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PART I – Engaging with PAISA 2015

On a relatively warm day with the sun surprisingly making its presence felt considering the last month of the year was upon us, I landed at the Bhopal Junction with a backpack,  my laptop and a book which had given me company during last night train’s journey from New Delhi. As I waited for my cab driver to arrive, I realised that the coming week would be an experience I was excitedly looking forward to ever since I joined Accountability Initiative (AI) 4 months back.

As part of its PAISA project, AI conducts extensive Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) concentrating on understanding governance and fund flows in key social sector schemes. The overarching goal of this project is to use this social accountability tool to assess the manner, quantity and timing of releases of funds from the highest levels of the government to the frontline public service providers and beneficiaries. In the past, large scale PAISA surveys were concentrated on tracking fund flows in the flagship programme -Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). However, this year the project encompassed 3 schemes within its ambit- Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and Swachh Bharat Abhiyan- Gramin (SBM-G). Geographically, the survey covered 300 villages in 10 districts spread across 5 states.

The sheer scale of the survey necessitated that both the Delhi team and field associates work together much in advance to prepare for the survey’s implementation. Thus, in the run up to the PAISA 2015 survey, the team was involved in varied activities ranging from preparing the questionnaire tools to selecting the sample villages to running extensive pilot surveys to test the tools. As a new member of the AI team and my first professional experience, I had much to learn. I dived into the deep end of the pool of work only to find support and guidance at every end. The decision to conduct the survey using tablets instead of the traditional paper based questionnaires meant that we were treading unchartered territories which brought along its own share of challenges and opportunities; PAISA 2015 was indeed going to be a new experience for the entire team at AI.

The survey was scheduled to be conducted simultaneously in all 5 states which was to be preceded by a 5 day volunteer training session in each of the states. The PAISA surveys see the participation of volunteers recruited from the states who are then given the context of the survey through foundational knowledge of public finance and trained on the nuances of conducting a survey. These training sessions also involved mock field visits to acclimatise the volunteers to the on-ground survey experience as well as the opportunity to try their hands with tablet enabled questionnaires.

Read Part 2 – Field Experience: Not Just About Data to learn more about the PAISA experience.

Priyanka Roychoudhury is a Research Associate at Accountability Initiative. She works primarily with tracking fund-flows of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) on education, health and sanitation.

Reforms in the Education Bureaucracy

The issue of quality in education has caught the attention of the nation like never before. Politicians and lay persons alike are raising questions around classroom transactions, learning levels of students and learning outcomes. In his most recent national address, the Prime Minister also emphasised the importance of shifting the governments’ attention from schooling to learning.[1] But while the policy level rhetoric seems to be pointing in the right direction, translating words into actions is an altogether different ball game.   

Our research in unpacking the functioning of the education bureaucracy has taught us some big lessons about the way the “education system” works.[2] If improving learning outcomes is a key objective of the Education Department, then the following factors should be viewed as obstacles on the path of creating an optimum institutional environment to achieve this goal.     

Obstacles

  • “Status quo-ism”: Looking at the education bureaucracy we learnt that the work culture is geared towards maintaining the status quo, no matter how dysfunctional or detrimental the status quo may be. Priority is given to keeping files and formats in order and rule compliance over substantive matters like assessing and improving teachers’ teaching abilities. Moreover, there is negligible reflection on the wealth of data being collected around learning outcomes.
  • Degrees over aptitude: Professional degrees rather than the lived experience of individuals appear to carry more weight in the system. This is reflected in the recruitment processes that sort candidates primarily on the basis of their educational qualifications rather than aptitude or problem solving skills in their field of work.
  • Approach towards capacity building: No one is more sensitive to the issues of capacity and unresponsiveness in the bureaucracy than the administrators themselves. Thus calls for capacity building and increased monitoring are frequently made by officials posted at different levels (note that the calls for capacity building and increased monitoring are almost always directed towards subordinates). These are stock responses of the administration. Moreover, when it comes to implementing the training sessions and conducting monitoring, it is not uncommon to see administrators work the same way they perform paperwork i.e. mechanically. The objective of a training session is to improve the functional capacity of those partaking in it. But this gets diluted in the system wherein people are held accountable for the minimum criteria of making sure a training session is conducted rather than the quality of the session or following up with participants. Monitoring is also equated primarily with the idea that an external person’s presence would create fear in the worker leading to better performance.

One could interpret the approach of monitoring, capacity building, and the mechanical prioritisation of degrees as symptoms of the “status quo-ist” nature of the education bureaucracy. To continue this story, my next blog will discuss some of the lessons learnt from our observations and interactions with bureaucrats themselves which carry the seeds of solutions that could break this detrimental equilibrium.  

A good starting point is to learn from the bureaucracy itself. Outliers are not as rare as we might think. Occasionally we come across teachers and administrators at different levels who are managing to do their job in both letter and spirit in this very environment. How are they able to do what they do in a system that seems to resist breaks in the status quo? 

  • Aligning goals and expectations: By studying the implementation process of a Bihar based government programme[3], we learnt that organisational culture plays an important role, if not more, than the design of a programme. The programme in question was aimed towards improving learning outcomes, and for a short span of time, the same people who seemed to resist change were able to gear up and deliver positive results. What happened in this case? We learnt that results are achieved when goals, actions and performance expectations of all education officials are aligned. During the programme’s active phase, improving learning outcomes was stated as the number one priority of the education administration.  
  • Leadership matters: The nature of the leadership embodied by relevant stakeholders must be “transformational” rather than “transactional.” During the programme’s active phase, leaders i.e senior officials led by example, inspired workers to look beyond their own self-interest, promoted cooperation, and allowed and enabled workers to be innovative. This was a departure from the status quo where leaders promoted rule compliance and prioritised paperwork over other factors. 
  • Involving more stakeholders in problem identification and resolution: We  learnt that including frontline education officials (who have to implement the programme) in the process of identifying and articulating problems as well as looking for solutions to the problems does wonders in creating a greater feeling of ownership and directly impacts the skills of everyone in the process.

Keeping the system going versus keeping the system growing

These lessons emerged from our study of a programme that was being implemented in “mission mode.” In the government, a programme being implemented in mission mode simply means that extra resources including human attention are diverted to achieve time-bound goals. When the pace of functioning and attention given to one programme inevitably goes down, initial gains may retract. This happens when less or no thought is put in to figure out ways to sustain the momentum, at least on few ends, once the initial flurry of activities subsides.

