcomes, and imposing sanctions if specified outputs and outcomes are not delivered.”[3]

As the authors rightly state, “[a]ccountability requires that public servants have clear responsibilities and are held answerable in exercising those responsibilities, and if they do not, face predetermined sanctions.” This statement has resonance especially concerning our disgruntled block officials. As the elementary education institutional structures have merged into one in several districts – combining the previously-separated roles and responsibilities of officials from the parallel systems of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and the Education Line Department – it is imperative that at each level (school, cluster, block, district), responsibilities are clearly delineated and that chains of interaction/command are not unnecessarily broken. To illustrate, in Bihar, we have often found teachers approaching the district administration directly, whether it is to submit utilisation certificates or to share bank account information. This ambiguity in processes leads to confusion while implementing the SSA. It is thus important that the administration enforces a system, where officials at each level are enabled to carry out their duties properly and in the desired manner; and where they do not, holds them accountable. Knowledge of benchmarks to be maintained, timely information and sound incentives for better performance would also be equally important to ensure effective governance of the system.

Drawing on the work of Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, the authors have four broad dimensions with which they measure education sector performance: (i) budget and resource management; (ii) human resources; (iii) household payments; and (iv) corruption perceptions. While the first two dimensions relate to fund flows and teacher absence, the third dimension includes indicators on illegal payments for publicly provided education services and charges to teachers for private tuition. The fourth dimension relates to the percentage of households reporting corruption in the education sector as well as an assessment of institutional quality.

A framework such as this, coupled with an evaluation of learning outcomes, would help to analyse the overall effectiveness of education service delivery. In particular, as funds are tracked, as teachers are monitored, there should also be greater effort to provide incentives for teachers and officials, which would complement their intrinsic motivation to work; for example, through a combination of wider professional recognition and career development prospects, better-designed performance pay, and greater empowerment to impose sanctions (where relevant). Chaudhary et al (2006) document how non-monetary returns to teaching, such as the work environment and level of school infrastructure, can induce teachers to be more actively present in their schools. In fact, even after controlling for other factors, they found that schools with the highest levels of infrastructure and other teaching learning equipment had a lower teacher absence rate than those with the lowest levels.[4] It therefore becomes crucial for administrations to ensure that all basic infrastructure requirements are met in both schools and Department offices, to ensure that lack of infrastructure (especially lack of proper access in the case of schools) doesn’t become an excuse for absence. Finally, wider spaces should be created for teachers and officials that enable them to take initiative and innovate within their domains – even if it is in small steps – such as appointing those who perform well as local resource persons and thus allowing others to learn from their examples.[5]

 

[1] Largely, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.

[2] Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, 2003, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,”Policy Research Working Paper 3106, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Available here.

[3]Lewis, M. and G. Pettersson, 2009, “Governance in Education: Raising Performance,” World Bank Human Development Network Working Paper. Available here.

[4]Chaudhury, N., J. Hammer, M. Kremer, K. Muralidharan, and F. H. Rogers, 2006, “Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 91–116. Available here.

[5]For an account of some of Azim Premji Foundation’s experiences in improving education sector governance in India, see here.

Boosting Demand for Social Sector Services

Government Spending in the Social Sector has been increasing over the years. In the financial year 2012-13, the government has spent Rs. 25,555 crores on its flagship education programme, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (1), Rs 33,000 crore on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (2), and Rs 20,855 crores on the National Rural Health Mission (3). 

In addition to the amounts spent, the rate at which social sector spending has been growing is also astounding. Since 2006-07 expenditure on social sector services as a proportion of total expenditure increased from 21.6 per cent in 2006-7 to 24.1 per cent in 2009-10 and further to 25 percent in 2011-12. (4)

If you were to look at our Budget Briefs (5), you would find that despite significant government spending, the outcomes are somewhat limited. The burgeoning question that poses itself then is why does there still exist a sizeable gap between the intended impact and the actual impact of the hundreds of crores of rupees spent by the GOI (and other development agencies) each year, across the years? While this is in itself a complex question that would require a thorough, multifarious analysis, the single aspect I’d like to explore in this post is the need for boosting demand in order to streamline social sector service provision.

In the last weeks I’ve given some thought to the idea of the need for a stronger pull factor from the people in order to improve public service delivery. What strikes one most while observing  the process of rural public service delivery is how little the primary stakeholder – the individual beneficiary asserts herself or himself while engaging with service providers, who is often in a position of perceived superiority. Case in point being,a whole community of MGNREGA workers I have interacted with in south west Rajasthan, all of whom were dismayed when they received lower than expected daily wage rates, but none of whom demanded to see muster rolls or any other relevant documents from the relevant authorities. It is not uncommon for scores of women to wait uncomplainingly for hours outside rural sub-centres for medical treatment, and communities have very little involvement in how the local institutions such as Primary Health Centres, Schools, Anganwadi centres or Village Education Committees are run. To some extent, it seems as if inefficiency is somewhat expected and therefore exempted by the people, and no particularly strong demands seem to be made of the authorities. The need to strengthen the demand side of public service programme delivery has been acknowledged by the GOI in the recent past. The planning commission in some of its reports (6) has given credence to the idea that demand side factors need to be strengthened in order to ensure that the mechanisms designed to deliver public services function effectively. It would therefore perhaps be worthwhile for schemes and other initiatives to consider incentivizing service seeking behavior among its beneficiaries.

