Blog Archive - Page 86 of 130 - Accountability Initiative: Responsive Governance

Its Our Money, Where’s it Gone? Social Auditing in Kenya

In Kenya, members of parliament receive approximately one million dollars per year to spend on development projects in their constituencies through a scheme called the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). However, with no system to hold them accountable, MPs spend these funds as they like and the CDF is plagued with corruption. Drawing on the experience of social audits in India, a civil society organisation, MUHURI is helping local slum dwelling communities in Mombasa investigate how their local CDF is being used. In a fascinating documentary “Its Our Money, Where’s it Gone?”, the International Budget Parternship presents the story of MUHURI and the transformative power of social audits in helping local communities hold the government to account.

Accountability Initiative Summer Internships 2010

The Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi invites applications for a summer internship programme offering internship positions to interested MA and M.PHIL students. The internship programme affords an opportunity to students interested in undertaking policy research on the mechanisms of accountability in India’s governance institutions.

Case Studies on Accountability Internship: Recent years have seen significant changes in the design of social sector schemes and programmes. Flagship schemes such as the National Rural Health Mission, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme have inbuilt institutional mechanisms for accountability. But how are these mechanisms working on the ground? And are they effective? The Accountability Initiative wants to document the implementation of these new mechanisms through a series of case studies. Interns would be assigned a particular case study and required to undertake desk and field based research over a five to six week period.

Duration: The internship will be for five to six weeks from mid May – end June 2010.

Qualifications:

MA and M.PHIL students with a preference for those studying sociology, political science, history, economics, development studies, law and journalism;
Strong research and analytical skills;
Strong writing skills;
Interns must be willing to travel for up to two weeks of the internship;
Knowledge of vernacular languages (please specify in your application);

Compensation: Interns will be paid a stipend to cover their expenses.

Working at AI: The AI staff comprises a decided team of professionals with different areas of expertise including, economics, political science and development studies. The intern will be working out of the AI office. The case studies internship will provide interns with exposure to key issues in the debate on governance and accountability in India. The internship will also give interns the opportunity to develop their policy and field research skills.

Application Requirements: Please submit a resume and cover letter along with a writing sample and one reference to Mandakini Devasher at [email protected]. Please specify “Case Studies Internship” in the subject line of the email.

Applications Deadline: Applications will be accepted on a rolling basis. The last date for submitting applications is 1 April 2010. Only shortlisted candidates will be contacted. For more information on the Accountability Initiative log on to our website: www.accountabilityindia.org.

Employment Programmes By Any Other Name

Is it an employment program? Is it an anti-poverty program? Is it a safety net? Is it a disaster management program, is it…..? Actually, it’s all of these. Public works programs are both good development and good politics. India’s National Employment Guarantee Scheme (now called the Mahatma Gandhi EGS) , despite its implementation challenges, is fast becoming the stuff international lore is made of.

Demographers talk of the diffusion effects of ideas of low fertility and other behaviors. And while South Asian countries have a history of public works programs as safety nets – a history that actually goes back to the Maurya Empire in circa 3rd century BC – the diffusion effect of NREGS across South Asia is apparent. This is as much due to the urgent employment needs in all countries in the region, as due to the fact that the Congress victory in India was purported to have hinged significantly on NREGS.

Consider some South Asian countries. Nepal has several public works programs based on both cash and food. In the remote and intractable hill districts (known by the omnibus category of the “Karnali Zone”) the government implements a food for work program, for which the World Food Program delivers food. There are similar programs in southern Nepal. Last summer I was in Sunsari – the part of the Tarai that was ravaged by the Kosi floods – and it was quite clear that the demand of public works programs far outweighs the supply.

Bangladesh similarly has a long history of both food and cash based public works programs. Its success in dealing with the chronic floods and cyclones is well known, but lesser known is the fact that public works programs have come to the rescue of households who have been hit by these disasters. Sri Lanka is considering similar interventions for its internally displaced persons.

In response to the food and fuel crisis about eighteen or so months ago, both Nepal and Bangladesh stepped up their coverage of employment generation programs. Bangladesh’s 100 Day Employment Program was evaluated independently by BRAC and the World Bank. The results have been very encouraging, showing reasonably good targeting of the poorest and efficient delivery of the program. Building on the experience of the 100 Day Employment Generation Program the Government of Bangladesh is now implementing the Employment Generation Program for the Poorest (EGPP), a cash-based workfare program.

But Bangladesh’s EGPP is very different from India’s NREGS. While both are based on a long history of implementing public works, yet the India program has a guarantee that entitles individuals to receive compensation if the work they seek is not provided within a certain period. The state has accepted and in fact co-opted an “entitlement approach” that was initially pushed hard by a formidable civil society movement. Citizen monitoring is built into the NREGS design and social audits are mandated twice a year even implementation uneven across states.

Moreover, NREGS is linked to a larger grassroots movement that questions the manner in which in India’s growth has affected the poorest and the high levels of malnutrition that persist despite overall reduction of poverty. A movement that is aided by judicial activism, citizen vigilance and an activist intelligentsia. Bangladesh, despite its renowned NGO movement does not have similar movements that demand accountability from the state.