One way to keep the momentum going is to identify and articulate one or few clear problems, and give the authorisation to relevant people to experiment with different solutions. If capacity is an issue then capacity building could also be done in a more targeted way as a result of this approach. In other words, the implementers could get trained on the skills needed to apply the solution they have come up with (a common grouse of officials is that trainings are usually quite generic. This would address that issue). Enough time and space should be given to those involved in the problem solving to learn through hit and trial, with adequate support provided by trained resource persons, such that growth is incremental. The ‘monitors’ of those who are involved in the experiments should be empowered to give the implementers space and be tolerant of failures in the areas where they are learning.

Adopting this approach would also result in a fundamental shift in the way people perceive the system – from one that is geared towards upholding the status quo to one that takes stock of what it already knows and builds on it such that the system is geared towards growth.    

 

[1] PM’s national address dated 24th April 2016. http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Government-Should-Focus-on-Quality-Education-Modi/2016/04/24/article3397716.ece

[2] In this blog I have primarily referred to the broad lessons learnt through our analysis of Mission Gunvatta – a Bihar based programme aimed at improving teaching learning outcomes. The full working paper can be accessed here: http://accountabilityindia.in/understanddownload/1245

[3]In this blog I have primarily referred to the broad lessons learnt through our analysis of Mission Gunvatta – a Bihar based programme aimed at improving teaching learning outcomes. The full working paper can be accessed here: http://accountabilityindia.in/understanddownload/1245

Deconstructing A New Era in Fiscal Devolution in India

The Accountability Initiative (AI) at CPR has conducted extensive research on fiscal devolution in two separate studies—one that focuses on the effects of the Fourteenth Finance Commission recommendations on state finances, with a particular focus on effects on social sector investments. And a second study that focuses on understanding the fiscal devolution to rural local governments through a case study of fund flows to Gram Panchayats in one district in Karnataka.

Findings from the studies will be shared at a seminar on 3rd June with several stakeholders, including from the government of India. In the run-up, Yamini Aiyar, Avani Kapur, and Padmapriya Janakiraman from AI share their insights (below) on the importance and relevance of these studies, providing a glimpse into critical findings.

Is fiscal devolution a brave new move by the current government?

Yamini: As you know fiscal devolution means devolution of power and responsibilities from national government to sub-national governments. Constitutionally, the government is mandated to set up a Finance Commission (FC) every five years to determine the share of financial resources between the union and the state governments.

In 2013, the government constituted the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FFC). The FFC recommendations, accepted by the Government of India in February 2015, are an attempt to re-align the constitutionally mandated responsibilities of state governments’ with adequate financial resources. To do this, the FFC recommended enhancing tax devolution (of the pool of resources shared between the centre and the states) to state governments from 32 per cent (Thirteenth Finance Commission) to 42 per cent from the years running 2015 through 2020.

There is a long standing precedent that the government of the day whole-heartedly accepts the recommendations of the Finance Commission. However, it must be said that there was a dissenting note that suggested a slower approach for devolution in the FFC report submitted in February, 2015, but the government chose to overlook that.

So while in its implementation the fiscal devolution being undertaken by the current government is new, it is to be noted that this was not a move made by the government, but was recommended by the FFC.

Can you tell us more about the research undertaken by the Accountability Initiative (AI) on fiscal devolution?

Yamini: In 2015 after accepting the recommendations of the FFC, the Government of India presented its budget. In its budget presentation, in order to create the fiscal space to enhance tax devolution to state governments, it significantly cut down funds provided to states through Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS).

Let me explain how this works—there are different modes through which money is transferred from the Government of India to the states: i) taxes (determined by FC); ii) grants and aid (determined by FC); iii) central assistance to states (determined by the erstwhile Planning Commission, and now coordinated by the line ministries). Central assistance is essentially money tied to priorities identified by the centre, with mechanisms for implementation also largely identified by the centre. Over time, these became a critical source of financing social policy in India.

So what the government has done in the budget is to reduce the funds provided through central assistance (primarily CSS) to enhance tax devolution. While the cuts makes sense constitutionally, since the constitutional responsibility to provide services funded through CSS lies with the states, in practice over the last decade, a large number of these functions were re-appropriated by the centre. So in cutting back the CSS, the centre, in theory, gave the states the choice to prioritise funds the way they would like to in line with their constitutionally aligned responsibilities.

Yet, the move raised an important question. Key social sector services in India, are in many ways, a national responsibility, includingeducation, health, social protection etc.  And it is the Government of India, which has signed up to the global Sustainable Development Goals to ensure these are nationally realised. So the question raised was how does one ensure that these national priorities are fulfilled if the centre is not financing these key activities (through CSS)? In addition, many state governments too began worrying if the cuts in the CSS would have a significant impact on the fiscal space available to them to invest in the social sector programmes? 

In order to answer these questions, we decided to examine state budgets so as to understand what is actually happening at the state level. It is important to say that given the vagaries of how budgeting takes place in India, the true picture of the investment pattern in this changed scenario will only come to light a few years down the line, because the Government of India and the state governments report on actual expenditure at a two-year lag . Moreover, it is important to take a long term view on such foundational changes to the country’s fiscal architecture.

Therefore the results of our study must be seen as indicative rather than definitive, and it is also important to note that the process of transition will always have teething problems. In that sense the findings are a sign of how states are beginning to adjust to the changed devolution. They also provide us a benchmark with which to track state expenditure over the remaining period of the FFC implementation, so that we have evidence with which to debate the effects of devolution four years from now.

Can you share key findings from the examination of these state budgets in light of the questions raised?

Avani: We studied state budgets from 19 states, and interestingly, despite initial reservations, here is what we found:

  • All 19 states saw an increase in funds transfer, which means that the cuts in CSS were offset by the increase in tax devolution.
  • Further, even as the centre cut back on funds through the CSS, throughout the year, the Government of India passed a number of supplementary budgets. Consequently, in effect there was no significant reduction in the amount of funds traditionally transferred through CSS; in fact most states saw an increase compared with the previous financial year.
  • At the all India level, union government transfers to states saw an increase of less than 1% of GDP between 2014-15, and the 2015-16 revised estimates. When we studied it state-wise, all states received at least 20 percent more from the union.
  • Importantly, we have not seen any drop in expenditure on social sector schemes in these states.

You also conducted a study on fiscal devolution to local governments, especially Panchayats. Can you tell us more about this?

Yamini: The devolution story in India began with the path-breaking 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments (in 1992), when the Parliament committed India to devolving significant powers and responsibilities to a third tier of the elected local government. Over the years, anyone who is familiar with the evolution of the local government system in India will be aware of the fact that the actual devolution of key powers and resources, commonly referred to as the funds, functions, and functionaries, has been limited at best, leaving Panchayats and local municipalities with very little authority and financial resources to fulfill their constitutional mandate.

Despite this, there is very little empirical data that can actually tell us what is happening at the Panchayat level as well as at the local municipality level. More importantly, the key stakeholders (the elected representatives) themselves have very little idea of what powers and resources should be devolved to them, and what actually does get devolved to them.