The government of India has successfully made use of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) model to cause an increase in demand for core public services. Its biggest success is undoubtedly the Janani Suraksha Yojana. The Ministry of Women and Child Development in a recent press release (7) said that the scheme had caused an increase in institutional deliveries from 47% in(District Level Household Survey-III, 2007-08) to 72.9% (Coverage Evaluation Survey, 2009). The monetary incentive had caused a huge surge in demand, with the number of beneficiaries of the scheme increasing from up from 7.39 lakhs beneficiaries in 2005-06 to 108.69 lakhs beneficiaries in 2011-12. (8)

Other schemes that have similarly used the CCT model include Laadli, A Haryana and Delhi government scheme that offers monetary rewards to the girl child upon birth and on attaining various levels of education and the National SC/ST Re-imbursement Scheme pioneered by the Delhi government, which offers fee reimbursements to students from disadvantaged groups meeting a certain academic criterion. While implementing initiatives through CCTs have seen success, one cannot deny their heavy dependence on requisite infrastructure, human resources and capital. They are not in themselves an effective means of ensuring efficient delivery of public services, but certainly have acted as an enabler to this end.

Causing an increase in claimant behavior among intended beneficiaries is often the result of sustained, community driven advocacy initiatives. The Mazdoor Kisaan Shakti Sanghatan has for instance, worked since the early 1990’s in the state of Rajasthan to strengthen community involvement in decision making and public accounting processes. Through their efforts, they were successful at being able to cause a huge surge in the demand for transparency and accountability. MKSS’ work culminated into the formation of the National Council for the People’s Right to Information in 1996, and the organisation is credited with being instrumental in the passing of the Right to Information Act in 2005. (9)

A Planning Commission study has suggested that the basic failure in creating demand amongst the Indian rural masses for public services is due to the difficulty faced by the rural populace in transitioning into the democracy mindset after several hundred years of monarchic rule. (10) It seems to me as if this is a crucial factor, and that policy interventions would do well to address this concern while designing or assessing delivery mechanisms.

The Case of the Missing Records

If you have ever visited a government office, you would have been astounded (like I was) to see numerous files stacked in dingy offices, gathering dust. Yet, there often appeared to be a method to the madness and if you requested for a file, it was easily pulled out.

Despite this, in recent years there seems to be growing number of cases where records go “missing”.

I first became aware of this “strange” phenomenon when we started working on the PAISA Project. As you all must be aware by now, through the PAISA Project we analyse government documents at different levels (Government of India (GOI), state and district) and complement that with school-level surveys in order to ascertain the following: How do funds flow through the system? Is money utilised? When is it utilised and how are funds spent?

We have received a decent “success rate” in gaining access to documents at the GOI, state and district levels. With the exception of a few stray cases where the relevant authority at the district level was transferred along with access to all the important documents at the district level (we were told that only he had the password and without the password, the new official was unable to access any of the documents), if the data exists, it has been given. (Data not existing at all is another problem altogether and more details on that are available here.)

However, the greatest number of issues seems to come about at the school level. During our surveys, we request to see passbooks, registers, utilisation certificates and cashbooks. Interestingly, we seem to have encountered numerous cases of “passbooks being stolen”, “passbooks lost in floods”, cashbooks “burnt” in kitchen fires!

This got me wondering…Was the inability to get records the fault of our surveyors (i.e., did we not ask the question correctly, did our surveyors not probe enough, etc.), or was it something deeper? Preliminary research suggests that in recent years, the frequency of these cases being reported (probably due to the greater use of the Right to Information (RTI) Act and rising citizen engagement with government records) has increased. So here are some of the stories:

  • In February 2012, Lokayukta Justice Manmohan Sarin asked for all records from the Delhi Government’s Urban Development Department relating to a case on an unauthorised colony in Wazirpur village. The village had been allegedly granted illegal provisional regularisation certificates by the then urban development Minister, ahead of the 2008 assembly elections. In the complaint, it had been alleged that the land was issued based on forged and incomplete applications and the provisional certificate had been signed by the Minister. The result: the Lokayukta was informed that the file regarding the colony could not be traced “despite all efforts”!
  • In March 2012, an RTI application requested records from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) pertaining to the imposition of the Emergency in India in 1975. The PMO’s office however stated, “a thorough search was made to retrieve, trace records of correspondence between the then Prime Minister and the President of India relating to proclamation of emergency. However, no such records were found in the PMO (Prime Minister’s Office).”
  • It is hard to put a date to the missing records in the Adarsh Society housing scam. The Adarsh Society, originally meant to be a six-storey structure to house Kargil war heroes and war widows, was converted into a 31-storey building, violating a number of laws. The flats were allotted to bureaucrats, politicians’ relatives and defence officers at artificially lower prices. Between 2010 and 2012, there have been more than four instances of crucial documents going missing. The first entailed important file notings dating August 30, 2009 and November, 1, 2010, going missing from Maharashtra’s Urban Development Department office. This was subsequently followed by important papers “disappearing” from the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Another set of papers went missing from the Army Headquarters in Mumbai. In June 2011, maps and some survey sheets from 1872-1960 related to Adarsh land were untraceable from the land records office of the Mumbai. According to a recent Indian Express article, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has hit a roadblock in its investigations to look for the missing records and is currently weighing the options of closing the investigations.
  • A similar problem was faced during the auditing of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) scheme in Uttar Pradesh by the Comptroller and Auditor General’s office. The report states that “in many cases during the course of the audit, it was informed that records were either not available in full or not available at all and in quite a few instances, original records had not been maintained, particularly relating to Accounts.” For instance, records from the Director General, National Programmes, Monitoring and Evaluation from 2005-06 to 2006-07 amounting to Rs. 1277 crores were not available. Even at the district level, records from 2005-06 to 2008-09 related to medicine and equipment purchase, utilisation certificate and stock position in two Community Health Centres in Lucknow were not traceable. Similarly, cashbooks, ledgers, passbooks, tender, quotation and purchase files, bill registers, stock and voucher book from April 2005 to December 2006 for the Reproductive and Child Health-II and from April 2005 to August 2008 for the Routine Immunization Programme in Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh were also missing. (more details available here)

These are just some of the bigger examples that have come to light in the recent past in relation to “missing” records containing valuable information (and interestingly, often in relation to scams!).

In fact, according to the Public Cause Research Foundation (PCRF ) which had analysed orders passed by various information commissioners at the national and state level – in many cases government officials had refused to provide information sought under an RTI application, due to “missing documents.” According to a member of the PCRF, “during 2010, Information Commissioner Shailesh Gandhi, who handles Departments pertaining to Delhi, had received as many as 30 such cases and ordered filing FIRs in 28 cases.” (Hindustan Times, February 2011).

Moreover, in a significant Judgement, the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Jharkhand, has held that, in cases where a department is required to keep a record but it is not available or missing, then it should be reconstructed. It is also “within the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Right To Information Act to direct the office to reconstitute the record…” (link to the judgement available here).

Insistence on filing FIR’s immediately upon theft/destruction and reconstruction of lost records are just some steps to ensure greater accountability. However, the question still arises as to who is held accountable if valuable records go missing and how do we ensure that the “reconstruction” itself is accurate. In this day and age of digitisation and cloud storage, it feels strange that often the lack of records is the main hindrance in ensuring due process and accountability. In fact, I am reminded of my days of college where the crashing of a hard drive just before submission of papers was not reason enough to ask for an extension. Instead, you had to deal with the consequences. As more and more such cases come to light, it feels like time has come to remove the “dust” from the files and figure out a better system of maintaining records such that the person who claims its loss/destruction is held accountable for it.

Training volunteers for a survey

I am here in a district with two colleagues conducting a PAISA survey of the Mid-Day Meal scheme. The survey is long (28 pages long, to be precise) and we are looking at a number of variables regarding MDM funds, such as when do schools receive their funds, when do they spend it and how much do they spend.

If you thought designing a questionnaire (aka tool in this part of the world) for a survey is the difficult part, then you need to see the effort that goes into training. Volunteers, with usually no background in accounting, have to be taught to read passbooks, stock registers and utilization certificates, no mean feat!

We, being champions of decentralization, accomplished this in a decentralized manner. We first identified Master Trainers (MT’s) in each district. This was a fairly long-drawn out process. The PAISA associate’s (PA’s) contacted people, who had volunteered for earlier similar surveys and through them, identified interested candidates with a minimum qualification of a BA degree. These candidates were then tested on basic mathematical and financial skills, their knowledge of MDM and their ability to conduct trainings. Selected candidates were also required to have bikes (I know this sounds slightly biased, but if you see the long distances the MT’s have to travel, you would allow us this luxury). Based on these criteria, MT’s and backup-MT’s were selected from each district.

In parallel, the PA’s were mobilizing volunteers by talking to various NGO’s, youth organizations, previous PAISA survey volunteers and people who are interested in education. Volunteers also underwent a series of tests on their mathematical abilities and preliminary MDM understanding.

The day the training started, our PA’s and MT’s were on the phone throughout, talking with the chosen volunteers and making sure that they were coming for the training. There’s always that one heart-stopping moment before the training starts, when you are wondering how many volunteers are going to turn up – are there going to be too few? (In which case, one has to figure out whom else to talk to). Or are there going to be too many? (In which case, one has to figure out how to reduce the number to a manageable figure).  In this particular district, we started out with 82 volunteers.