Why is this?

Maitreyi Bordia Das is Senior Social Protection Specialist in the South Asia Human Development Department at the World Bank in Washington DC. This piece was cross posted from Maitreyi’s Blog. Log on to read more of her blog posts.

SC Moves Appeal to Itself on RTI

In an unprecedented move the Supreme Court of India has moved an appeal before itself. The appeal has been filed against the landmark decision of the Delhi High Court in January which brought the office of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) under the purview of the Right to Information Act 2005. The appeal is set against the backdrop of debates within government about amending the Right to Information Act 2005 to exclude frivolous requests for information, discussions on policy matters and also the office of the Chief Justice.

CDF Policy Briefs on Centrally Sponsored Schemes

The Centre for Development Finance has released a series of policy briefs that analyse and evaluate the performance of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). The first four scheme briefs look at the performance of Integrated Child Development Services scheme (ICDS), Mid Day Meal (MDM) scheme, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). The briefs provide a thematic insight in to the issues of early child care and development, school feeding, sustainable livelihood generation, and universalising primary education, respectively. Click here to download the briefs.

Who Cares About Outcomes?

I had almost forgotten, till I saw a copy at a friend’s office yesterday, that every year in Parliament’s budget session, apart from presenting the annual budget, the Government of India tables an outcomes budget where every ministry reports on its outcomes. Remiss as I was in forgetting, I can’t be blamed, entirely. The outcomes budget was launched amidst much talk of reform in 2005 by then finance minister P Chidambaram. In a promising budget speech, he said ‘I must caution that outlays do not necessarily result in outcomes’. ‘The people of this country,’ he went on to add, ‘are concerned with outcomes’. And to his credit he launched the outcomes budget. In its short five year existence, the budget has been nothing but a damp squib. So valued is the outcomes budget that it never makes even the inside pages of newspapers and if you want to look for them on line – well best of luck to you.

What went wrong? Well, like many things in government, the idea is a good one but its implementation nothing short of poor. There are two critical elements to a successful ‘outcomes budget’. First, it requires the identification of clear, concise and quantifiable outcome indicators. These indicators need to be tangible and realistic. Here the outcomes budget falls short. Indicators are vague – the health ministry describes ‘funding of institutions’ and ‘widening of surveillance mechanisms’ as some of its key outcomes- making measurement impossible and irrelevant.

Second, for an ‘outcomes budget’ to achieve results it must be accompanied by increased information on performance against these indicators. The Finance Minister emphasized this at the launch of the outcomes budget, by pointing out that the objective of the budget is to put critical data on expected outcomes in to the public domain and allow for public scrutiny. On this count too, the outcomes budget has fallen far short of expectations. The budget itself was launched with much media fanfare but over the years it has simply disappeared from the public radar. There is no evidence of any proactive effort by government agencies to generate and disseminate information on progress.

In today’s Mint, Sanjiv Misra, former member of the 13th Finance Commission made some interesting observations about the failure of the outcomes budget. He points out that for reforms like the Outcomes Budget to be successful it requires the “establishment of countrywide performance benchmarks and costing norms for the public goods and services supplied; development of measurable performance indicators for the objectives set out; development of performance monitoring systems to regularly collect data on the actual results achieved; independent third-party evaluation of major programmes; and use of performance contracts to enforce accountability of key actors.” He so argues for the need to link performance on outcomes budgeting with pay.

The interesting thing about India today is that we have all these design instruments in place and we speak the right ‘speak’. Everyone in Government from the highest to the lowest agree that outcomes matter. Everyone in Government from the highest to the lowest agree that these need to be monitored and that he failure to do just this is the cause of our persistent poor performance on human development. Everyone in Government from the highest to the lowest has some interesting ideas on how to address this problem. As we speak the cabinet secretariat is running a seminar on performance oriented monitoring in the civil services. In fact the performance management wing of the cabinet secretariat has signed a significant number of contracts with Government of India departments to performance criterion and goals and there are some whispers about introducing pay for performance measures. At the same time the planning commission seems to be moving towards setting up the Independent Evaluation Office and a few months ago, PMO set up a delivery monitoring unit. There is also much talk of using technology through the UID and other instruments to develop a transparent expenditure information network that will allow for transparency and regular tracking of government funds. All of which have the potential to address the problems reforms like the outcomes budget faces. But for these instruments to take effect, we need political will – and that as we all know is sadly missing. What we need now is not more instruments but a better understanding of how to circumvent this lack of political will and push for change.

Yamini Aiyar is the Director, Accountability Initiative.

India’s Anti-Corruption Agency in the Global Integrity Report 2009

The Global Integrity (GI) Report 2009 rates India as moderately capable of handling the “cancer” of corruption (70 on 100). With its legal framework scoring 86 (strong), India’s actual implementation of accountability mechanisms and transparency is only 55 (very weak) leaving a very large implementation gap of 31. Unlike other corruption indices, the GI Index does not measure corruption, but using responses to 300+ Integrity Indicators, it assesses “the access that citizens and businesses have to a country’s government, their ability to monitor its behaviour, and their ability to seek redress and advocate for improved governance” as a measure of a government’s ability to prevent abuse of power and promote public integrity.