To address this problem, we began in 2014 a micro-level analysis of trends in fiscal decentralisation to rural local governments (Panchayats) in the state of Karnataka.

Can you share key findings of this micro-level analysis in Karnataka?

Padmapriya: Through a detailed exploration of the Karnataka state budget and an expenditure tracking exercise that focuses on 30 Gram Panchayats (GP) in Mulbagal Taluka, Kolar district, this study tracks trends in fiscal decentralisation in the state, and attempts to identify the specific quantum of monies spent in the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayats contrasted with the money that Gram Panchayats actually receive.  Here is what we found:

  • A significant proportion of money that should be devolved to Panchayats is in fact appropriated by the state government. To explain this further—the total budgetary allocation for Karnataka in the Financial Year (FY) 2014-15 was Rs 1, 50,379 crore (Budgeted Estimates). Based on an analysis of functions devolved to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), as mandated by the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act 1993, our study estimates that approximately 33% of the total budget ought to have been devolved to PRIs. However, in actual fact, the state budgeted an allocation of only 17% of its total budget for expenditure by PRIs.
  • Consequently, Gram Panchayats are accountable for a miniscule proportion of the total monies spent in their political constituencies. Our survey found that the average expenditure (including all administrative and Panchayat activity) within a single GP in Mulbagal in FY 2014-15 was approximately Rs 6 crore. However, only 3% or Rs. 20 lakh of this amount was spent directly by a GP.
  • Worse, GPs are unaware of the nature and extent of funds spent in their own jurisdiction. This makes it impossible for GPs to track and hold authorities accountable for such expenditure.
  • Finally, even money that GPs are expected to receive directly from the centre into their accounts are being slowly re-appropriated by the state.

​You then took the findings of this case study in Karnataka back to various stakeholders. Can you share their responses to it?

Padmapriya: We shared the findings with: i) policy makers at the state government level, ii) Gram Panchayat Unions in Karnataka; iii) the Ministry of Panchayati Raj at the centre. At all levels, the response was very encouraging:

  • At the state level, the planning department, finance department, and the treasury have responded proactively by taking some of our recommendations on board, including tracing all the expenditure at the location where it occurs, which will help in aggregating data to a GP.
  • The Gram Panchayat Unions had never been given information of this nature. About 16 Gram Panchayats from North Karnataka have now come forward to do a research of this kind thus enabling them to track expenditures in their jurisdictions.
  • The Ministry of Panchayati Raj was very receptive as well, and we are in conversation with them to explore if such a study can be replicated in other states.

On Backwardness and Special Status – part 2

My previous blog outlined the manner in which funds are transferred from Government of India (GOI) to states and the need for a fresh approach in transferring funds in the context of changing centre-state relations. In May 2013, GOI had set up a six-member Committee headed by Raghuram Rajan (now RBI Governor) to develop a measure of development or (under) development. The Committee released a Composite Development Index in September 2013. This blog presents a summary of the index by laying out the objectives, methodology and finally the resultant shares of fiscal transfers from GOI to respective states.

Objective

There are two main objectives of the index. First is to propose a general method for allocating funds from GOI to the states based on both a state’s development “need” as well as its performance. Second, by categorizing states into relative degrees of (under) development- “least developed,” “less developed” and “relatively developed”- the index provides a benchmark by which GOI could consider offering additional forms of financial assistance to states that are particularly underdeveloped.

Methodology

As mentioned above, the index is a combination of a number of indicators representing a state’s “need,” based on geographical, income and human development indicators as well as its performance. While a state’s need was given a 75 percent weight, performance constituted 25 percent. The step by step methodology is given below:-

Step 1: Determining a State’s “Need”

The index measures need through a composite index of 10 indicators each assigned an equal weight. These were: (i) monthly per capita consumption expenditure, (ii) education, (iii) health, (iv) household amenities, (v) poverty rate, (vi) female literacy, (vii) percent of SC-ST population, (viii) urbanization rate, (viii) financial inclusion, and (x) connectivity.

Each state is assigned points based on their relative need, such that less developed states would rank higher on the index, and thereby get a larger share of allocations. Further, in order to ensure those particularly in need get a disproportionately higher share of resources, the underdevelopment scores are “squared” (see formula below).

Step 2: Accounting for State Size

In order to allocate more to underdeveloped states with large areas but small populations, weights were assigned to a state’s share in population (80 percent weightage) as well as its share in area (20 percent weightage).

The formula for need is thus given as/by:

(0.8* state’s population share + 0.2 * state’s area share)* [(under)development index for the state]2 

Step 3: Accounting for Performance

The committee recognized that need alone is an incomplete measure. A state’s ability to absorb and spend funds is affected by its administrative capacity. In a poorly governed state, additional resources may not reach a majority of the population nor have the desired impact. Further, if underdevelopment ensures a greater share of resources, looking at need alone could create a perverse incentive for states to not develop,. The index thus added a component of performance measured as the improvement in a states development index over time (i.e. a fall in underdevelopment).

The formula for performance is thus:

points to the state based on need * change in (under)development index for the state * performance weighing parameter

Step 4: Identifying the Constant – or the Basic Minimum

Finally, recognizing that all states require a basic minimum to meet fixed expenditures such as administrative costs, the committee assigned a fixed basic allocation for all states. Given that there are 28 states included in the index – the committee determined 8.4% (or 0.3%*28) as the fixed allocation.

The formula thus is: –

% share of a state to the total GOI allocation = 0.3% (i.e., the fixed allocation) + % share of a state based on need + % share of a state based on performance.

Comparison with other methodologies

The index has a number of interesting innovations when compared with previous methodologies.

First is the use of monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) as opposed to a state’s per capita income. The rationale for using MPCE data was that the value of the underdevelopment index for a state should represent the need of an average individual in the state which may or may not be related to the state’s per capita income. For instance, the presence of a large number of registered offices of corporations in a state like Maharashtra or Karnataka, may increase the states’ per capita income but average household consumption may still be low. While the use of MPCE was debated within the committee,[1] it is an interesting attempt to measure the income actually available for an individual household.

Second, while the focus on performance is not new (the Gadgil formula includes components of a state’s fiscal performance), the index gives a higher weightage to performance than some of the previous methodologies. In fact, an important feature of the formula used is that since performance is multiplied by need – the formula rewards underdeveloped states more for an improvement in the index.

Finally, the methodology attempts to introduce a system of proportionate but non-linear share of allocations. For instance, by giving proportionate to need the formula takes into account changing trends over time such that over time a state may get a greater or lesser share of allocations over time. Moreover, by “squaring” the points a state gets on the need criteria – the methodology ensures that those in greater “need” get a higher share of resources.