Teaching 82 adults the basics of record-keeping and MDM, in a short 3-day training is not an easy task. In addition, one has to keep in mind the fact that we are from a separate culture, both in terms of the learning environments they are used to, and in normal usage of the word. Add to this, these predominantly backward districts are not the most convenient of training locations – electricity is a huge problem, sound acoustics in large halls are a problem and most importantly, a marriage hall (which is where our training took place) doesn’t conveniently provide you with standard teaching aids such as a blackboard, chalks, markers etc. So unless you have planned for these materials well in advance, it’s going to be difficult to carry out training.

Just to give you an idea of the cultural differences

Gender differences: In our training we found that the women barely raised their voice. Only when they were pointedly asked to speak up, would they speak up, and that too after much hesitation. In addition, when we were assigning schools, the women wanted to be paired only with another man, not with another woman. When I asked them why, they said the men would be able to fill out the questionnaire better (even though they got the same training) and talk to the headmaster better. On the other hand, the men were unwilling to be paired with the women, and whenever we did pair two of them together, they would threaten to back out. So we had to pay attention to the men-women dynamics in the training, and make sure that the women were encouraged to raise their voice.

Individualistic vs collective: In urban learning environments, I have generally seen an emphasis on self-reliance and autonomy, which means that there is more emphasis on rewarding individual effort and competition. In contrast, in smaller-towns, I have seen a greater emphasis on teamwork and cooperation. What this translates into is the fact there is usually a lot of snide snickering when an individual is taking a lot of initiative; and also a lot of faith that collectively you would be able to figure out any problem in the field, you don’t have to individually learn everything.

Emphasis on hierarchy – Most volunteers are used to a learning environment where any kind of questioning seems like questioning the competency of the teacher. In such an environment, teaching volunteers to question head-masters is quite challenging.

Teaching adults comes with another set of challenges. One needs to make sure that the content and teaching methodology is engaging enough to keep adults interested. However, there is only so much variety that can be brought into teaching people about all possible scenarios that can arise during the filling out of a questionnaire. It is a detail-oriented task and sometimes it is necessary to go through all scenarios by brute-force without caring about the bored looks on people’s faces in the class. To relieve the boredom, we use a lot of role-playing. One student plays a headmaster, other students play the role of surveyors. The surveyors ask the headmaster a particular question, and the headmaster then give a convoluted answer (based on possible scenarios from the instruction manual). The surveyors then have to tell the class what they would fill out in the tool. Other students are then asked to provide feedback, comments and recommendations on what could be done better. Role playing is not only limited to questions in the questionnaire, it’s also done to figure out how to talk to difficult headmasters, what to do when the headmaster is not there and so on. In addition, group reading of the instruction manual is undertaken. A person is chosen randomly by the trainer to read a paragraph of the instruction manual. This is followed by discussion. This process is then continued till the end of the manual.

Large-groups come with another set of challenges! And I don’t have to go into details about it. Anybody can imagine how holding the attention of 82 people at one time can be a challenge. In order to overcome that, we had to resort to breaking the larger group into smaller, more manageable groups.

So that was about the training. Once the students went through all the details of the questionnaire, they then piloted the questionnaire under the watchful eye of the trainers. This was then followed by guided reflection on the problems faced during piloting, and ways to solve them.

But every cloud has its silver lining, and every training has that moment when you think that it was worth going through all the trouble. For me, that moment was when people got back from the piloting of the tools. It was a treat to see the look of accomplishment on people’s faces. This was the first time that they realized that it’s not difficult to elicit information from authority. Earlier, they thought that confrontation was only way of getting information, but after the piloting they realized that sometimes plain straightforward questioning also works! It was a treat for another reason as well – we got the questionnaires back with almost no errors and are now looking forward to the results of the survey! Keep watching this space for more information.

Evaluating outcomes in Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas

Headlines that declare: “Navodaya Vidyalayas help the poor”, in addition to those that celebrate the success achieved by Navodaya students in national examinations, such as the UPSC Civil Services Examination, and the IIT Joint Entrance Examination, seem to seal the popular appraisal of the central government’s Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya Scheme as one that is successful. Whereas the average school-wide rate of passing in the school-leaving board examination is 80.64% in schools across the country, it is 90.11% (i) in Navodaya Vidyalayas. What is touted as the greatest success of Navodaya schools, however, is the fact that they facilitate the above-mentioned success “to serve the objective of excellence coupled with (those of) equity and social justice”, by affording the acquisition of quality education to rural students (with a focus on girl children, and students belonging to Scheduled Castes and Tribes), who may have otherwise been unable to partake in it. This blog argues that the current method for the evaluation of Navodaya Vidyalayas, which sheds positive light on their functioning and educational provision, is not comprehensive in terms of its analysis.

