Blog Archive - Page 72 of 130 - Accountability Initiative: Responsive Governance

Data in the dark

If government offices could exist virtually, they would be remarkably similar to government websites, waiting/loading time included. Most information is available but not easily accessible, like a cabinet full of files stacked somewhere.

Moreover, accessibility to government data does not ensure accuracy; in fact too much information can also lead to a misrepresentation of facts. This blog post seeks to highlight the various obstacles faced while researching Government of India (GOI) schemes purely using government data available online. For an insightful account of missing records in government offices, have a look at this AI post (Link).

According to the Open Data Foundation (Link), a data user should ideally be able to:

Discover the existence of data.
Access data for research and analysis.
Find detailed information describing data and its production process.
Effectively communicate with the agencies involved.
Share knowledge with other users.

Ideally. In reality however, there are many impediments to cogent data analysis.

The Indian government has taken several steps towards providing accessible information online. Extensive official guidelines explain what GOI websites should look like[1](Link), some pointers even address problems we’ve encountered. There’s also an analytics page(Link) rating these websites on the basis of their user interface and accessibility (the Indian Navy website is ranked highest). However, whether GOI departments take heed to these suggestionsis debatable.

We can spot various issues in data while analysing schemes such as the Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan (NBA/TSC), Jannani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) and the Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY). Discrepancies are evident in their documents for Centre and State financial spending, physical achievements, State guidelines, Annual Action plans, Panchayat reports and question lists in the Houses of Parliament. This by no means covers the gamut of government data available online, it is simply a selection based on schemes we are currently interested in. Let us look at some of the problems faced while analysing government data.

Information Mismanagement: Data on government websites is not well organised.Basic documents such as ‘State guidelines for the implementation of the JSY’ are extremely hard to locate. It is unclear whether information exists at the Central or State level, on the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare’s website, or a specific National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) page, or even whether specific guidelines exist at all. Documents are not dated properly and oftentimes the fate of Recommendations is left to our imagination. Most documents are not published in machine-readable formats such as Excel or Word that are conducive to further use. They are usually in a non-editable PDF format, where some say,“data goes to die” (Link). After much metaphorical running around, one is still unsure about the information they have accumulated, largely due to data not being presented in a consistent and sequential manner.

Sometimes these websites provide so many permutations and combinations for viewing data that extracting the required information becomes quite challenging. Certain data heavy pages promise information that is still about 8 clicks away, which only leads to another new set of pages to examine. For example, while checking entries for toilets constructed since 2001, we looked at Panchayat-wise data on the NBA website (Link):

This ten-minute process is for one GP, in one Block, in one District, in one State. Even if we analyse GP entries for just one State, it takes over a week to collate.

One can argue that this is precisely why datasheets have been compiled on these websites: to gather and present data in one place, but when inconsistencies such as double counting appear, we have no choice but to check the numbers ourselves. We undertook this more in-depth analysis precisely because in another GP; Anukunta (Link) 2 cases of identical BPL card numbers existed. This is also an example of data discrepancy, because the identical numbers exist only in the downloaded Excel version of the GP data and were different numbers on the NBA website.

Lack of standardisation of units and terms: Units of measurement especially for financial reports are not standardised across documents. It requires limited skill but a considerable amount of time to convert the lakhs to crores and vice-versa. However, a more tedious process is figuring out what the exact time period of a year is for different government ministries.

For example,figures for funds “released during the year” (2011-2012) according to NBA (Central government) data (Link)in 9 states is exactly double the figure given in the individual State Annual Action plans (2012-2013).Further fact checkingrevealed that theseAction plans did not include the grant received in March because the plans are prepared for April-January. While this explains difference innumbers, it also illustrates that a very substantial grant amount remains unaccounted for in the State plans. Excluding such vital information can mean incomplete research analysis and conclusions.

Data Discrepancies: Another shortcoming in data stems from data inconsistencies within and across different government sites.For example NBA numbers for physical achievement on one page might not match another NBA datasheet, technically providing the same information. Perhaps different calculation methods were employed, but usually no explanation is provided.This leads to uncertainty regarding which data is correct, since achievement is measured inconsistently. Another discrepancy is related to BPL/Antyodayacard numbers. Sometimes they’re an amalgam of 15 alphabetic and numeric characters (Link), sometimes the name of the beneficiary is identical to their card number (Link)and sometimes the numbers area sequence starting from 01 (Link).

Lastly, while an impressive amount of information is available on the websites of the Houses of Parliament, their Questions Search still needs refining. For example, searching for the ‘Indira Awaas Yojana’ does not bring up any hits for irregularities in the scheme, unless the term ‘irregularities’ is specifically mentioned. Additionally, IAY and ‘Indira Awaas Yojana’ bring up separate results, and when the terms are combined, the search bears no results whatsoever. Ideally, it should pull up any question with the term IAY in it; otherwise this can result in the omission of critical questions. Nonetheless, the inclusion of a ‘Wit and Humour’ page (Link) gets a nod of approval.

Data needs to be organised, synchronised and standardised in such a way that it is simpler, cleaner and faster, and serves its primary purpose of providing accessible and correct information. Promoting accountability requires access to information. Even though the Indian government has taken some measures towards providing better access to data, an overall upgrade and clean up of GOI websites is urgently required.

[1]For an example of an effective, user-friendly interface take a look at the UK governments website (Link).

‘Air-ing’ some statistics

With the monsoons finally here, most of us have been stuck in airports waiting in vain for flights that have been cancelled. The lucky few have had to endure only delayed flights. With that all-consuming thought, we thought we’d do some digging around and we landed on the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) website.

I think most people have heard our rants about bad quality government data, and if you haven’t, please see here, however sometimes it’s good to also show the other side. The DGCA website (http://dgca.nic.in/) unlike a lot of other government websites is a virtual goldmine of information, ranging from flight cancellations, on-time performance, passenger data and passenger complaints, just to name a few.

We’d like to highlight some of this data.

1) Market Share

In the domestic flights section, Jet Airways and Jet Lite together account for 26.1% of the market share, followed by Kingfisher(20%) and Indigo(19.9%). Air India is much lower at 13.2% In terms of number of flights, Kingfisher and Jet Airways lead the way with 24 and 23 percent respectively with IndiGo and Air India have 16 and 15 percent respectively.