Findings

As mentioned earlier, the index ranks different states based on their relative degree of (under)development.[2] Accordingly, Odisha ranks 1 in terms of underdevelopment, followed by Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. In contrast, Goa, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Maharashtra and Uttarakhand are amongst the states which are relative more developed. Table 1 below outlines the rank of the different states based on the underdevelopment index. (See Table 1 for more details)

Table 1: Relative Degrees of Development: Ranking of States

 

Table 2 shows the share of allocations for each state based on this index, which are then compared with allocations received through the Planning Commission and Finance Commission grants. On average, each state gets 3.6 percent of allocation of funds. However there are significant variations ranging from 0.3 percent to as high as 16.41 percent. In fact, according to this formula, 7 of the poorest states of the country—Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh—will corner 60.56 per cent of the Central allocation under the new formula.

Relative to the Finance Commission formula, only five states, namely Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Kerala lose one percentage point or more of their share. In contrast, compared to the Gadgil Mukherjee Formula, 12 states lose more than 1 percentage point with 4 of them losing more than 5 percentage points.

As one can see, the index is based on a combination of factors – a state may do better in terms of one measure but not with respect to another. For instance, based on the index, Uttar Pradesh gets the highest share based on both need and performance, followed by Bihar in terms of need but not in terms of performance. Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, gets a significantly high share based on performance but not as much on need. When measured in relation to population,  Arunachal Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Meghalaya, receive the highest based on need; whereas Rajasthan, Odisha, Jammu and Kashmir and Sikkim get the highest shares based on performance.

Conclusion

The findings of the index have raised a lot of debate. While some states stand to gain by this methodology, others such as Kerala, Goa, Sikkim and Assam, would lose in terms of a decreasing share of GOI allocations. The recommendations suggested in the Report are currently being examined by the Government.[3] The 14th Finance Commission, too, will be coming up with their report later in the year. Whether the composite development index methodology or some part of it will be used in determining the transfer of funds remains to be seen. If nothing else,the report has been successful in reigniting the debate on the need for a new criteria. 

All information on the index is available online at: http://finmin.nic.in/reports/Report_CompDevState.pdf

[1] A note of dissent by Dr. Shaibal Gupta is available in Appendix 7 of the Report..

[2] States that score 0.6 and above on the index  were categorized as “least developed” states. States that score below 0.6 and above 0.4 as “less developed” states, while states that score below 0.4 as “relatively developed” states.

[3] PIB Release, Criteria for Central Assistance, 13/12/2013

Conditionally Yours: Cash Transfers and School Attendance in Bihar

Student attendance in government schools in Bihar has been low for some time.[1] The Government of Bihar (GoB), with a view to boost attendance in its schools, decided that only those students who have at least 75% attendance in the period of April to September, would be eligible for various entitlements, such as money for uniforms, cycles and scholarship. The academic year 2012-13 was the first year in which this policy was introduced. A couple of our blog-posts last year had looked at the implementation of this policy at the school-level (see here and here). In a nutshell, there was much confusion on the ground about eligibility and distribution, with massive protests from parents and students. Overall, however, most teachers and administrators at the time claimed that such a condition on entitlements was necessary to get children to stay in school.

GoB decided to continue with this policy for academic year 2013-14 as well. All government schools were supposed to distribute cash to eligible students on the designated day, during December 16 to December 31, 2013, as decided by the District and/or Block officials. We conducted some preliminary field-work in Nalanda and Purnea to understand implementation at the school-level, given what we had seen last year. This blog post presents some of these initial findings.

Campaign Planning and Organisation

The biggest challenge faced last year was that schools did not have enough time to prepare the new beneficiary lists, communicate the new eligibility norms to parents, and hold distribution camps systematically.

In light of these problems, in 2013-14, Government Orders were issued by the State at the beginning of September 2013 to inform district and block administrations about the campaign to be held in December, as well as the preparation required for it. SSA devised specific formats in which beneficiary lists and demand for funds were to be submitted by schools to the block officials. These were given to headmasters by September, and were submitted at the block-level by early October in most cases. By November, several districts had prepared panchayat– or cluster-wise schedules for holding distribution camps. General information as well as campaign dates were published in newspapers across the state. Teachers and headmasters had also been instructed to give periodic information about norms to students and their parents.

Fund Flows

In 2012-13, there was huge rush to distribute funds in a campaign mode, and district administrations and schools had little time to prepare adequately.

This year, as with beneficiary lists, the demand for funds was submitted in the formats provided by SSA, and only the amount demanded was transferred to school bank accounts. This was crucial since last year lump-sum amounts were sent to schools according to the number of students enrolled rather than for those eligible. In cases where more money than required was sent, getting it back became an issue. District and state officials revealed that even by December 2013, not all schools had submitted their UCs or returned the money in whole. Such a problem is not expected to arise this year.

Distribution during Camps

The actual distribution of funds during camps held at schools has been much more streamlined than in the previous year. Most schools have distributed funds class-wise and at specific times, either in separate classrooms or at separate distribution counters set up within the school premises. This minimised chaos on the day of the distribution.

Monitoring

The local police was observed to be doing the rounds to maintain peace during the campaign. Block and cluster officials also came to monitor how camps were being conducted each day; however, this varied from block-to-block. The frequency of visits by district officials was much lower, close to negligible, at the time of observation in late December.

So broadly, one does see an improvement in the overall planning and management of this massive exercise. But this year also threw up quite a few challenges.

Confusion over Scholarships Norms and Data Collection

This year, until mid-December, there was much confusion over eligibility for the scholarships given by Department of Welfare. Generally, the scholarships are given to the children belonging to SC, ST, BC-1 and BC-II households. This year, however, there was some talk that more students would get the scholarships. Only in mid-November did the Bihar Cabinet pass a resolution that “General” category girls would also get scholarships. Incorrect interpretations of the Cabinet’s decisions in early December led to further chaos, as schools and parents really did not have clarity on who was eligible and who was not. Moreover, rather than the Welfare Department collecting scholarship beneficiary lists, SSA was asked to do that. All scholarship data was supposed to be submitted to the State by December 7, admittedly unrealistically. Given such delays in planning, there were clear adverse consequences on the fund flows for scholarships.

Problems in Fund Flows

Many schools reported not receiving money in time. One major reason cited for this is the staff shortage at the bank level as well as liquidity crunch at rural branches, leading to delays in transfers to schools. Additionally, given the confusion in December over scholarship norms and eligibility as mentioned earlier, funds for scholarship from the Department of Welfare have yet to reach a majority of schools.