Founded via the National Policy on Education 1986, Navodaya Vidyalayas are fully residential schools, established in each of 595 districts of India with the aim of “[identifying] and [developing] (the faculties of) talented, bright, and gifted children, predominantly from rural areas, who are denied good educational opportunities.” As of 2007, they had 1,80,391 students on their rolls (ii) (0.005% of an estimated total 40 million in secondary schools over the country), and received 41% of the total central government outlay on secondary education (as of 2003) (iii).This is indicative of the importance attached to these Vidyalayas, and of the high infrastructural (and educational) standards to which they are held. For example, each Navodaya Vidyalaya is required to:

  • Maintain a campus that is at least 30 acres in area (iv) and is constructed at a cost of Rs. 2.3 crore;
  • Possess hostel facilities (for 250 boys and girls), a fully stocked library, computer lab, and playing field;
  • Facilitate (among students) the development of a reasonable level of competence in 3 languages—English, Hindi, and a regional language—as envisaged under the “3 language formula” (v)

In comparison, the quintessential Indian secondary school is devoid of any ICT training (over 85% of rural secondary schools do not even have a computer on their premises(vi)), and is plagued by rampant teacher absenteeism(vii) It is also unable to ensure the acquisition of reading skills (in one language), at a 2nd grade level, in over 27% of 7th grade, and over 20% of 8th grade student(viii) .Thus, a Navodaya Vidyalaya can be considered as being relatively rich in its means, and ambitious in its outcomes.

Hence, were these Vidyalayas to be evaluated for their performance in terms of a scale, which utilizes resource-provision, and performance in examinations, as its sole gauges—as is often done in monitoring and evaluation activities conducted under the purview of educational schemes in India (e.g. in the 15th and 184th report of the HRD to the Rajya Sabha)—(then,) these schools could be considered as triumphant examples of effective educational delivery. However, prior to reaching a decisive conclusion in favour of Navodaya Vidyalayas, it is imperative to refer back to the original objective of the scheme(ix) and to determine whether a solely input and exam-driven approach for its evaluation is able to exhaustively assess its success/failure.

As I see it, the intended objectives of Navodaya schools are twofold: the first, to do with the identification of the “deserving” rural population, and the second, to do with the provision of quality education (to those identified). The above-mentioned approach for evaluating the Navodaya scheme fails in engaging with these intended objectives in two easily discernible ways: 1. By discounting from its purview the process used for determining admission into a Navodaya Vidyalaya and; 2. By assessing the quality of education as a function of the inputs that are injected into schools, and of the marks yielded at the close of such education, rather than of the processes involved in its administration.

In this blog, I am not hoping to offer an evaluation of the Navodaya Vidyalaya scheme, but merely to propose an expansion of the criteria used in any such evaluation, in order to make it more inclusive and reflective of reality. In determining the constituents of such criteria, I adopt the idea that forms the basis of Yamini Iyer’s blog (x) (entitled“Breaking out of the Input Trap”), which challenges the notion that guideline-driven expenditures (including those on infrastructure) are the be-all and end-all of educational delivery.

Identification of rural students:

  1. The Navodaya Admission test: The admission test is designed without any verbal components, in order to be equitable, and offer a fair chance of admission to any student who appears in it. However, it has been contended that the mental ability, arithmetic, and language sections of this test render it as being akin to one testing IQ, biased towards those students who attend elite rural schools (xi). Any evaluation of the Navodaya scheme is incomplete without a parallel evaluation of these claims, as the design of the admission test, were it to be in tandem with the notions of social justice that inform the Navodaya scheme, would be based in an ideology of neutrality (and not one of bias.)
  2. Other admission criteria (age): The UNESCO estimates that the gross enrollment ratio in primary schools in India is 106%, and the net enrollment ratio is 88% (xii). The gap between the two is representative of the sector of the population that is attending a primary institution despite not belonging to the “official primary school-going age” (6 -12 yrs). Given that any student who is admitted to a Navodaya Vidyalaya is required to be between the ages of 9 and 13 years, those who experience a break in their education are ineligible for admission. If an evaluation of the inclusivity of the scheme is to be made, it is important to consider the desired nature of such inclusivity and whether the current admission criteria (based on age) fulfills it.

Quality of education:

  1. How much do the students learn—in the library/computer lab/on the field? Learning outcomes are usually hard to measure, particularly because they are hard to quantify. That being said, the Annual Survey of Education Report (2011) makes a beginning at attempting to measure these outcomes, by checking for rural children’s level of language acquisition/their ability to perform arithmetic problems, etc. Given that different reports have periodically made a mention of the fact that the “3 language formula” associated with NVs is largely targeted towards the acquisition of writing skills, and does not aid the development of proficiency in spoken/understood language (xiii) it will be useful to employ strategies parallel to those employed in ASER to determine the actual state of learning in these schools. This would involve an assessment of exam scores, coupled with surveys of reading/speaking skills (and more.)
  2. Involvement of local stakeholders in the process of decision-making: It has been found that the decentralization of school administration, and the greater involvement of parents, can help control teacher absenteeism(xiv) and improve learning outcomes (such as language acquisition). Moreover, local communities are better able to perceive (and act on) the needs of a school, and have the most to gain from its proper functioning (xv). The Charter of the Navodaya Vidyalaya recognizes the importance of the involvement of local communities in the improvement of educational services/quality, and requires that parents and community members be a part of the Navodaya Vidyalaya Management Committees, constituted at a district level to oversee the functioning of a school. An evaluation of the nature/extent of parent/community involvement would give an indirect indication of the quality of services and education associated with a Navodaya Vidyalaya. Additionally, collaboration with these committees could also aid the overall evaluation of a Navodaya Vidyalaya with respect to the above-mentioned factors.
  3. Teachers: The National Policy on Education, as well as the Indian Education Commission, has identified the teacher as amongst the most significant contributors to the quality of education. The monitoring of teacher training activities conducted under the Navodaya Vidyalaya scheme, should, thus form an important element of evaluation of the quality of education.

An extension: Do Navodaya Vidyalayas serve as a seat for empowerment?

The Navodaya Vidyalaya scheme is overt in its pursuit of the objectives of social justice (in addition to those of excellence). Implicit in the philosophy behind these Vidyalayas is the desire to support the empowerment of the students—who form the core of their beneficiaries. A class I recently took, in the context of women’s empowerment, revealed to me that empowerment comes with (and could potentially be defined by) the ability to critically reflect on one’s own life and to express discontent with the state of things, prior to forging a mechanism to change them. While delving deeper into the issue of empowerment would make for a blog post of its own, it is useful to mention that an evaluation of whether Navodaya Vidyalayas provide the requisite environment would entail a comprehensive qualitative assessment centered on students(xvi).

Conclusion:

An expansion of the criteria on which to base the evaluation of NVs, to include the above-mentioned (and any additional) components, will enable the analysis of the functioning of the scheme on which to base one’s judgment of its effectiveness in achieving intended objectives. Such an evaluation would help inform not only the scheme itself, but also the broader spectrum of secondary schools in India. Since the Navodaya Vidyalayas are also hubs for “improving quality of education through sharing of experience”, conducting the evaluation would, in itself, be a fulfillment of one of its intended goals.

Decentralised Education Delivery- Do GPs holds lessons for SMCs? Part 1

A theme that has been emerging on this blog in the past month has been the curious case of the School Management Committees (SMCs) – the last but crucial leg of the quality education marathon. Laina Emmanuel and Yamini Aiyar(1) have discussed both problems and solutions to the problems that the SMCs face, namely those of understanding responsibilities and roles, and of implementing plans. Here, we can see two types of issues- one is empowering the SMCs, and Yamini Aiyar suggests a few interventions to aid capacity building. Additionally, the other problem relates to increasing the accountability of these SMCs towards the community and the children, and to incentivising their proper functioning. If we want a truly decentralised system, as the RTE mandate suggests(2), we require decentralized accountability as well as better incentives which would push SMCs to perform better. The decentralised accountability would be in addition to the centralized monitoring (say, through real-time management information systems, as Yamini Aiyar suggests), and would involve the communities keeping SMCs in check. This would create a more holistic form of accountability with pressures from both top and bottom. Along with accountability, incentivising better SMC functioning would be also critical.

Some interesting solutions to SMC functioning problemswere suggested by a World Bank paper, which was shared last week(3). This paper detailed a set of experiments that were carried out in Indonesia regarding forms of community participation in School Committees (the equivalent of SMCs), and its impact on quality education. The researchers conducted two unique interventions. Firstly, they tried to increase the legitimacy of school committee members by conducting elections for these posts. Secondly, a planning process, which linked the school committee members and democratically elected village council members, was promoted. These two measures were found to be positively related to learning levels, compared to other common forms of engagement, like grants and training. These measures sought to form a bridge between the community and the school committee. Perhaps such interventions hold some answers for us as they have made the SMCs stronger and improved their functioning.

The challenge of empowering SMCs, mirrored the challenges in empowering Gram Panchayats, a crucial last step in another decentralised chain. Gram Panchayats were given constitutional status in 1992 with the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act. Following this, the eleventh schedule of the Constitution listed 29 subjects appropriate for devolution to Panchayats, and directed all states to develop their own Panchayat legislations that decentralise planning and devolve powers to these local self governments.

The 3Fs (Functions, Finances, Functionaries) of decentralisation are extremely important in the Panchayat devolution process. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj uses a devolution index to rank and reward states in terms of how well they have devolved powers to the Panchayats(4) . The overall averages show that financial devolution lags far behind functional devolution.