2) Cancellation Rates

Which air-lines have the greatest number of “cancellations”? The data we have pertains to only May 2011, which is probably one of the major limitations of the website (sorry had to point this out as well) and as even a cursory glance suggests, Air India is the clear leader in terms of cancellation rates! A primary reason for this is the 10 day strike by some AI pilots, which left the airline paralysed and passengers high and dry.

3) On-Time Performance

Over 92 percent of the flights of IndiGo and JetLite are on time whilst Spice Jet and Air India are the stragglers with 79 and 69 percent of flights on time respectively. The main reason for delays is “reactionary” (59%). This is primarily due to a vicious cycle of delayed departures and arrivals which, amongst other things, may be because of inadequate air traffic control capacity.

4) Passenger Complaints

Figures on passenger complaints also tell an interesting story. In May 2011, despite the cancellations and delays, Air India had the least number of complaints at 1.4 complaints per 10,000 passengers. Kingfisher and JetLite also had few complaints, while surprisingly Jet Airways left a lot of travelers in a petulant mood with 3.3 complaints per 10,000 passengers.

While none of the data spouted above may help us in actually planning our travels, we thought it would be interesting to know the statistics! If this is not enough, then some good news for stranded passengers – a recent Supreme Court judgment has made it mandatory for airlines to serve passengers food and water if the airline has been delayed beyond 3 hours!!

The life and times of Mamta Didi

Ask anyone where the Anganwadi Centre (AWC) is in Paschimi Gaon (name changed for privacy) in Lucknow and you are directed to an Anganwadi worker’s house. Its courtyard has a large mat where 15 children aged 3-6 years are sitting, playing with broken toys. The walls are covered with posters of alphabets so faded that they look more than a decade old, and the nearby hand-pump no longer works. This is Mamta Didi’s house, an Anganwadi Worker (AWW) for the past 19 years.

We were in Lucknow as part of a workshop on PAHELI – a Peoples Audit on Health, Education and Livelihoods and one of our tasks entailed interviewing AWW’s about their roles and responsibilities and tracking the amount of money that reaches an AWC.

For those who may be unfamiliar with the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) scheme, AWC’s are the main unit of service delivery and have now been acknowledged as the first outpost of health, nutrition and early learning at the habitation level (details of the scheme can be found here and here). Anganwadi Workers (AWW) and Anganwadi Helpers (AWH) thereby are the front-line functionaries at AWC. Over time, AWW’s in the government’s own words “have emerged as the central figure for child care and development under the ICDS scheme”

And indeed, take a look at Mamta didi’s job responsibilities and you would amazed at the number of responsibilities she handles – literally covering an entire lifecycle. Even the guidelines (they can be found here) list 21 tasks that an AWW is meant to do. To give a brief idea – every year Mamta Didi’s work starts with a survey of the families in the village to keep track of the number of young children below the age of 6, adolescent girls and pregnant women. She needs to monitor the health of the adolescent girls (kishori’s), and provide them with take home ration/food in accordance with the recently launched Kishori Shakti Yojana (KSY). As soon as a Kishori gets married, Mamta didi is responsible for providing contraceptives to her and once the Kishori plans to have children, give her health advice. Once pregnant, Mamta helps the Primary Health Clinic (PHC) staff and Accredited Social Health Worker(ASHA) with conducting the ante and post natal checkups and then provides the pregnant and lactating mother (erstwhile Kishori) with rations. Once the baby is delivered, she assists the family in birth registration. In addition, she assists the local PHC staff in a myriad of activities including organization of immunization camps and health checkups, measurement of height and weight of children, provision of counselling to caregivers and organization of non-formal pre-school activities. Mamta Didi’s work thus goes much beyond the responsibility of providing nutritional support to children and mothers.

And then there are the registers – a task in themselves!

The Government of Orissa’s Women and Child Development website (link here) for instance pegs the number at 14 registers. These include a family survey register, daily stock register, an immunization register, daily diary, growth monitoring chart, a supervision-cum-visitor book – the list goes on. In addition, the AWWs are also expected to maintain Monthly Progress Reports capturing information ranging from population details, births and deaths of children, maternal deaths, number of children who attended AWC for supplementary nutrition and pre-school education, nutritional status of children by looking at their age appropriate weight, information home visits by AWW etc. These progress reports are meant to be sent to the officers in charge on the 5^th day of every month. (For more details on the monitoring mechanisms, see here)

Given the extent of their responsibility, one would imagine that a lot of attention is being paid to the AWC, but that is definitely not the case. To give a few examples:-

1) Infrastructural Facilities: Most AWC’s continue to run from the house of the AWW, with no compensation given to her. While the guidelines mention a rent allowance, during our field visit, no one had heard of such a thing. Most AWCs further lack adequate drinking water and toilet facilities – a fact admitted even by the Minister of Women and Child Development in a reply to a question in the Lok Sabha, when she said, “the Government has information available in respect of 11.13 lakh AWCs/ mini-AWCs in 33 States/UTs according to which 57.48% AWCs have drinking water facilities within the premises and 6.61% AWCs have toilet facilities.” (link available here). Similar findings have been found in evaluations conducted by NCAER and the Planning Commission amongst others and their findings can be found on the ICDS website itself.

2) Kits and small items: While the guidelines mention that a medicine Kit, Pre-school Education Kit, Joint Mother & Child Protection Card, Growth Monitoring Chart and other Petty items such as tumbler, bucket, mug etc. are to be provided to each AWC every year, they usually do not come.

3) Finances: Some of the grants mentioned in a government notification include contingency grants for each AWC, Monitoring and Evaluation grants, monies for replacement of registers, weighing scales etc @ Rs. 200 per functional AWC, a flexi fund of Rs. 1000 per AWC for activities like transportation of ICDS beneficiaries requiring urgent medical care, local innovations, etc. However not ONE of the AWCs we visited had ever heard of the flexifund scheme nor received any such grant. Instead the only thing the AWC had received was a cupboard, a chowky, a medicine kit (of which many medicines had now expired) and a weighing scale many years ago.

4) Food and Rations: The AWC is meant to provide both dry take home rations as well as hot cooked food – the ration of which is supposed to come on a regular basis. However, even this does not come regularly. In the AWC’s we visited, while the dry ration had come the rations for the hot-cooked meal had not come for the past 2 months!