Problems in Distribution during Camps

In almost all schools we visited, parents were observed protesting that their child should also be given the benefits. They all had prior knowledge about the 75% minimum attendance requirement, but their main bone of contention was that their child’s attendance had not been taken properly during the year. Teachers responded to this by telling parents that they should come and monitor attendance more often.

As per norm, vouchers or receipts indicating purchase of uniforms must be shown in order to receive the funds. However, this verification was not done systematically in each school and was left to the headmasters’ discretion. Our surveyors also reported that funds were distributed to children who did not have the requisite attendance rates – either to placate community members or out of fear of repercussion from influential local leaders.

The distribution of remaining funds (i.e., scholarships) would not be done via camps, but would be distributed by teachers in the school as and when funds are received.  It is not yet certain by when this distribution would be completed.

What is of most interest is that attendance registers on which this entire entitlement distribution is conducted, don’t receive much attention. District and State Officials categorically stated that there was no time to verify the registers or the beneficiary lists submitted amidst all the other tasks. Given the allegations of parents, complete lack of trust between parents and school officials, and increasing awareness levels among parents, it is imperative that the administration enforces better – and more regular – monitoring of attendance registers. Regular and open communication, through enforcing the mandatory weekly parent-teacher meetings and monthly SMC meetings, would go a long way in establishing this trust and creating confidence among parents to ensure their children come to school.

[1]It has been less than 60% these past few years according to ASER. 

Not The Straight & The Narrow

With a new government coming to power in the capital and National Elections round the corner; there have been a lot of discussion over issues of government. The question of why governments do not take some obvious steps to improve governance and implementation of public policy is central to this debate. This blog aims to provide an overview on the role cast out for the government in economic theory and how this can be extended and modified to understand government behaviour. In part, it also seeks to answer why social sector schemes and activities in the economic realm do not function the way they ought to.

One extends the meaning of the term government to incorporate the political class, bureaucracy and public sector enterprise. Classic public economic theory adopts the Paul Samuelson formulation where the government is seen as a socially benevolent planner,who attempts to achieve the best result for all parties involved. Intervention by the government in case of negative externalities like pollution, missing markets and for the provision of public goods justifies this perception. Given a socially benevolent government that derives its utility from working in the interest of the public and is only concerned with social welfare, intervention would perhaps lead to socially optimal outcomes. A government that maximizes welfare will intervene on issues based on poverty alleviation, access to healthcare and education. India like most governments around the world has introduced social sector schemes such as SSA, ICDS, MGNREGA and NRHM to name a few. These schemes however are riddled with systemic inefficiencies and misappropriation of funds.

Nature of the Government: An alternative view

According to Hindriks and Myles (2006), the assumption that the government has our best interests at heart providesa misleading picture of both reality and the benefits of public policy. In addition to the systemic realities that need to be understood, looking at levels of efficiency goes a long way towards analyzing government functioning. Intervention may not be efficient, especially when information is incomplete or restricted even between the different government agencies/ officials. Public choice economists are of the opinion that there is something known as government failure. There are endogenous reasons why government intervention does not achieve the desired effect.

This theory makes room for the possibility that the government is not a social welfare-maximizing, agency. Each member of the government, be it the politician, bureaucrat or mid level official, could be governed by self-interest. It may not be in their best interest to see that a scheme is implemented efficiently. The opportunity cost of being efficient may be too high. This theory purports that individuals in the government system are constrained by political and monetary considerations and there is an inherent conflict between the duties of the government and their individual personal interest.

Unlike the government, the private sector exploits the market directly to raise income and serve their self-interest. Individuals in the government mayalso want to raise their income from the market, but for them the process is not as straightforward. In fact, Niskanen (1968) suggests that individuals in the government derive their utility from non-pecuniary goods such as power, patronage and reputation. Possibly most government officials raise their incomes through patronage of some form.

Given this hypothesis, if the government has the same information set available as the unregulated economy and is managed by at least some non-benevolent officials, subject to their own set of constraints, it may fail to correct the market failure and may also introduce a new set of costs. Socially ideal interventions or outcomes may not be achieved as a result.

A non-benevolent government and corruption

This gains greater significance given the fact that corruption exists. In India alone, over the past five years we have seen scams coming to the fore; the CWG 2010, the 2G Spectrum Allocations, Coal Gate to name a few. Corruption in the system then emerges as a consequence of government officials using their power for personal gain and some players in the market endorsing it. In some ways a non-benevolent government has the potential to cause far more welfare loss than a monopolist. A government once formed has a monopoly over the force of coercion, which underlies every intervention, and such power, plausibly can be abused. With utility defined by non-pecuniary goods, their actions can impact societal outcomes negatively. The argument in consumer theory against tax collection has always been that it creates distortions (a deadweight loss) for society. Nevertheless one pays taxes in the belief that the government will use the collected revenue to provide necessary public goods and redistribute in the form of social sector schemes to reduce inequity. Welfare loss is exacerbated when the non- benevolent planner is the recipient of the taxpayers’ money. The scope for misuse is tremendous. The allocated resources move away from productive or equity based to rent seeking occupation. It adversely affects decisions in policy, which may no longer be governed by principles of equity, justice or efficiency. It is likely to be influenced by an interest group, who the officials may favour based on political considerations. 

One of the most damaging forms of corruption is predatory regulation. In layman terms predatory regulation can be described as a method in which the government deliberately lays down very cumbersome regulatory rules that entrepreneurs/ the private sector have to pay bribes to wheedle out of. This of course raises the cost of productive activity and reduces efficiency and pushes some players out of the market. Cronyism as a phenomenon is not unheard of and predatory regulation favours its rise. The problem is more acute when several government officials autonomously create obstacles at every level so that each individual can collect a separate bribe. This has the effect of stunting economic growth and development. In the realm of public policy, corruptionleads to situations where beneficiaries of schemes are handpicked and the officials handing out the benefits receive some kickbacks. Public policy thereby suffers from several lacunae and fails to provide support on a need basis for alleviation.

Laffont (2000) offers any reader of development economic theory solace by stating that corruption is an endogenous phenomenon of society and zero corruption is observed nowhere. He suggests rather ironically that since it is observed nowhere, zero corruption is perhaps not optimal. He argues that as an economy continues to develop, new and complex systems and institutions are added, which open up more avenues for corruption. His inverted U shape hypothesis is: As an economy develops, opportunities for corruption increase, peak at a point and then begin to decline as an economy continues to develop further. He acknowledges that this relationship between corruption and development is only feasible if the government is benevolent. 

One can extend this argument to include a government, which is primarily governed by self-interest. Presumably one of the goals of the political class is to get re-elected. As a country develops and more people are educated: there is a possibility that democracy will function the way it was visualized. Potentially, the people could direct the government towards making socially optimal decisions by holding them accountable for the policy decisions they take. Irrespective of the nature of the government (benevolent or governed by self interest), one could alter the constraints a government functions within to include consequences for not moving towards socially optimal schemes or results. It would be in their best interest that they put in place better deterrents for corruption even for the non-elected officials. An optimistic view hopes that then the opportunity cost of fighting corruption will decrease, given this new set of considerations.