Let me explain financial devolution in more detail

According to the Act, finances could be made available to Panchayats in the following ways-

  1. Assigned and devolved revenues are accessible to them through the state government.
  1. The assigned revenues are those that are directly due to them from the State Government through tax collection carried out by the State Government.
  2. Devolved revenues are direct grants by the state, based on State Finance Commission’s (SFC) recommendations.
  1. Scheme based funds (like those for the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme)
  2. Other funds can also be generated through tax and fees collection from the villages. These Own Source Revenues (OSR) can then be utilised in any form by the Panchayats, based on their given functions.

So the devolution index shows that while the roles of Panchayats have been defined well, the independence in receipts and expenditure is not as strong. The Panchayats still receive mostly tied grants from the centre and the state (tied grants are those grants which have a preset purpose and the Panchayats do not have the power to use them independently). This is similar to the case of SMCs, where usage of less than 10% of the funds is decided by the SMCs. Similarities between SMCs and Gram Panchayats made me wonder if there might be some lessons for SMCs from Gram Panchayats.

Published earlier this year, a paper(5) discusses the financial devolution to Panchayats in Tamil Nadu (specifically in 3 districts). The paper finds that these taxes, for OSR, are not seriously imposed by the Panchayats. Flat rates for house tax have been followed, irrespective of size (despite the fact that the act recommends plinth area and house type be used), and these rates have remained constant over a period of time. Even the collections do not seem to be efficient (lack of man power and operational difficulties hamper the process reduce the total possible collection),and under-collection is quite common.

As the funding of the Panchayats is not contingent on performance, they do not have enough incentive to focus on local infrastructure and services. They receive their devolved funds irrespective of the quality of services provided. The authors argue that accountability is compromised as the Panchayats look to the Sate and Centre for funds and neglect local residents needs. Thus, a perverse incentive structure is formed, where the community suffers due to lack of development and the Panchayat is incentivised to continue along this path. The authors also find that the tied funds tend to be spent more than the untied ones (a finding that AI’s paper on Gram Panchayat fund usage corroborates(6)). The local officials know that they will be better served spending the scheme based funds from higher-ups, as this usage ensures a constant supply of money for them. If they do decide to tax the locals more, they run the risk of a political backlash. So, they choose to use the tied funds more. Further, the local residents, also, prefer this structure to more taxes and fees.

We see that there is less accountability for Gram Panchayats as the community does not contribute much directly through taxes or fees, so they are less concerned with their operation. Hence, development work which is not directly tied to orders from higher bodies is neglected and this is reflected in the status of basic infrastructure. The authors suggest two reforms which might help in overcoming the problem;

Firstly, they acknowledge the need for positive incentive for improved performance and suggest a form of ranking of Panchayats to generate competition amongst them. The rankings would then be disseminated amongst the community so that a village can judge how well their Panchayat is performing in comparison to others; this would increase accountability and bring in greater transparency.

Secondly, the SFC can suggest tax bands which the Panchayats must use; this would ensure at least a minimum supply of funds for the Panchayats.

There are largely tied funds which flow down to the SMC, even with these funds, the accountability is mainly about whether they are being spent or not and rarely about how well they are being used. To gauge how well they are being used and to create a system where negligence is overcome, the community needs to be more active and the school committee needs to have more legitimacy. If we look at some of the solutions suggested for Gram Panchayats – a ranking of the SMCs and their performance (possibly prepared by State rural development departments and research institutes), followed by dissemination of this information, through NGOs, might bring about greater accountability. The community would be able to see where their SMC is falling short in comparison to other SMCs and demand a certain level of functioning. Along with this, some monetary incentives for better performing SMCs would serve to foster competition for improved performance.

Another way could possibly be to give the community a larger stake in this process (say through cash contributions or contributions in kind, similar to OSRs but on a smaller scale). They already participate in terms of monitoring and in some cases, they also contribute in kind and cash, although such contributions are not compulsory.

So the question is – would communities which have such a stake in the process be more inclined to hold SMCs accountable, with regard to delivering better quality education, thereby improving SMC performance? We would need to corroborate such a theory with data on whether community contributions improve the functioning of SMCs. In fact, we have collected data on community contributions in our PAISA survey. It would be interesting to see if there exists a correlation between these contributions and functioning of SMCs. The only variable which can currently be used (from the PAISA survey) to assess the functioning of SMCs is how regularly they meet. This variable will not give us a full picture of how well an SMC functions, but it would be an interesting starting point to test out this theory. A correlation between these variables would provide us with an initial indication of how strong this relation is (if, at all, there exists one). We can also study what would be a better dataset to analyse such a theory. This is what I intend to explore in part 2.

Assessing Status of Schools through Composite Indices

If you have been tracking our work as we have been tracking development funds of the Indian government, you would have realized that it has been just about a year since we embarked on our ambitious survey to track fund flows in elementary education. Our district studies were based on a first crack at the data we collected through the school survey and from government budget documents.

In the last few weeks, some of us have been trying to delve deeper into our data to see if we can find any patterns in fund flow and school characteristics across our 9 PAISA districts. While Ambrish has been trying to figure out whether fund flows to schools can be explained by school-level characteristics (e.g. other things remaining constant, would a school with high enrolment be more likely to receive a grant, does the distance of the school from the block resource centre or the cluster resource centre matter etc.), I have been trying to compare the “status” of schools in our 9 districts.

How do we go about evaluating this “status”? What does it even mean? Should we look at how schools function – do teachers come to schools, do students come to school; or examine infrastructure facilities in a school – whether there is a usable hand pump or toilet? Or we could try and see if a school receives the grants it is entitled to. Perhaps, we could look at learning levels of children in a school or the school’s examination results? Or do we look at parent involvement in the school. My personal feeling is that we should look at all of these, and more. However, the tragedy is that we haven’t collected data on everything that we would possibly want to evaluate schools on. So we compromise and make do with what we have.

A limited, but good way to assess the status of schools across districts is through the creation of an index. The last two decades have seen widespread usage of indices to put a number on things as diverse as health, wealth and happiness, to name a few. So we created different indices to compare infrastructure, finances, student and teacher attendance, and teacher training across districts.

Instead of dwelling on the process of creating the indices, let me skip to the results. A word of warning though – most variables, especially those related to infrastructure are dichotomous (where 0 indicates the absence of a facility and 1, presence) or have been scaled to lie between 0 and 1 (the closer to 1, the better). Another thing to keep in mind is that different indices use different methods, so it would be unwise to compare district scores across different indices. Keep in mind the ranking of districts though.

Let us tee off with infrastructure then. The components of the school infrastructure index were:

  1. Usable toilets for students
  2. Usable drinking water facility
  3. Complete boundary wall
  4. Playground
  5. Library room
  6. % classrooms that can be used for teaching

This index is relatively easy to interpret. If we find a school that has a complete boundary wall, a room for a library, a playground, a usable hand pump or tap, a usable boys’, girls’ and common toilet and where all the existing classrooms can be used for teaching, then that school gets a score of 1. We average the scores of all the schools in the district to get the district score.

Rank District School Infrastructure Index
1 Satara 0.52
2 Kangra 0.50
3 Jaipur 0.48
4 Udaipur 0.46
5 Nalanda 0.45
6 Medak 0.45
7 Purnea 0.44
8 Jalpaiguri 0.37
9 Sagar 0.37

 

Satara (in Maharashtra) tops the list, followed by Kangra (HP), Jaipur and Udaipur (both in Rajasthan). However, even the best performer scores just over 50%. Clearly, infrastructure is a major concern for all our districts.

Next, let us consider teacher and student attendance. Each school was assigned a number (or score) that was a simple average of the proportion of teachers and students present in the school on the day of the survey. As in the previous index, individual school scores in a district have been averaged to arrive at the district score.

Rank District Student and teacher attendance
1 Satara 0.92
2 Udaipur 0.86
3 Kangra 0.84
4 Medak 0.82
5 Sagar 0.75
6 Purnea 0.67
7 Jalpaiguri 0.66
8 Nalanda 0.64
9 Jaipur 0.52

Satara tops this list as well with a phenomenal score of 0.92, with Udaipur some distance behind with 0.86. The other district in Rajasthan, Jaipur, surprisingly is at the bottom. But it is worth pointing out that our Jaipur survey took place in May 2011, which coincided with the marriage season there. As a result, we would have been as likely to find teachers and students in shaadi halls, pandals and shamiyanas as in schools. I know where I would have wanted to be!

Finally, getting down to what we think do best– tracking fund flows. As you would know, there are 3 annual grants that each school (or teacher) is supposed to get – the school maintenance grant for minor repairs and upkeep, school development grant for day-to-day functioning and the teaching learning materials grant to buy and make teaching aids. Thus, the School Grant Receipt index is based on how many of these grants a school received in 2010-11.

Rank District Annual School Grant Receipt Index
1 Kangra 0.95
2 Satara 0.92
3 Medak 0.86
4 Nalanda 0.84
5 Sagar 0.84
6 Udaipur 0.80
7 Jaipur 0.78
8 Jalpaiguri 0.47
9 Purnea 0.40

Here, Kangra is at the top with a score of 0.95.

Satara also does well with 0.92. Both do much better than the next district, Medak, that scores 0.86. Within-state variations are also interesting – Udaipur and Jaipur in Rajasthan are not too far apart with scores of 0.80 and 0.78. However, Nalanda and Purnea in Bihar are far apart – while Nalanda does relatively well with 0.84, Purnea is at the bottom with 0.40.

What do these rankings show us? If we compare across indices, Kangra and Satara are in the top 3 in each index and Purnea and Jalpaiguri are at or near the bottom. Clearly, districts that are doing well in one dimension are also doing well in others. A preliminary thought is that this is a good portent – once a district “gets its act together” in one aspect, it is also likely to do well in others. However, if we think about this for a little longer, we realize that harnessing complementarities is hard. Since these facets (captured through indices) are not independent, it is likely that districts at the bottom of the ladder will have to address them comprehensively to truly emerge