In such a situation, it is hard to imagine how an AWW carries out her many responsibilities, that too at a minimal salary. But there is some hope. Effective from 1^st April 2011, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs finally approved the enhancement of Honoraria for Anganwadi Workers to Rs.3000/- from Rs.1500/- per month and for Anganwadi Helpers and Workers of Mini-AWCs to Rs.1500/- from Rs.750/- per month. However, when we had visited Mamta didi in end of May, she and her helper had not even received their previous honorarium of 3 months!

Yet, when you ask her about how she feels to be an AWW, she smiles proudly showing off her recently received “badge” and uniform (a sari worth Rs. 200) and says, “Don’t I look professional- please take a photo!”

When the mirror has 2 faces: the story of governments own datasets not matching!

A few months back I was searching for release and expenditure data for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). Since the financial management section of the SSA portal hasn’t been updated in 2 years (the latest available information is August 2008!), I was left struggling to find places to look. Luckily, I remembered that we now we have a tool – the Right to Information Act – an easy method to get information. So I decided to file my first RTI !

At the outset, let me just say that I got an amazing response. The PIO officer in-charge was prompt in his response, transferred some of my queries to the relevant departments and even sent them reminder letters to send me the information on time. So for those sceptical about filing RTI’s – go ahead, give it a shot, you might be surprised! But this post isn’t about filing RTI’s. It’s about what the RTI revealed.

The RTI showed the complete chaos and confusion that exists within government databases. Information on state-wise expenditures and releases for SSA in 2008-09 from the Joint Review Mission( available on the SSA website here) put the All India total GOI release for SSA in 2008-09 at Rs. 1,270,533 lakh and the total expenditure for SSA, during the same period at Rs. 1933231 lakh. However, the same data in the RTI gave the figures of Rs. 1,261,120 lakh and Rs. 1,905,652 lakh respectively.

For more details, please see that table below giving the state-wise variations.

State	GOI release according to Joint Review Mission ( in Rs. Lakh)	GOI Release according to the RTI ( in Rs. Lakh)	Difference ( in Rs. Lakh)
Tamil Nadu	45,414	53,241	7,827
Himachal Pradesh	8,553	10,513	1,960
Arunachal Pradesh	13,684	15,568	1,884
Mizoram	5,113	3,873	1,240
Delhi	1,529	1,029	500
Nagaland	2,868	2,368	500
Dadra & N. Haveli	105	85	20
Madhya Pradesh	85,569	85,570	1

State	Total expenditure according to Joint Review Mission ( in Rs. Lakh)	Total expenditure according to the RTI ( in Rs. Lakh)	Difference ( in Rs. Lakh)
Bihar	209,431	226,382	16,951
Chhattisgarh	75,101	82,246	7,145
Mizoram	2,127	5,244	3,117

Such vast differences – (for Bihar amounting to Rs. 16,951 lakhs of rupees!) can’t be blamed on “reporting errors”. Instead, they raise some important questions.

How do we know which is the “correct” data? How are schemes and programmes expected to function efficiently and be successful when no one is sure how much money is being released or spent? And most importantly, how can we expect to have transparency and accountability when our government databases are in shambles?

While organisations like the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) do their part in highlighting some of the discrepancies or errors in government data, they can’t overhaul the entire system. But it’s obvious – it’s time we get back to the basics- get our data clean. And whether the UID can assist in this process – I guess we’ll have to wait and watch!

Avani Kapur is Senior Research and Program Analyst, Accountability Initiative.

Rants of a Public Finance Junkie

For the past few months, my colleague and I had been holed up at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), trying to “uncover” the wonderful world of state budgets. Our task appeared to be simple – we wanted to categorise the elementary education budget for various states into more accessible and functional categories, thereby enabling us to estimate the “cost” of various inputs in delivering elementary education. This would further allow us to compare differing state priorities on the basis of the “type” of allocations/ expenditures. So for instance, since we were working on education, the categories consisted of:-

School Infrastructure
Teacher salaries,
Teacher inputs (such as training, materials etc),
Entitlements for children such as uniforms, textbooks etc,
Mainstreaming of children (out of school etc),
“Quality” related inputs and,
Administration.

Did I say simple? Umm… not so much. Let me explain.

The existing system of classification divides the Consolidated Fund of India (namely, the fund from which all expenditures of the Government are incurred into Revenue and Capital Sections (for more details on revenue and capital expenditure please see here) and requires that all expenditures be categorized into these two broad divisions at the highest level. At the operational level, all allocations and expenditures are classified using a 6 tier hierarchical classification. These are:-

Classification	Type of Classification
Major Head	Represents the major functions of the government
Sub-Major Head	Represents the sub-functions of the government
Minor Head	Refers to government programmes
Sub-Head	Schemes of the government
Detailed Head	Representing sub-schemes
Object Head	The economic “type” of expenditure

Thus for example in education, if we wanted to know the amount of money being allocated for the Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) providing grants in aid to SCERT for teacher training institutions, we would have to drill down from:-

2202- General Education (Major Head)

01 – Elementary Education (Sub-Major Head)

001- Teacher Training (Minor Head)

85- Teacher Training Institution

99- Grants in aid to SCERT

31- Grants in aid to SCERT (CSS)

(for more details on Minor Heads and Major Heads, please see here)

OK, now having detailed the task at hand, let’s get to the problems (this is going to be a long list). So reader patience is advised.

1) Logistical
One of the first (though probably the least important given the list!) is the sheer logistics of looking at state budgets. Many states do not have their budgets online, or if they do the links don’t always work, and past years’ budgets are unavailable. Moreover, often while the overall budget is available, the “detailed demand for grants” (necessary for disaggregation) is not. The task thus requires access to a library such as NIPFP and a LOT of manual data entry! Moreover, the sheer volume of budgets (some states have 9 volumes) results in a lot of heavy lifting! Further, some budgets are only in Hindi, which makes it difficult for those whose vernacular is not Hindi to access such documents

2) Lack of Uniform Accounting systems

a. Differing Budget Heads:

Under the current system of classification, functions not only repeat themselves under revenue and capital sections but more importantly, there is no uniformity of classification in terms of budget heads across states. A look at the table below containing collated information for 2008-09 indicates the basic problem. For each state, allocations are booked under different budget heads. To give an example, while Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan should technically be a sub-minor head (as it is a scheme), it is sometimes included as a minor head (a government programme). As a result, while Himachal Pradesh and West Bengal give SSA separately as a minor head (111), for other states it comes as a sub-minor head under government primary schools (101). Similarly, for some states such as Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal, textbooks have been mentioned separately, it does not mean that other states do not provide textbooks. The truth is that in other states it is booked under a detailed head.