References:

Hindriks, Jean, and Gareth D Myles. Intermediate Public Economics.The MIT Press, 2006

Niskanen, William. “The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy.” The American Economic Review, 1968

Laffont, J.J. ,Incentives and Political Economy, Oxford University Press,  2000

Seventeen Signatures

At first sight, this looks like a digression from my continuing tale of the tortuous way in which public expenditure happens in India, but read on.

 

Last week, a good friend of mine and I caught up to exchange notes. He had had a torrid time for a few days, he said. His son, a brilliant student in a top-notch university abroad, had suddenly taken ill and was admitted to hospital. My friend was worried sick and decided to make a dash to the US, to be with his son. Being a government officer, he had to obtain prior permission to travel abroad. When he checked up with his department, he found to his consternation that the process would take upward of three weeks.

 

 

That was when a Good Samaritan appeared on the scene; a Government Fixer. He undertook to carry the file from table to table to obtain the requisite permissions and did that is a space of three hours.

 

 

My friend told me that securing the permission to travel abroad took seventeen signatures.

 

 

Now my friend works as the head of vigilance in a large government department. He himself is in a position where he has to ensure that people follow the rules and take instant action in case they don’t. He was well aware of the fact that any slippage in obtaining the required number of signatures would lead to fingers being pointed at him.

 

 

‘But how many signatures are actually material to the decision to let you go abroad?’ I asked my friend.

 

 

‘Three’, he said, after a pause. ‘One from the Human Resources section to check whether there are any pending cases of disciplinary action, one from the Vigilance Section, to ensure that I am not involved in any enquiry and then the third, by my boss, who finally approves my travel.’

 

 

Three signatures would suffice, but seventeen are required.

 

 

The layering of decision making is a persistent reality of the government. It is something that everybody speaks of eliminating, but which is rarely eliminated. There are two reasons why such arrangements tenaciously persist. First, it enables people to avoid responsibility. In my friend’s case, it feels much nicer for his boss to have seventeen people to blame, in case something goes wrong, rather than three people. Second, it enables the continuing usefulness of government Fixers.

 

 

Nobody knows what motivates an individual to become a Government Fixer. What such an individual does is to study processes intimately, and then become an expert in how to negotiate the system. Every department has a Government Fixer, adept at chasing papers within the department. I have met many Government Fixers and as a rule, they are honest brokers, with altruistic motives and generally combine a philosophical air with extreme practicality. They provide gratuitous help and often, their only reward is the deep appreciation for the benefaction they dispense. They are unfailingly polite and non-discriminatory. They help everybody, regardless of their ethical foundation. They maintain excellent relations with people who really matter in each department; those who prepare the files and deal with their movement. They are particularly friendly with the Private Secretaries of senior officers, those, who can in the twinkling of an eye, move a file from the bottom of the pile to the top, and get a signature just as the officer heads out to his car at the end of a tough day.

 

 

Come to think of it, I owe my career progression to the good deeds of a few Government Fixers. More of that next time.

 

 

Post script: My friend’s son got better in double quick time and my friend did not have to go abroad after all. The Government Fixer’s efforts though effective, were thankfully redundant.

 

New ways of conducting field surveys: Computerised data collection and responsive survey design

In November, I went for a talk at NCAER on “Computerized data collection and the management of Survey Costs and Quality” by James Wagner and Nicole Kirgis from the University of Michigan. The abstract of the talk stated that it would cover topics like responsive survey design, survey biases and ‘paradata’. Now, usually, I am quite wary of talks where I don’t understand 50% of the abstract. However, this talk turned out to be quite interesting and useful.

As most of you know, a lot of the PAISA work that AI does involves extensive surveys of schools in our PAISA districts[1]. To carry out such large scale surveys, we mobilize a team of 35-50 local volunteers who visit around 140-150 schools in each district. This process involves a number of monitoring and rechecking exercises at various levels to ensure that data collection is of the highest quality. What I learnt from the talk was that responsive survey design and ‘paradata’ can help in ensuring that this aim is achieved more efficiently.

So what exactly is responsive survey design?

A responsive survey design pre-identifies a set of design features which can affect survey costs and statistics, monitors them through the process of data collection and makes changes to features of the survey if required. The survey administrator is able to respond to the data being collected while the survey is being carried out thereby ensuring that mistakes are being rectified almost simultaneously[2]. For example, if we are doing a survey of 100 individuals between the age of 15-50 and out of this 10 people are in the age group of 15-20. However, when we conduct the survey, only 5 of these people consent to do the survey. The results of this data, would thus, suffer from a non-response bias because of a higher non-response in a specific category, which would lead to biased estimates. Similar problems could arise for specific questions as well, for example if there is a question about maternal health, certain sections of the society may not be comfortable responding to them. In a standard survey design, the survey would first have to be completed, compiled, data entered and then analysed before the administrators would see such trends emerging, which would make responding to these problems difficult. To overcome these issues, survey administrators can employ a responsive survey design through computerized collection of data.  This design would allow the administrators to skip the compilation and data entry stage, and start analyzing the data straightaway.  The main survey team can then monitor the process from a distance and check if there are certain sections which are not responding. If required, the surveyors can be instructed to conduct more follow-ups with such groups and try and correct this problem[3].

Paradata, which is the administrative data about the survey such as the time taken to survey, number of visits required to complete the survey etc., can be very useful at this stage. When we use a computerized form of data collection, we can automatically monitor the surveyors on various parameters like how many times did the surveyors follow-up with the respondents? How much time did they spend on a survey? Whether they had to go back to an earlier question while administering the survey etc. Thus, we can actually check if the surveyors are making that extra effort towards the sub sample where non response is higher. Softwares such as SurveyTrak[4] are easy to use for this purpose and they automatically generate a lot of useful paradata for the survey administrators. These softwares also allow us to record how the surveyors are introducing themselves and asking questions. This can be very handy during training as we can identify volunteers who need more support.

Along with reducing survey biases, this design can cut down on the cost of transporting the survey tools and getting the data entered. This method would further allow a centralized monitoring of the survey with the survey data and the paradata being generated in real time. Furthermore, since this process does not have to go through a data entry phase, the analysis can start almost simultaneously with the data collection. This would allow analysts to notice certain trends while the survey is still in the field and conduct any follow-up/corrections on this, if required. Finally, it allows surveyors to communicate directly with the team and leave comments which can be useful during the analysis.