The Anti-corruption and Rule of Law category of the Indicators shows that India’s strong anti-corruption laws (score: 89) are made ineffective by a weak anti-corruption agency (score: 69), weak rule of law (score: 67) and very weak law enforcement (score: 58).

More than a decade after the Supreme Court (SC) gave extensive directions to the government in the landmark Vineet Narain case to secure the independence of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate, the governments in power continue to manipulate the CBI and the legal processes instead of consistently upholding the rule of law.

Why anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) fail has been well documented through the experiences of many countries. Fear of consequences that lead to loss of independence and autonomy, unrealistic expectations when fighting deeply entrenched systemic corruption, excessive reliance on enforcement after the event, lack of public involvement, insufficient accountability, are some of the reasons of failure frequently cited.

These causes may well apply to ACAs in India because the flaws are largely institutional. Independence and autonomy of the CBI is a myth. The CBI still must get permission from the government to register cases (under certain situations) and sanction for prosecution of corruption cases against public servants. The Criminal Procedure Code makes it essential for the CBI to take permission of the government before it can appeal to a higher court against a case lost in the trial court. Senior level police officers in the CBI belong to the Indian Police Service who owe their allegiance to the government who appoint and can remove them from service.

Despite its claim to a “three pronged strategy for prevention, surveillance and detection as well as deterrent and punitive action” to contain corruption, the preventive vigilance functions of the ACAs (which in the Central government is a multi-agency combined force of the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT), Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), CBI and Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) is virtually non-existent. Asset declaration religiously gathered and filed by the government departments is a good example. Low registration of cases and low conviction rates point as much to poor vigilance as to ineffective investigation and prosecution.

The SC perhaps tried to create a powerful single agency by its 1997 judgment endowing the CVC with powers of supervision and control over vigilance administration and corruption cases and also over CBI investigations. As a statutory body answerable to the Parliament, the SC directives were intended to insulate appointments, investigation and prosecution from government control, read the DoPT. This experiment with independence has nearly failed.

But the single-agency approach appears to have worked for South Korea, which the GI Report rates as the most capable of all the 35 countries assessed to fight corruption. It not only scores full marks for its AC law, but its ACA is rated as strong (an Independent Commission that reports to the President), as is its law enforcement. A powerful centralized agency that has also worked excellently is Hong Kong’s (not part of the GI Report) Independent Commission Against Corruption whose mission is to prosecute the “big fish” in combination with encouraging citizen involvement in oversight and reporting of corruption cases.

In attempting to create a single agency system, was the SC relying far too much on independence and autonomy? Interestingly, studies show that accountability and formal independence, though desirable, are overrated because they can be so easily subverted by political factors. This seems to be borne out by the GI data which show that ACAs of a large number of countries like India, Algeria, Columbia, Venezuela, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, which are in law protected from political interference, fare poorly when it comes to actual practice. The United States on the other hand, without any formal law, scores highly in insulating its ACA.

Effective laws, procedures, courts system, and financial system governance have been found to make ACAs successful. The experiences of Hong Kong have shown that public and civil society participation to eradicate corruption are effective strategies. As are freedom of information laws.

Collecting and publishing performance data is sine qua non for analysing performance of ACAs. Unfortunately, so little of it is available on India. For example, once too often CBI announces countrywide raids to catch corrupt public officials, but there is rarely any information on the follow-up. Given the low levels of cases which actually to go trial, it is doubtful that CBI puts its raid data to effective use. Looking inwards is the only way India’s ACAs can shed their public image that they exist only to shield the corrupt.

Madhumita D. Mitra is a Consultant with Corporate Lexport, a law firm based in New Delhi

RTE sparks a centre-state row: We want your views!

India made international headlines last week with the official enactment of Right to Education Act (RTE) guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory education to every child between the age group of 4 and 16 years. But barely a week after it was passed by Parliament, the RTE has been mired in an intense debate over centre-state relations. Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Mayawati has led criticisms of the RTE, arguing that the new law puts an immense implementation and fiscal burden on already cash strapped states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. A number of states including West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Bihar and Punjab have voiced similar concerns about how they will fund the RTE.

The current exchange of barbs and criticisms across party lines highlights an important question: in an increased era of centralization, where policies are designed by the centre but implemented by states – where do states find the resources to fund and implement such massive programs? And who is ultimately accountable for how these programs are rolled out on the ground? Who is answerable for how monies were spent, progress made and targets achieved? These questions are not restricted to the RTE but apply to the broader package of social reforms including the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, National Rural Health Mission, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission introduced by the government in the last few years.

What do you think? Write in and share your views with us.

Launch of the Right to Education Portal

A new Right to Education Portal has been launched by the Centre for Civil Society, as part of the RTE Coalition created to nurture a democratic space where each coalition partner and interested citizen will be able to strategize and contribute as to make universal elementary education a reality in India. The focus is on the Right to Education Act and its implementation at all levels. To access the portal click here.