Source: Compiled from the Comptroller and Auditor General, State Finance Reports. Numbers are provisional.

b. Functional Categories not always “functional”

As the recently released Rangarajan Committee Report (see here) – (a must read for those interested in public finance) aptly recognises, “functional heads should be really functional” – though that is often not the case. For instance, a major head like 2552 (North Eastern Areas), does not really signify any “function” of the government and even expenditure on education in North Eastern Areas is shown under this head. As such, as the report highlights “This is a geographical attribute camouflaged as functional attribute”, increasing the difficulty in classifying budgets.

c. Lack of Uniform Measurement units

Related to the lack of uniform budget heads is the lack of uniform units of measurement. While some states report in lakhs, others in crores, others in thousands, some states such as West Bengal report actual numbers. Collating these in itself becomes a cumbersome process and requires us to have our 0’s in order!

d. Decoding some of the Budget Heads

A further complication caused by the lack of uniform budget heads was the fact that often the detailed object heads were missing, resulting significant problems with decoding the budget heads. For instance, a budget head such as “Assistance to local bodies” consists broadly of monies provided to Gram Panchayats etc for the delivery of education. Within it, however there would be components of salaries, administrative expenditure, maintenance works, inspection, and even actual schools built by the Zilla Parishad.

3) Dealing with Multiple Departments or Budget heads other than 2202.01

While some states, such as Karnataka and Rajasthan classify their budgets only according to budget heads, for most states it is done department wise. An example below:

One would imagine that education would be under the Department of Education. Unfortunately, that is not necessarily true. State governments also draw funds from the Tribal Welfare Department, Social Welfare and Justice Department, the Planning Department and Public Works Department amongst others. While some states book grants from Tribal Department and Social Welfare Department within 2202.01 as Tribal Area Sub-Plan and Special Component Plan for Scheduled Castes, others would require going through each and every department within the state budget. For instance, a state such as Chhattisgarh had the education budget head in 14 different departments , while in Maharashtra, the planning department gives elementary education for each district (35 of them) separately!

In other cases, within the department of education itself, other budget heads such as 2059 (public works), 2225 (welfare of SCs), 2235(welfare of STs etc) are included further complicating the collating system.

Given the current push for accountability and transparency, it is surprising that detailed state budgets continue to be inaccessible to most. It is no wonder that for many (including me!), understanding and more importantly analyzing them remains an extremely daunting task. While, initiatives such as the the RBI’s annual State Finances –A Study of Budgets by the RBI (link here) are commendable, they still do not give the disaggregation required for us public finance junkies !

I am happy to report that we managed to task at hand, at least for the 7 states we were studying (For a look at the results, please look here), and since we are gluttons for punishment, we hope soon to do similar classifications for more states and even more sectors. Wish us luck (and sanity)!

Mis-Management or Missing Management

Over the last few years, India’s elementary education landscape has witnessed a lot of change. On the one hand, there has been a substantial increase in financial allocations. For instance, allocations for Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) – the programmatic vehicle for elementary education have increased from Rs. 15,000 crores in 2010-11 to Rs. 25,555 crores in 2012-13. This represents an increase of 70 percent in 3 years. At the same time, with the passing of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE) in April 2010, states now have an increased responsibility towards the beneficiaries. Central and state governments can now be held accountable for failure of delivery.

So more resources and increased responsibility are being pushed into the system. But then the question arises – Is the architecture of elementary education equipped to handle it? Fundamentally, do we have the capacity and manpower to handle these changes?

So lets try and understand this with the help of a few examples….

1) Constraints at the Block Level

The Block is an essential component of the SSA structure for day-to-day support to teachers. The SSA organisational structures requires a Block Education Officer, responsible for supervision and monitoring of schools. In addition, the block has a Block Resource Coordinator (BRC), responsible for providing curricular support to teachers such as developing teaching learning materials. The BRCs are also expected to conduct workshops with subject teachers of upper primary classes and organise trainings.

However, a look at the number of vacancies across different states indicates a huge human resource deficit at the block level. As the table below indicates, at the end of 2011-12, there was a shortage of 60 BRC’s in Chhattisgarh, 192 in Haryana, 205 in Himachal Pradesh, 322 in Bihar and 353 in Maharashtra!

Interviews with officials in Medak district, also confirmed that 60 percent of posts for Mandal Education Officers (equivalent to BEO’s) are currently vacant.

Table 1

State	Post Sanctioned	Post vacant
Maharashtra	407	353
Bihar	537	322
Himachal Pradesh	301	205
Haryana	299	192
Uttar Pradesh	880	136
Madhya Pradesh	322	82
West Bengal	696	75
Rajasthan	244	69
Jharkhand	237	61
Chhattisgarh	150	60

2) Missing Junior Engineers: Example from Satara

The Junior Engineers (JE) are essential for the planning, designing and monitoring of all civil works – the second largest component of the SSA budget after teacher salaries. The roles and responsibilities of the JE include:

Cross checking the school civil work requirements.
Estimating the cost of the work on the basis of design specifications.
Giving directions to the SMC on the layout and the work-estimates
Monitoring the progress of the work
Scrutinising the works to assess whether it meets the standards given the in the Public Works Department schedule of rates for building works
And finally, assessing the work completion and expenditure and providing the completion certificate.

It is thus safe to say, the JE is one of the key implementing officers for any civil works project in schools. However, while analysing data for our district studies, we found that while the infrastructure budget for Satara, Maharashtra had increased by 61.6% between 2009-10 and 2010-11, the pace of activities at the school level was much slower. For example, allocations for boundary walls saw a massive jump from 0.88 lakhs to 210.9 lakhs, yet only 6.8 percent of schools had started construction. Similarly, only 15.2% schools had started toilet construction, despite an increase in allocations from Rs. 3.5 lakhs to Rs. 17.7 lakhs.

Interviews with officials solved part of the mystery – we found that more than half of required posts for JE’s were vacant in 2010-11. In fact, no infrastructure works could be carried out in one block as there were no JE’s in position. Satara is finally undergoing a huge recruitment drive to ensure this doesn’t happen this year.

A similar reason namely, “inadequate supervision staff” was cited in the Project Approval Board Meeting minutes as one of the main reasons for slow completion of civil works in Bihar.