However, there are some limitations to this. Firstly, the volunteers would have to be equipped with either laptops or other mobile devices to carry out the survey which would result in increased costs. Secondly, training volunteers to use this technology may also require a longer time and monetary investment. Thirdly, the low penetration of internet facilities in India would slow down the process as there would be a time lag between collection and upload of data. Finally, replicating this model in a national survey in India could be difficult as the software would have to be available in multiple languages, which may increase the costs significantly.

Any organization looking to take up such survey models will have to consider these factors and ascertain which cost model works best for them. The total sample size and the length of the survey would be the most important factors while deciding whether this investment is viable. However, looking at the benefits involved, any survey design should definitely consider this approach before proceeding.

[1] Our PAISA reports can be found here http://www.accountabilityindia.in/paisa_states The PAISA states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra.

[2] Such a design is currently being used in the National Survey of Family Growth in USA. For more details check out Wagner et al, 2012, “Use of Paradata in a Responsive Design Framework to Manage a Field Data Collection”, available at http://www.jos.nu/Articles/abstract.asp?article=284477

[3] For more such applications and a stronger theoretical framework for this survey design check out- Groves, Robert M., and Steven Heeringa. 2006. “Responsive design for household surveys: tools for actively controlling survey errors and costs.” Available at www.isr.umich.edu/src/smp/Electronic%20Copies/127.pdf

[4] You can find out more details about the software at http://www.surveytrak.com/

Through the Looking Glass

In all the debates about rights, social sector schemes and pushing towards ensuring quality services to citizens, there is but mere passing mention about the importance of performance management and administrative reforms over and above the implementation failure of public services[1].  This blog looks at the growing emphasis on the features of the social sector schemes, and overlooking the other side of the (administrative) coin which looks at the management style and employer-employee relations in a public sector context. This has been discussed by Lant Pritchett[2]  in the context of ‘State Capability Trap’ in reference to governance & public sector reform.

This view is definitely not new, and some efforts have been made towards inching closer to more output-based large scale performance management tools. While there are presently vertical lines of appraisal systems in place across departments and ministries, and supervisory checks are present on paper for those implementing schemes at a local level (see blogs on the process in the education sector by my colleagues), as well as citizen-led monitoring through social audits for large schemes like the MGNREGA, there are serious gaps when it comes to understanding performance at a macro level. From the World Development Report 1997, “The State in a Changing World”[3] we see a growing interest in the significant role that formal and informal institutions played, and the need for an overarching Public Sector Reform agenda that focused on ‘managerial capacities, developing positive organisational cultures, and providing incentives for performance both at individual and organisational level’. India added this to their agenda with the UPA government setting up the 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in 2005, which brought out 15 key recommendation reports over a period of 5 years. This was followed by the Public Services Bill in 2007 which reviewed and set up a Management System for Public Service.

A colleague at AI a few years ago had written a blog about the introduction of the PMES or the ‘Performance Monitoring and Evaluation System’ in 2009 (see here). Since then, quite a few evaluation reports have been published . So what is the PMES? According to the Administrative Reforms Commissions 10th Report in 2011, “Performance management is the systematic process by which the organization involves its employees, as individuals and members of a group, in improving organizational effectiveness in the accomplishment of organizational mission and goals”[4]. A subset of performance measurement, which looks at the inputs, goals, impact and effectiveness defined by the departments themselves  of a particular service/scheme, performance management looks at the planning, reviewing and evaluating the performance of individuals and departments, looking towards developing capacity (skill building) and promoting innovation for a result-oriented work process. A visual of what this looks like is given below

 

(Source: Adapted from Second Administrative Reforms Commission’s Tenth Report, 2008)

 

This is preceded by the processes that Ministries and Departments engage in, when structuring projects. According to the Guidelines for the Results Based Document (RFD), each Department (with consultations with their officers) sends in the RFD to the Ministry by February end, specifying their goals and success indicators for the year. After being reviewed by an Ad- Hoc Task Force (ATF) (which consists of domain experts, former Secretaries to the Government of India and retired Corporate Heads) this document, and the Budget, is approved/edited by March every year by the Cabinet Secretariat. This is followed by a review of the document by the High Power Committee- HPC (which consists of the Cabinet Secretary, Finance Secretary and other senior officials)- and submission of the report to the Prime Minister. The Departments/Ministries have to send in the year-end evaluation by May of the following year- with reviews again by the ATF and the HPC.

The strength of forming such a system is the recognition that there is a need for assessing performance of individuals in a system, done so in relation to the targets prepared at the beginning and in sync with goals of the department and not limited to the individual’s capacity. This type of review existed previously only for IAS officers (by the Department of Personnel & Training), but was not done for state level officials until recently. Taking a few pointers from the Appraisal format that currently exists by the Ministry of Personnel, the PMES allows for a concrete and systematic assessment of officials and their work in a standardized way and makes each Department review (and hopefully revise) their own specific structure of appraisals. A performance system, then, aims to removes any vague criteria of ‘good or bad’ for promotion, and moves towards improving motivation and creating an incentive based rating system that places the individual in a larger context of the organisation. This is backed by creating avenues for developing interests and aligning potential of an officer to what they will be doing in the future.

While these all are a welcome change, there are, as with every new system, challenges they need to overcome. At a broader level, most reforms that take an administrative avatar, have quite frankly, failed to take off, or be implemented. Even the recommendations that were offered by the ARC have only been taken up by a handful of States (though almost all of them were accepted by the Cabinet committee)- and it is unclear whether this was done with intentions for actual implementation or as a box-checking task. Problems such as pre-decided budgetary allocation, inflexible program structure or even the lack of a conducive work environment can hamper a government official’s performance.  

This, in addition to blurred reporting structures (as is seen in most projects that have an inter-department characteristic or being handled by multiple agencies) can create hurdles for those who are finally held accountable for inaction. The website, where a few reports are available, does not showcase any documents on action taken if an official has fared poorly in the performance rating, or what incentive-schemes were developed, or the type of innovations that may have led to promotions. Putting this out in the public domain could be the start of increasing transparency in this area.

Recent debates emphasise the challenges that are seen with outputs (or lack thereof) of particular schemes, plagued with officials that do not implement well, usurp public resources and are inefficient. What has not gained much traction in these debates is the point of internal public sector reforms that has tried to go hand in hand with more schemes and more public services offered. If we look at the sheer number of schemes that exist in this country, and the number of officials on the ground and the incentives that currently exist, we can assess the gargantuan task that lies ahead. While steps have been taken to bring attention to this, the lack of enthusiasm in terms of the uptake of previous recommendations is telling of the future course of action.