3) School Management Committee Accountants – Example from Himachal Pradesh

The School Management Committee are an integral part of school functioning and decentralized decision making. According to the RTE, SMCs are mandated to monitor school functioning and develop annual school development plans (SDP). In addition, one of the most important tasks of the SMC’s is the management of finances. All monies related to basic school functioning (school grants) as well as infrastructure monies are transferred directly into SMC bank accounts at the school level. The SMC’s are thus responsible for maintaining passbooks and cashbooks and deciding and incurring expenditures at the school level.

Himachal Pradesh was a step ahead of most other states in that they were able to constitute their SMC’s by April 2010 (just after the passing of the Act). Moreover, in order to assist in the management of funds at the school level, Himachal Pradesh decided to appoint 1 accountant for 50 SMCs at the block level. However, one year after the implementation of the RTE, of the 303 accountants required, only 63 posts were filled by April 2011, leaving 240 posts vacant!! In addition, in Himachal Pradesh in 2011, the posts of a Finance controller at the state level and of 2 Finance and Accounts officers at the district level were also vacant.

Interestingly, while the budgets for SSA have increased substantially, the share of allocations for management (Block Resource Centres, Cluster Resource Centres, Management and MIS) have actually decreased. In 2009, allocations for management constituted 8 percent of the total SSA allocations. However, in 2011, this dropped to 7 percent. Moreover, even in terms of expenditure, in 2010, only 71 percent of management funds were spent, down from 78 percent in 2009-10.

These statistics clearly point to a great management challenge in SSA. Until we are able to staff and strengthen our management structures at every level of government – national, state, block, cluster and SMC – timely and efficient implementation of the programme will remain a challenge. One positive step has been the recognition of this constraint by the SSA Framework 2011. In fact, the framework stated “the project management structure and requirement of manpower, delegation and capacity building would have to be reviewed in light of the larger fund availability and considerable expansion of the activities of SSA in view of the RTE Act.” Now it’s time to move from theory to practice.

Why do politicians transfer bureaucrats?

Elected politicians and bureaucrats are important pillars of governance. In India and in many other countries, politicians have very limited powers over the bureaucrats, at least in theory. For example, a politician in India does not have any control over the recruitment of IAS officers. He can’t change their wages, can’t dismiss them nor demote them. In some sense, this is desirable, to avoid the politicization of policy implementation. But then the question arises: how would a politician facing electoral pressures ensure that his pet projects are being implemented by the bureaucrats over whom he doesn’t have any control. Of course, a politician can offer the bureaucrat, non-monetary incentives or can pick somebody who shares his world view.

I just came across a very interesting research paper by Laxmi Iyer and Anandi Mani, (‘Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India’, November 2009), which explores the phenomenon of the power of politicians to transfer the bureaucrats to retain control over them.

Transfer of bureaucrats by politicians is not something unheard of, at least in India. Some of our Chief Ministers are actually famous for their tendency to transfer bureaucrats. This has prompted demands to put explicit limits on the politicians’ ability to transfer bureaucrats before they complete, say, at least two years of service in that position.

The authors build a theoretical model, based on some realistic assumptions in the Indian context. A noteworthy feature of the paper is that the predictions of the model are empirically verified by using a very unique dataset on the career histories of 2800 IAS officers between 1980 and 2004, combined with data on political changes in major Indian states over the same period, proxy measures for bureaucrats’ ability, and a measure of the relative importance of different posts as viewed by the bureaucrats themselves. I won’t go into details about the data. But it’s worth reading to see the efforts taken by the authors to collect such unique data.

What are their findings?

First, they find that IAS officers are indeed transferred quite frequently. Over the period of 1980-2000, the probability that an officer gets transferred is 53%. The average tenure of the IAS officers is merely 16 months.

Secondly, consistent with the hypothesis that the politicians use transfers as a control mechanism, they find that the average rate of bureaucrat transfers increases significantly, by 10% over the baseline of 53%, when there is a new Chief Minister. Most of these transfers take place in the first four months after a new CM takes over. Further, a CM who comes to power along with a new party in power, is twice as likely to transfer bureaucrats than a CM who comes to power without a change in the party in power. The majority of such transfers are what authors call ‘lateral’ transfers, i.e. not accompanied by promotion. Thus, these transfers are not for a reward for past performance or routine promotions that merely coincide with a new CM coming into the office.

The bureaucrats with a higher ability invest more in developing expertise, they undergo longer durations of training over the course of their entire career. These officers are also significantly more likely to be recommended for senior positions in the central government (‘empaneled’). But there is another way of obtaining important positions- by being ‘loyal’ to specific politicians. The authors find that the officers are more likely to be appointed to important positions when they belong to the same caste as the CM’s party base.

Disturbingly, the average importance of the posts held by an officer over the course of his or her career does not vary significantly with his ability– the officers with high ability are no more likely to be assigned to important posts than other (say, loyal) officers.

May be it’s time to pressurize the political establishment to pass the ‘Public Services Bill’, which stipulates that the bureaucrats can’t be transferred before completion of at least two years in that position. No wonder, only eleven states in India have agreed, while ten states have refused outright!

A house for the homeless

This article was published in One India One People magazine, June 2013 issue, available at: http://www.oneindiaonepeople.com/

After the Right to Education and the Right to Food, a new right is being sought to be tabled in Parliament – the Right to Housing. The Draft Homestead Bill 2013 aims at providing a homestead[1] of not less than 10 cents (0.1 acres or 4,356 sq. ft) to every landless and homeless poor family in rural areas.

Given that India is home to close to 8 million homeless rural families the demand for the right to housing is not surprising. In fact, the Twelfth Plan working group on rural housing estimates the shortage in the Plan period (2012-17) at around 40 million.

However, the main question arises is – how will this “right” differ in its implementation from the existing scheme on rural housing – the Indira Awas Yojana (IAY).

Background

Launched in 1985, IAY is Government of India’s (GOI) flagship programme on rural housing. The objective of the scheme is to provide funds to for the construction of dwelling units for members of Scheduled Castes (SCs)/Scheduled Tribes (STs), free bonded labourers, and non SC/ST rural below poverty line (BPL) households.

With effect from 2013, Rs. 70,000 is provided per dwelling unit for plain areas (up from 45,000 in 2009) and Rs. 75,000 for hilly/difficult areas (up from Rs. 48,500)[2]. IAY funds can also be utilized for up gradation of a kutcha house for which a subsidy of Rs. 15,000 per unit is provided. Further, IAY beneficiaries can also avail of a top-up loan of up to Rs. 20,000.[3] In 2009, to assist those rural BPL households who have neither agricultural land nor a house-site, IAY also launched a scheme for providing homestead sites.

Over the years, allocations for IAY have increased over 2-fold from Rs. 3,885 crores in 2007-08 to Rs. 8,121 crores in 2012-13. The scheme received a significant boost in allocations in 2013-14, when GOI allocated 15,184 crores- nearly doubling the allocations for the previous year.

During the 11th Five Year Plan, against a target of 140 lakh houses, 126.98 lakh houses were constructed at a cost of Rs. 53497 crores. (See Table below for performance in the last 10 years)[4].

Performance of IAY over the last 10 years				in lakhs
Year	GOI Allocation	GOI Release	Utilization	Target (No.of houses)	No.of houses constructed
2002-03	165640	162852.86	279496.46	13.14	15.49
2003-04	187050	187107.78	258009.69	14.84	13.61
2004-05	246067	288310.02	326208.64	15.62	15.21
2005-06	273240	273822.58	365409.05	14.41	15.52
2006-07	290753	290753.06	425342.45	15.33	14.98
2007-08	403270	388237.01	546454.3	21.27	19.92
2008-09	564577	879579.39	834834.33	21.27	21.34
2009-10	849470	863573.99	1329236.4	40.52	33.86
2010-11	1005370	1013945.4	1346572.75	29.08	27.15
2011-12	949120	986477.8	1292632.74	27.26	24.71

Source: Ministry of Rural Development, Annual Report 2012-13

While these numbers suggest a relatively well functioning scheme – most of GOI allocations are released, funds are utilised and houses are being constructed – there are wide state variations in performance and numerous issues with respect to implementation. Some of these are highlighted below:-

Implementation Highlights

1) Delays in Fund Flows and Construction

In 2012-13, till January (more than 3 quarters of the financial year completed), out of the total funds available[5] for IAY, only 63% of the funds were utilised. Moreover, only 46% percent of the annual target for construction was completed. These delays are particularly acute in some states. While Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh had utilised nearly 100 percent of their funds available during this period, Jammu and Kashmir had utilised only 21%, Punjab 36% and Tamil Nadu 45%. Other states such as Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, West Bengal and Maharashtra had utilised only between 50-60% of funds available.[6] According to reports, part of the problem lies with delayed release of funds. In 2012-13 itself, out of the total allocation of Rs. 10513.20 crores only 54% (Rs. 5655.37 crores) was released by January 2013.

Pace of construction is also slow. Till January 2013, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh had only completed 10% and 13% of their annual target for the year, respectively. Most other states also ranged between 20-50 percent completion rates including Maharashtra (20%), Odisha (32%), Gujarat (33%), Chhattisgarh (36%) and Kerala (46%).[7]

2) Quality of houses

An important concern over the years has been with respect to the quality of houses. According to the IAY guidelines, the construction of an IAY house is the responsibility of the beneficiary. While no specific design type has been stipulated for an IAY house, sanitary latrine and smokeless chullah’s are required to be constructed along with each IAY house.

The Planning Commission’s mid-term review of the XIth Plan noted many instances of “poor quality construction, sagging foundation, use of temporary materials for roofing or leaving the construction incomplete because of inadequate finance”[8]

Four years later, similar findings were reported by the Ministry’s National Level Monitors (NLMs). During their visit to 3083 villages across 478 districts, only 15.2% of the houses were found ‘Excellent’ in terms of quality of construction, 52.2 % were rated ‘Good’, and the remaining 32.6% were ranked poor or average condition. [9]

The NLMs further found that 16% of houses which have been sanctioned for more than 2 years were still incomplete. Moreover only, 8% of the verified houses visited had smokeless chullahs and only 39% had sanitary latrines provided.

3) Beneficiary selection and allotment of houses

Selection of beneficiaries was originally the responsibility of Gram Panchayats (GP). However, due to rampant irregularities and biased selection[10], the revised guidelines stipulate that beneficiaries be identified through a Permanent IAY Waiting lists prepared on the BPL list of 2002. In order to increase transparency these lists are supposed to be displayed in all GPs.

The NLM reports however found that out of 2780 villages where permanent IAY lists were finalised, only 53% villages these were displayed on the walls. Moreover in nearly 10% of the villages the selection of beneficiaries was still not based on these lists.

While guidelines specify that 60% of IAY allocation is meant for SC/ST families and IAY houses are to be allotted (in this order of preference) in the name of the woman or jointly between the husband and the wife, audit reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have found many instances of houses being allotted to “fake persons” or male members.[11]

5) Land availability

Finally, the biggest constraint faced is often with respect to land availability. Land costs tend to be high and in the absence of land, houses tend to be incomplete or in a worse case not be constructed despite being sanctioned.

These findings suggest that despite nearly 30 year of the scheme in operation, there are a number of hurdles with respect to the implementation of IAY. While GOI has taken some steps in addressing these (particularly with respect to increasing the unit costs of dwelling units. providing additional assistance for construction of toilets and increasing transparency in selection of beneficiaries), there still appears to be genuine constrains with respect to delays, lack of monitoring, technical capacity, lack awareness amongst beneficiaries and even unavailability of land. Until these implementation issues are resolved the “right to housing” is unlikely to go too far.

(The author is grateful to Ms. Saamia Ibrahim for her research assistance)

[1] Homestead is defined as a dwelling with adequate housing facilities including access to basic services (drinking water, electricity, roads and public transport), appropriate location, accessibility and cultural adequacy.

[2] Ministry of Rural Development, Annual Report 2012-13.

[3] This is a part of the Differential Rate of Interest (DRI scheme) wherein beneficiaries can apply for a loan from any Nationalised bank at an interest rate of 4% per annum

[4] Ministry of Rural Development, Annual Report 2012-13.

[5] Funding for IAY is shared between GOI and states in a 75:25 ratio (for UTs it is completely centrally funded)^{^[5]}. Total funds available would include releases by GOI and States as well as opening balances at the start of the year.

[6] Indira Awas Yojana Portal, PRC Meeting 1 and 2

[7] Ibid

[8] Planning Commission, Mid Term Appraisal for Eleventh Five Year Plan. Available online at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/mta/11th_mta/MTA.html

[9] Details of the criterias for different categories are available at: http://www.ruralmonitor.in/nlmreport/RM_12-13_Phase-I_All%20India.pdf

[10] The 11^th Five Year Plan document had found that “25 to 50 percent of beneficiaries were not being selected to Gram Sabhas’s. Alloaction among Panchayats were influenced by PRI/MLAs.

[11] For instance, CAG found that in one district in Maharashtra, in 685 out of 2426 cases allotment of houses at a cos of Rs.4.69 crores were to male members in 2010-11. A recent report on Odisha found Rs. 1.15 crore in allotment of houses to 1144 non-BPL families in 4 districts and irregular payments to 321 “fake” BPL beneficiaries

JNNURM – A Work in Progress

As India completes 60 years of being a republic, one can’t help but look around at our towns and cities and wonder where we are heading. And as a resident of Delhi, the first thought that comes to my mind (maybe due to the infinite signs that plague Delhi roads in anticipation of the Commonwealth Games) is that we today are a “work in progress”. Open drains, pot holes, roads dug up, lakhs of homeless people struggling to stay warm in the extreme cold are all constant reminders that urban chaos is becoming a way of life. And as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently noted, “our cities and towns are not an acceptable face of a rapidly modernizing and developing economy”.

This is despite the fact that on December 3rd, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), India’s comprehensive flagship programme for urban development completed four of its intended seven year tenure. This is no small amount of money –a total of Rs. 103,462 crores has been approved of which the centre has committed assistance of Rs. 55,625 crores, provided states and local bodies give their prescribed share of funds. However, the programme is running at a very slow pace, with not even a quarter of the projects completed and less than a third having got off the ground. To give a simple example, 14.59 lakh houses for the poor have been approved under the mission. However, so far only 1.80 lakh houses have been completed and another 4.38 lakh homes are under construction.

As more and more money gets pumped into the scheme (including a $1-billion loan which is currently being approved from the World Bank), serious questions need to be asked about state capacity and the ability of states to effectively utilize the money for urban development.

Even in terms of the enactment of the community participation law, out of the 26 states scheduled to implement it by the fourth year, only 8 have implemented it.

In particular, I would like to highlight three points that need careful attention as we move forward with JNNURM.

• First, Funds.
JNNURM works on a cost sharing model with centre, states and local bodies all having a prescribed share. Till March 2009, while states like Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu released over 70 percent of their share of funds, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab released just over half and Haryana only released 22 percent. Urban local bodies on their part too, have fallen behind. While Greater Mumbai and Hyderabad released over 80 percent of their funds, Chennai and Kolkata released only 24 and 18 percent respectively. Inability to release funds in time has resulted in significant delays to infrastructural projects. In Kanpur for instance, the repair work in the city, with a Rs 96.23 crore project allocated under JNNURM, is lying incomplete for the last three months due to a lack of funds. Reason: sanctioned funds from the state have already been used elsewhere.

• Second, Citizen Participation.
First principles of public accountability require that expenditures must adequately reflect citizens’ interests and priorities. Interestingly, citizen participation is embedded in the overall design of the JNNURM Mission. One mechanism is the creation of the National Technical Advisory Group, made of members of civil society. In addition, a Community Participation Fund (CPF) was also launched in September 2007 – to catalyze community participation by supporting the building of community assets. Moreover, states are mandated to enact community participation laws. However, while there is provision for about 1000 community projects under CPF, with Rs.90 crores already approved, only 21 projects have been sanctioned under this scheme for the mission cities as on May 2009, with 14 more awaiting approval. Even in terms of the enactment of the community participation law, out of the 26 states scheduled to implement it by the fourth year, only 8 have implemented it.

• And finally, Reforms.
In theory, these reforms ensure that governments at each level have the requisite autonomy, resources and power to carry out the duties assigned to them. In addition, they ensure accountability and efficiency. But in practice, these reforms have progressed very slowly. For instance, up to year 4, while 18 states had committed to implementation of the 74th constitutional Amendment Act (transfer of 12th schedule functions from states to urban local bodies), 8 states are yet to fully implement the reform. Similarly, while 29 states had committed to enact the Public Disclosure Law, only 15 states had successfully implemented the reform.

Another key objective of the JNNURM is to introduce e-governance in the municipalities to provide single-window services to the citizens, to increase efficiency and productivity of the urban local bodies (ULBs), and to provide timely and reliable management information. However, only 13 of 45 cities had enacted the reform.

In the coming years, as the quantum of money allocated for JNNURM increases, the pressure on states and local bodies to deliver will continue to increase. A careful look at the existing inefficiencies is therefore a priority – if our cities are to reflect our growth.

Avani Kapur is Researcher and Coordinator of PAISA project at Accountability Initiative.

How is Janani Suraksha Yojana performing in backward districts of India? – Part 3

So far we have seen that Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) has been successful in increasing institutional deliveries. The scheme is performing well even in some of the most backward districts in the country. But there is a scope for improvement in its functioning especially with regards to delays in receiving benefits, payment of bribes and other problems in receiving the benefits.

This part of the series discusses the role of the Accredited Social Health Workers (ASHA) and the Auxiliary Nurse Mid-wife (ANM).

Part III- Role of ASHA & ANM

An ASHA is a critical element of the NRHM and JSY. As per the guidelines, an ASHA is supposed to identify pregnant women in the village, make sure that they receive antenatal care, identify a functioning government or accredited private medical facility where these women can deliver their baby, escort them and stay with them at the medical facility till the time of discharge. She is also supposed to arrange immunization for the newborn and postnatal care.

We covered only a few of these aspects in our questionnaire. The results are discussed below and indicated in a table at the end of the blog.

1. Mode of Transport and Transport Arrangements

65% of women delivering in government medical facilities reached the institution using car/ taxi/ jeep, while 6% used an ambulance. Making transport arrangement for pregnant women is an ASHA’s responsibility. But 82% respondents reported that members of their household or other relatives made travel arrangement. Only 16% women mentioned that such an arrangement was made by an ASHA, while 2% reported that some health worker, other than ASHA, made the arrangement. There are variations across districts- ASHAs in Sundargarh, Nalanda, Hardoi and Gumla perform better than ASHAs in other districts.

2. Staying with Pregnant Woman

Only 72% women delivering in government medical facilities reported that a health worker (either ASHA or ANM or Anganwadi worker) stayed with them during delivery. The proportion is highest in Sundargarh, Hardoi (more than 90% in both) and Gumla (88%), while it is lowest in Udaipur (48%) and Rajgarh (55%).

Only 67% of these women reported that the ASHAs stayed with them at the facility during birth. The proportion is highest in Sundargarh (96%) and Hardoi (82%), and lowest in Udaipur (30%), Rajgarh (35%) and Bhilwara (37%).

More worryingly, 18% of women delivering in medical facilities reported that none amongst ASHA, ANM or Anganwadi worker stayed with them.

3. Post Delivery Visit

An ASHA is supposed to visit the women within seven days of delivery to track their health post-delivery. But only 47% women reported of a health worker visiting them in a week. Out of these women, 60% reported that an ASHA visited them, while 25% reported being visited by an ANM. Thus, proportion of women who delivered at a government facility and reported that ASHAs visited them within seven days is barely 28%[1].

This discussion clearly indicates that the performance of ASHAs leaves a lot to be desired.

We also canvassed a short questionnaire separately for ASHAs, where we asked about timing of their appointment, amount they receive per delivery, days post-delivery to receive their incentives, and impediments (if any) in receiving these incentives.

The data indicates that three-quarters of the ASHAs interviewed were appointed in the period 2005 to 2008. Thus, lack of experience is unlikely to explain why ASHAs might not be able to perform as per expectations.

ASHAs receive Rs 448 per delivery, on an average[2]. Interestingly, 35% of the ASHAs interviewed report receiving Rs 350 per delivery, while 37% report receiving Rs 600. Overall, 62% received less than Rs 600 per delivery. ASHAs in Hardoi and Nalanda report receiving Rs 600 per delivery, while ASHAs in Rajgarh and Korba receive the least amount per delivery within our sample districts, around Rs 340 on an average. This might also reflect the fact that the households are making transport arrangements themselves and ASHAs are being paid only the incentive amount and amount for escorting women to the facility.

When it comes to the timing of receiving incentives post-delivery, overall, 58% of surveyed ASHAs received their incentives within or up to 7 days, while 65% received it within or up to 15 days[3]. Bhilwara, Sundargarh and Udaipur perform quite well. More than 80% of ASHAs in these districts receive incentives within 7 days. Hardoi and Gumla are the worst performers where only 17% and 28% ASHAs report receiving their incentives within 7 days post-delivery.

Our findings are consistent with those of other studies[4]. The CES (2009) for instance found that on average ASHA’s accompanied only 54.3 percent of women who delivered in government institutions in low performing States (LPS) and in only 49.1 percent cases, the ASHA stayed with the woman. Even in terms of motivation, the percentage of rural women motivated by ASHAs was 19.2 percent in rural areas. Interestingly, according to the NHRC survey, when JSY beneficiaries were asked why the ASHA had not accompanied them, in about “40% the reason was that institutional delivery was not promoted by ASHAs”.

It is clear from the above discussion that while the payment of the incentive to the individual beneficiary has resulted in an increase in institutional delivery, there are some gaps with respect to the role of the ASHAs, and we need more specific evidence to learn more about them.

In the next and the final section, we will summarize the main findings of the survey and look at some of the constraints from the supply side – in terms of public health institutions and their facilities.

		Rajasthan		Jharkhand	Uttar Pradesh	Chhattisgarh	Bihar	Madhya Pradesh	Orissa	Overall
		Udaipur	Bhilwara	Gumla	Hardoi	Korba	Nalanda	Rajgarh	Sundargarh
Mode of transport to government medical facility	Ambulance	3.15	1.9	4.38	0.61	0	2.35	6.14	27.98	6.3
Mode of transport to government medical facility	Car/Taxi/Jeep	79.13	86.08	58.13	58.18	47.19	60.09	56.68	65.8	64.94
Who made arrangements in case of car/taxi/jeep to the government facility?	ASHA	7.96	13.24	23.91	23.96	0	28.13	3.25	29.13	16.09
	Other health worker	2.99	4.41	1.09	0	7.14	0	0.65	0	1.74
	Household	86.07	77.94	72.83	75	88.1	69.53	90.26	67.72	78.79
	Other relatives	1.99	2.94	2.17	0	4.76	2.34	5.19	3.15	2.77
Did any health worker stay with you at the govt. facility during the birth?		47.68	58.11	87.66	90.8	76.19	80.86	54.62	96.95	72.18
If yes, who stayed with you at the government facility?	ASHA	29.73	37.21	78.46	81.63	54.69	79.75	34.62	96.28	66.54
	ANM	26.13	23.26	11.54	3.4	14.06	7.36	7.69	2.66	10.3
	AWW	7.21	15.12	4.62	2.04	10.94	1.23	12.31	0	5.4
	None	36.94	24.42	5.38	12.93	20.31	11.66	45.38	1.06	17.76
Did any health worker visit you at the govt. facility during the birth?		41.67	42.04	72.26	41.36	53.93	54.07	19.03	72.02	47.21
If yes, who visited you?	ASHA	23.53	40.63	67.27	75.76	51.06	78.18	20	84.56	59.71
	ANM	42.16	32.81	26.36	10.61	25.53	15.45	66	6.62	24.96
	AWW	24.51	23.44	4.55	6.06	21.28	3.64	2	4.41	10.22
	Others	7.84	3.13	0.91	7.58	0	1.82	10	2.94	3.94
	Don’t know	1.96	0	0.91	0	2.13	0.91	2	1.47	1.17
Amount received by ASHA per delivery (Rs)	Mean	354.84	426.92	395.87	596.51	342.39	600	340.38	477.38	447.61
	Median	400	400	350	600	350	600	350	550	400
	Observations	31	26	49	43	46	38	26	42	301
% of ASHAs receiving incentives after delivery in government facility	Within 7 days	83.33	87.1	27.91	16.67	63.04	48.72	59.26	86.36	57.79
	Within 14 days	86.11	90.32	30.23	33.33	73.91	51.28	77.78	88.64	64.94
Days post delivery to receive the amount	Mean	8.06	7.16	28.74	23.48	8.52	24.03	7.56	4.86	14.55
Days post delivery to receive the amount	Median	3	3	30	15	7	8	7	1	5.5

[1] (47% * 60% = 28%)

[2] Median is Rs 400. There are 3 observations with values above Rs 100 and 3 observations with values greater than Rs 800. These have been excluded in calculations.

[3] 15 observations with more than 90 days have been excluded in these calculations.

[4] Coverage Evaluation Survey (2009), NHRC(2010), UNFPA (2007)