[1] Performance of social sector schemes, 2014. http://finmin.nic.in/WorkingPaper/Performance_MSSSchemes.pdf

[2] ‘Capability Trap: The Mechanisms of Persistant Implementation Failure’ http://www.cgdev.org/publication/capability-traps-mechanisms-persistent-implementation-failure-working-paper-234

[3] World Bank. World Development Report 1997. http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/c.html/world_development_report_1997/abstract/WB.0-1952-1114-6.abstract

[4] Government of India. Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances. ‘Performance Management in Government’ http://indiagovernance.gov.in/files/performance-management.pdf

Strengthening SMC to make SDP– Should be an Empowering Process

I had recently attended two training programmes on Strengthening the School Management Committee[1] (SMC) to make an effective School Development Plan. One of it was at the state level, wherein all the District Education Officers of the state attended and the other was at block level, where in block level extension officers for education including some head masters and cluster coordinators were present.  The major objective of this program was to train the officers to support SMC members with respect to access, equity, quality and community participation, while SMCs develop the School Development Plan (SDP). All of them are directed towards empowering individuals in the management of school related activities.

The aim of this blog is to unravel whether state mechanisms are serious in moving towards empowering SMC members, or whether it is merely a box-checking endeavor to gather numbers, using experiences and reflections from this training programme.

At the outset, I was really impressed with the detailed module[2]  on how to prepare School Development Plan (SDP)[3] the state has prepared. The module for the training programme had a detailed schedule, with the exact time the trainer required for each topic. In both the training programme that I attended, I found that the trainers have followed the module fully. However, while they were instructing the officers on what they need to do, they failed to share or explain, how to do it – the process/methodology of doing it. In other words, the trainer did not focus on the information which could potentially be the vehicle to empower and conscientize the SMC members and the community at large. This is the concern that I want to raise among the policy makers for critical debate on the process of strengthening SMC at the community level.

The process of training, that I witnessed, was like the “banking” approach to education — a metaphor used by Paulo Freire[4] that suggests trainees are considered empty bank accounts that should remain open to deposits made by the trainers. This “banking” approach will result in the dehumanization of both the trainees and the trainers. In addition, it will stimulate oppressive attitudes and practices in society. Hence the SMC members will never take the role as envisaged in RTE Act.

As per the module, the SMC members need to map down the history of the school, make a social and resource mapping, as well as draw out different types of Venn diagram for mapping out the distance of different villages from where the children come to that particular school, etc. I feel that this process, is actually a Participatory Learning and Action (PLA)[5] methodology. These tools allow parents to know more about the school and can be an empowering process for the community members. They can really own the school and feel for it. It can be the vehicle that helps the SMC members by allowing them to be aware of the strengths as well as the areas of improvements in their school while also mapping out different ways to make it more resourceful.

For example, if during SMC meetings, while documenting the history of the school, the people will come to know that actually this school was made due to someone’s contribution. This could motivate someone else in the village or the whole village to ponder over these things and also follow the same benevolent act in another way for the school. Thus, this method of collecting information through stories can lead to a domino effect of motivating other community members to not just start a thought-process on how to improve the schooling system in their community, but also try to emulate others who have made an impact.

The whole process of training the SMC members should be a means of consciously shaping them and the society for making a SMART[6] SDP. This particular philosophy, I feel, is missing from the whole process of training of the officers and thus, is not seen in the training of the SMC members.. I am really skeptical of the ability of such a training process to empower the community and SMC members.

The above reflection also helps us to look into two key areas for critical discussion:  

a)      The process of making the SDP using participatory techniques will ‘break the silence’ of the poor and disadvantaged sections, recognize the value of popular collective knowledge and wisdom as well as legitimize the production of knowledge by the people themselves.

b)      The process of strengthening SMC training might  fail to highlight the key techniques in adult training for learning such as linking learning to problems, linking learning to people’s goals and visions, and giving SMC members  control over decisions on training.

The government officials need to understand that the School Management Committee (SMC) is another community based institutions (CBO) which, if strengthened and empowered well, with conscious effort, can really make many of their interventions effective at the grassroots level. The whole initiative of decentralization of power at the school level can be really strengthened. Above all the SMCs have a legal validity through the RTE Act 2009. It can be another marvelous initiative to move a step forward in terms of delegation of power and resources from the upper level to the lowest level.

The government officials are currently looking at the process of formation and strengthening of SMC as a task, like any other task, and leaving a trail of data, without really looking at the human aspect of it. 

The envisaged dream of the RTE Act with regard to SMC’s functioning can only be achieved, if and only if the “Community” is conscientised. The active participation of its members in planning of SDP formation and quality monitoring is a great challenge which can be treated as an opportunity also. The RTE Act in a specific way wants to make the parents an important stakeholder in the decision-making process with an objective to make teachers and the principal more accountable for education delivery. This is envisaged for better learning outcomes of students. Thus the effort of integrating teacher and community through SMC can lead to better education system with decentralized planning and management.

The PAISA report has shown us that planning and allocation of funds as well as the timing of releasing funds and their actual receipts in schools are so problematic that whether the SDP will get the required funds at the right time is a big question. This is a persistent problem which needs a lot of bureaucratic support along with legislative advocacy for mending this problem. This process is continuous and taking place slowly but steadily. If the SDP does not get implemented due to delay of funds, then people could get de-motivated and slowly withdraw from the whole process. It is very important that SMC members are empowered to understand the constraints and take steps accordingly. Thus the whole training process should be liberating process to view things critically for better Redressal. Otherwise, I fear that with the existing training process, the SDP formation and implementation will be rhetoric bureaucratic exercise of just filling data and fulfilling the required norms without bringing any change in the community managed decision making process in education.

Through this blog, I would like my readers think about the following questions and initiate a discussion, “Whether the present Government policy and administrative structure/s provide a favorable environment for SMC to be conscientious and function effectively to achieve the goal as penned down in RTE Act?”

At the end, I feel that the soft component (Capacity Building) of the implementation of RTE cannot be ignored or taken for granted if we really want to see RTE Act moving out from the framework of implementation of schemes to enforcement of rights.

 

[1] To make the education system more effective and to encourage participation of parents in the decision process, a School Management Committee (SMC) will be formed in every school under the Right to Education (RTE) Act. As per the RTE Act, School Management Committee (SMC) should perform the following functions like, Monitor the working of the school; prepare and recommend school development plan, monitor the utilization of the grants received from the appropriate government or local authority or any other source, perform such functions as may be prescribed.

[2] http://www.mpsp.maharashtra.gov.in/site/Pdf/Forms/SDPform.pdf).

[3] http://righttoeducation.in/what-school-development-plan-smcs-will-prepare

[4] http://www.pedagogyoftheoppressed.com/author/

[5] https://faculty.washington.edu/markh/TC498/Readings/PRA_Manual.pdf

[6] SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound