Who Cares About Outcomes?

I had almost forgotten, till I saw a copy at a friend’s office yesterday, that every year in Parliament’s budget session, apart from presenting the annual budget, the Government of India tables an outcomes budget where every ministry reports on its outcomes. Remiss as I was in forgetting, I can’t be blamed, entirely. The outcomes budget was launched amidst much talk of reform in 2005 by then finance minister P Chidambaram. In a promising budget speech, he said ‘I must caution that outlays do not necessarily result in outcomes’. ‘The people of this country,’ he went on to add, ‘are concerned with outcomes’. And to his credit he launched the outcomes budget. In its short five year existence, the budget has been nothing but a damp squib. So valued is the outcomes budget that it never makes even the inside pages of newspapers and if you want to look for them on line – well best of luck to you.

What went wrong? Well, like many things in government, the idea is a good one but its implementation nothing short of poor. There are two critical elements to a successful ‘outcomes budget’. First, it requires the identification of clear, concise and quantifiable outcome indicators. These indicators need to be tangible and realistic. Here the outcomes budget falls short. Indicators are vague – the health ministry describes ‘funding of institutions’ and ‘widening of surveillance mechanisms’ as some of its key outcomes- making measurement impossible and irrelevant.

Second, for an ‘outcomes budget’ to achieve results it must be accompanied by increased information on performance against these indicators. The Finance Minister emphasized this at the launch of the outcomes budget, by pointing out that the objective of the budget is to put critical data on expected outcomes in to the public domain and allow for public scrutiny. On this count too, the outcomes budget has fallen far short of expectations. The budget itself was launched with much media fanfare but over the years it has simply disappeared from the public radar. There is no evidence of any proactive effort by government agencies to generate and disseminate information on progress.

In today’s Mint, Sanjiv Misra, former member of the 13th Finance Commission made some interesting observations about the failure of the outcomes budget. He points out that for reforms like the Outcomes Budget to be successful it requires the “establishment of countrywide performance benchmarks and costing norms for the public goods and services supplied; development of measurable performance indicators for the objectives set out; development of performance monitoring systems to regularly collect data on the actual results achieved; independent third-party evaluation of major programmes; and use of performance contracts to enforce accountability of key actors.” He so argues for the need to link performance on outcomes budgeting with pay.

The interesting thing about India today is that we have all these design instruments in place and we speak the right ‘speak’. Everyone in Government from the highest to the lowest agree that outcomes matter. Everyone in Government from the highest to the lowest agree that these need to be monitored and that he failure to do just this is the cause of our persistent poor performance on human development. Everyone in Government from the highest to the lowest has some interesting ideas on how to address this problem. As we speak the cabinet secretariat is running a seminar on performance oriented monitoring in the civil services. In fact the performance management wing of the cabinet secretariat has signed a significant number of contracts with Government of India departments to performance criterion and goals and there are some whispers about introducing pay for performance measures. At the same time the planning commission seems to be moving towards setting up the Independent Evaluation Office and a few months ago, PMO set up a delivery monitoring unit. There is also much talk of using technology through the UID and other instruments to develop a transparent expenditure information network that will allow for transparency and regular tracking of government funds. All of which have the potential to address the problems reforms like the outcomes budget faces. But for these instruments to take effect, we need political will – and that as we all know is sadly missing. What we need now is not more instruments but a better understanding of how to circumvent this lack of political will and push for change.

Yamini Aiyar is the Director, Accountability Initiative.

Community-Funded Participatory Journalism: New era of Grievance Redresser

The Indian government is spending crores of rupees on welfare schemes. However that is news to Sharan, whose house is half built as the money from Indira Vikas Yojna was inadequate to even complete the roof. Sharan lives in a village just 10 km away from Purnia town. While symbols of modernity like mobile phone have made inroads, welfare lags. Sharan said officials asked for a 200 rupee bribe for a job card under NREGA -a charge echoed across several villagers.

“Does the government know that we are willing to work under NREGA and still not getting any job? Where should we go and complain then?” Sharan asked. Who can possibly give Sharan his answers?

The concept of community co-funded participatory journalism aims to put consumers of news in touch with journalists and publishers – allowing the consumers to request news about topics of interest. If you have 50 people, you can all hire a journalist from the nearest block office to investigate the problems in the fund flow management under various social sector schemes. This report would enable the villagers to identify the right person in the long chain of officials and demand accountability from him.

Now the obvious question how it is different from other existing tools and how do I envision it as a tool that can improve service delivery mechanism? In this model, there is a direct connection between the consumer and the producer. People are asking for reliable information from an individual, not organizations. In this set up, end users would decide what stories need to be told. Journalist can investigate about the origins of the problem and how the concerned authority could possibly remediate it. There would be media centres in each block, and would be run by local graduates. Reporters are selected from district based panel and posted in a particular district office. They need to be present at the block office on few given dates and time, to register request from the villagers. The cost of this time bound investigation would be shared by the government and by the fund raised (tax empted) from the common people. All the donation would go to the selected scheme/topic and place the donor want it to go. There would be guidelines specifying the standards of remuneration. It would be based on competitive rates throughout the country for freelancers. If a news organization wants to buy exclusive rights to the story – then they can do so by paying the government.

Government would only fully sponsor two stories per month for each block. Beyond these two stories, if the money doesn’t materialize, the idea goes unreported. Local people can report if their information needs are met at the end of the investigation. No one person can donate more than 20% of the total cost, and the report needs to be peer reviewed to avoid unethical practices. The government can put 5% of the annual social sector allocation for this project. For 2010-11, the amount comes out to be Rs 14, 741 crores of rupees.

Copies of report would reach the DM, MP, MLA and BDO or the councillor (depending on rural or urban set up). Pictorial representations need to be created for the illiterate consumers (who requested for the news). There would be designated media partners to publish or broadcast the stories on local news channel.

To equip thousands of illiterate citizens with the tools for demanding accountability from the public service provider is not an easy task. We certainly need to experiment. Some of them might not work. But we need to launch a lot of boats.

Sruti Bandyopadhyay is a Researcher with the Accountability Initiative

Assam to Guarantee Right to Health

Assam became the first state in the country to introduce a bill guaranteeing the right to health and well-being. The state government tabled the Assam Public Health Bill, 2010, in the assembly on March 12, 2010. The bill, will be put to vote on March 31.

The bill proposes to make it compulsory for both government and private hospitals to provide free healthcare services and maintain appropriate protocol of treatment for the first 24 hours to an emergency patient. Whether the state has the capacity to fulfil these promises may be debatable, it is certainly true that Assam has a long way in achieving this target.

We highlight the positional matrix of Assam related to health sector in the following graphs. (Figures are taken from Lok Sabha website).





Sruti Bandyopadhyay is a Research Associate with Accountability Initiative

Performance Management and Government?

Performance management and government – two words you don’t often hear together and when you do – you’re quite likely to roll your eyes and move on to the next headline. That’s what I used to do until I attended a SAARC workshop on “Government Performance Management” which changed my mind. The two-day workshop in New Delhi from 30-31 March 2010, brought together delegates from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan to discuss what government’s can do to improve their performance. Quite surprisingly the Indian government is doing a whole lot.

Under a directive from the Prime Minister’s Office, departments with uncharacteristic speed and efficiency have been implementing a new “Performance Monitoring and Evaluation System” (PMES) since 2009. At the heart of the PMES is a relatively simple concept – “what gets measured, gets managed”. It marks a shift away from traditional practices of measuring expenditures as outcomes to a more rigorous system of evaluating the performance of government departments. Steered by the Cabinet Secretariat’s Performance Management Division, the PMES is designed to help government departments define, measure and monitor their progress against defined targets and indicators.

How will it work?

At the beginning of each year (1 April), government departments have to develop a Results Framework Document (RFD) which is essentially a performance agreement signed between a Minister and the Secretary of a particular department. In the RFD, departments have to address three basic questions: i) what are the main objectives of the department for the year? ii) what actions are necessary to achieve these objectives and finally iii) what are the success indicators necessary to evaluate these actions. The matrix that results from this exercise is locked into an online MIS system which is then tracked through the year. The department’s progress against these set targets is first reviewed after 6 months and finally evaluated at the end of the year (31 March). Till date, 62 line ministries have signed up to the RFD and their RFDs can already be accessed online. Under discussion is also a controversial proposal to link 40% of a Secretary’s salary to the department’s performance. If implemented this would introduce a system of performance based pay never before seen in the history of Indian administration.

 

When you factor in the many centrally sponsored schemes and their complex funding and implementation structures – things get even more complicated.

 

Potential roadblocks?

While all of this looks fantastic on paper, you have to wonder how it will work in practice given the scale and complexity of India’s governance and service delivery system. Take the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) for example; it is one of the largest ministries in the government with a budget of Rs 66137.86 crore for the year 2010-11. The Department of Rural Development – one of three departments within the Ministry – handles a range of social sector programmes including the NREGA, SGSY, PMGSY, IAY, NSAP and PURA. The scale of their interventions is tremendous: 28 states, 619 districts, 6484 blocks, 2.5 lakh panchayats, 15 lakh rural habitations and 542.90 lakh BPL households (data from MoRD). How do you begin to map all of this into a results based performance management system?

When you factor in the many centrally sponsored schemes and their complex funding and implementation structures – things get even more complicated. Here there are practical issues of coordination between different layers of bureaucracy, data and information gaps, limited implementation capacity, questions about the quality of services and even the quality of reporting. Over and above these implementation issues, there are broader questions about how the PMES will fit in with existing reporting and monitoring mechanisms which now include an Independent Evaluation Office and the Prime Ministers’ Delivery Monitoring Unit. Without sustained political will and proper incentives to see it through there is a real danger that the PMES will become just one amongst many well-intentioned but poorly implemented monitoring mechanisms – the ill-fated outcomes budget comes to mind.

Without a doubt, the government has its work cut out. But we have reasons to be optimistic. There is clearly a lot of political will and energy backing the PMES and its evident the Cabinet Secretariat means business. This is definitely one trend worth watching!

Mandakini Devasher Surie is a Research Associate with the Accountability Initiative.

RTI Act – to Amend or Not to Amend?

The RTI Act – to amend or not to amend? That is the question that has everyone talking. In a rare instance, Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh and Congress President, Sonia Gandhi are on opposite sides of the debate with the Prime Minister backing amendments to the Act in the face of strong opposition from activists. Under consideration are three major amendments which if pushed through will exempt frivolous and vexatious requests for information; discussions on policy decisions (read file notings) and the office of the Chief Justice of India. But the big question is why amend the RTI Act at all? The government’s take on the issue is simple – the amendments are necessary to improve the functioning of the law and to prevent its misuse by false or frivolous requesters. RTI activists on the other hand feel that the amendments have been designed to appease a recalcitrant bureaucracy and judiciary and will restrict the scope of the law.

Looking at just the first of the proposed amendments – frivolous and vexatious requests – it is not really clear what the government has in mind. What exactly is a frivolous or vexatious request for information? And more importantly who gets to decide and on what criteria? The fact of the matter is that most RTI requests are simple requests for information on government rules, procedures, budgets, expenditure, schemes and policies etc. Studies have shown the RTI Act is frequently used as a grievance redressal tool with people filing RTIs to find out why they have not received their ration cards, passports, election cards or other benefits. Most of this information should already be available and accessible to the public. But such requests are often considered vexatious, frivolous or voluminous simply because government departments do not have the necessary records management and information retrieval systems to deal with them.

For the small percentage of applications that are genuinely annoying, governments need to think of creating ways of dealing with them. In the UK, government departments get a fair number of ‘frivolous’ requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In 2006, the Hampshire Police received a request for a list of the names and addresses of eligible bachelors within the Hampshire constabulary. Taking the request in their stride, the office replied that they did in fact have 210 eligible bachelors on the rolls but sadly could not give out their personal information! In another case the Ministry of Defence got a request from an ex-sailor wanting to track down “an old Royal Navy recipe for sautéed kidneys and curried meatballs”!

In India, a creative solution is luckily close at hand and departments need look only as far as the RTI Act for help. Section 4 of the RTI Act requires departments to routinely publish 17 categories of information. This includes information on the functions and powers of an organisation, its decision making procedures, the names and contact details of officials and information on salaries, budgets, subsidy schemes etc. This information has to be updated regularly and published on the departments’ website and through other means. If implemented properly proactive disclosure gives people easy and regular access to government information which minimises the need for citizens to file formal RTI requests. This in turn helps reduce the volume of RTI requests received by government departments.

Unfortunately, departments across the country have a poor Section 4 compliance record. According to a recent study by the Right to Information Assessment and Analysis Group (RaaG), most departments are reporting only 30% of their Section 4 requirements. And even this information is incomplete and out of date. The problem is multifaceted. On the one hand there are a lot of departments that simply pay lip service to Section 4 and are insincere in their disclosure efforts. On the other hand there are departments who simply do not know what information they should be disclosing. The lack of awareness, training and capacity building of officials and departments on their proactive disclosure obligations is a major implementation hurdle. Poor records management is another. Archaic systems of records keeping, retrieval and archiving make it nearly impossible for Public Information Officers (PIOs) to piece together Section 4 information. Clearly, the need of the hour is stronger and more effective implementation of the RTI Act particularly Section 4 and not amendments.

In an effort to pacify RTI activists, the government has decided to shelve the amendments until consultations have been held with a range of stakeholders. But rather than seesawing on the issue, the government would do better to take on board the findings of the recent RaaG study which shows that more than frivolous and vexatious requests – weak implementation, lack of training and capacity building and poor records management are the major constrains faced by the governments in implementing the RTI Act today. In 2004, the UPA Government in its Common Minimum Programme promised to make the RTI Act “progressive, participatory and meaningful” – the current amendments fall far short of this promise.

Mandakini Devasher Surie is a Research Associate with the Accountability Initiative

Launch of the Right to Education Portal

A new Right to Education Portal has been launched by the Centre for Civil Society, as part of the RTE Coalition created to nurture a democratic space where each coalition partner and interested citizen will be able to strategize and contribute as to make universal elementary education a reality in India. The focus is on the Right to Education Act and its implementation at all levels. To access the portal click here.

RTE sparks a centre-state row: We want your views!

India made international headlines last week with the official enactment of Right to Education Act (RTE)  guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory education to every child between the age group of 4 and 16 years. But barely a week after it was passed by Parliament, the RTE has been mired in an intense debate over centre-state relations. Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Mayawati has led criticisms of the RTE, arguing that the new law puts an immense implementation and fiscal burden on already cash strapped states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. A number of states including West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Bihar and Punjab have voiced similar concerns about how they will fund the RTE.

The current exchange of barbs and criticisms across party lines highlights an important question: in an increased era of centralization, where policies are designed by the centre but implemented by  states – where do states find the resources to fund and implement such massive programs? And who is ultimately accountable for how these programs are rolled out on the ground? Who is  answerable for how monies were spent, progress made and targets achieved? These questions are not restricted to the RTE but apply to  the broader package of social reforms including the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, National Rural Health Mission, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission introduced by the government in the last few years.

What do you think? Write in and share your views with us.

From the right to education to the right to food

From the right to education to the right to food, solving our development problems by clothing India’s citizens with new rights seems to be the flavor of our times. What should we make of this rise of rights? Skeptics have argued (and with some conviction) that this expansion of rights serves merely to raise expectations of delivery from a state that has proved conclusively that its greatest characteristic is its inefficiency. And so these new rights amount to nothing but political rhetoric. In a recent article on the subject the Economist suggests just this: ‘Perhaps its only indisputable achievement is political – as potential vote-winners, rights-based schemes are often attractive to politicians, no matter how effective they are’. And perhaps because of their political salience, another set of criticisms is that they serve as a diversion from the real challenge of creating an accountable and responsive state. While it could be argued that creating rights might in fact do just this, in reality – in a system where grievance redressal mechanisms are barely functional and the courts are no different to other arms of the Indian state (and should judges really be making decisions on areas where they have no competency?) – these new rights can never be made justiciable and thus have little credibility. See these link on the subject: When the blueprint isnt sound.

So do we dismiss this expansion of rights as nothing but new labels on old bottles that will dilute their own credibility, as mere political rhetoric that will divert from the real challenge at hand? I think not. To understand the potential of these new rights, it is important to think of them in the context of the power dynamics that shape state-citizen relationships in India. It is now a commonplace observation that in much of India citizen-state relationships exist more in the realm of patronage – the paternalistic, mai-baap sarkar that distributes state largess – than in the realm of rights and responsibilities. In this sense Indian democracy has fallen short of its ideal –honoring the standing of citizens and free and equal persons. The invocation of the language of rights in citizen’s everyday dealings with the state offers the opportunity to re–frame modes of citizen engagement from that of being passive recipients to becoming active agents that ‘demand’ services as their right. And this is critical to accountability. In a panel discussion we organized a few months ago, Nikhil Dey made the interesting point that ‘accountability from, the citizen’s point of view, is inextricably tied to basic entitlements. Who can I hold accountable if I don’t have an entitlement?’

We need to think long and hard about creating effective grievance redressal; about undertaking much needed administrative reforms and at the very minimum about ensuring that people are made adequately aware of their rights and what this means for accessing services from the state.

Consider the movement for the Right to Information – arguably the first (and perhaps most successful) effort in India to expand the notion of fundamental rights to the domain of social and economic rights. The movement pushed the frontiers of the notion of access to information to offer a radical interpretation of access to information as a ‘right’ that is fundamental to citizen’s right to participate in government and hold it accountable. This interpretation was premised on the notion that the provision of a ‘right’ fundamentally alters power asymmetries between citizens and the state by giving citizens an entitlement which they have a ‘right’ to demand. Two of Accountability Initiative’s researchers have recently completed a study of the effects of a citizen’s organization in Delhi – the Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS) – that has been working with slum dwellers (mostly women) to invoke the Right to Information as a means to access basic services – ration cards, widow’s pensions from the state. SNS has also been running information campaigns to build resident capacity to engage with the formal government system. A language of rights and entitlements is integral to SNS’s information campaigns. The study finds that making citizens aware of their rights and entitlements and pushing them to invoke these rights to access services has had an empowering influence on slum dwellers who are have increasingly more confidence in making demands directly to officials and politicians. In fact the study finds that awareness of rights and entitlements and the invocation of these rights in dealings with officials– particularly the right to information has had considerable success in enabling citizens to access basic services.

But in all of this one needs to acknowledge that the aspirations of rights approaches will only be met if one addresses the hard challenge of ensuring that entitlements are realized. We need to think long and hard about creating effective grievance redressal; about undertaking much needed administrative reforms and at the very minimum about ensuring that people are made adequately aware of their rights and what this means for accessing services from the state. The rhetoric of rights adopted by the current political dispensation offers an opportunity to do this. But this will require concerted civil society action. Can civil society rise to the challenge? And will civil society pressure be enough?

In sum, rights approaches could be the starting point of re-articulation of citizen state relationships – one that could fundamentally alter the nature of the Indian state. Or they could end up proving critics right and end up as yet another moment in Indian democracy that never took off.

Yamini Aiyar is the Director, Accountability Initiative.

World Press Freedom Day – Special focus on Right to Know

Today (May 3rd) is World Press Freedom day. Ever since it’s proclamation by the UN in 1993, the World Press Freedom Day has aimed at raising awareness about media freedom issues and to promote the right of journalists to collect and disseminate information without risk to life or liberty. The theme for this year’s World Press Day is the “Right to Know” or “Freedom of Information”. Today more than 80 countries around the world have introduced laws that guarantee citizens the right to access information held by public authorities. The Right to know has been recognized as an essential part of the right to freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<br /><br />In the World Press Freedom Day Conference organised by UNESCO, Governments have been called on to enact laws guaranteeing the right to information. Participants of World Press Freedom Day on Monday adopted the Brisbane Declaration. The declaration calls on UNESCO member states “to enact legislation guaranteeing the right to information in accordance with the internationally-recognized principle of maximum disclosure”.It also demands that media companies to raise awareness of freedom of expression and the right to information, and for UNESCO to aid the development and implementation of new laws. (<a href=”http://www.wpfd2010.org/news/17-news/124-conference-adopts-brisbane-declaration”>Read more…</a>)<br /><br />In addition, Access Info Europe and Transparency International, together with members of the Freedom of Information Advocates Network and the UNCAC Coalition, are marking World Press Freedom Day by submitting requests for information in 30 countries around the globe under the Tell Us What You’ve Done Initiative. (<a href=”http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2010/2010_05_03_world_press_freedom”>Read More…..</a>)

SC Upholds the MPLADs Scheme: A Questionable Judgement?

On Thursday, the Supreme Court Bench passed an order upholding the disastrous MPLAD Scheme – claiming it was meant for public purpose. The MPLAD is a disaster not because, as newspapers often report, of the extent of corruption in MPLAD expenditures and the extent to which these schemes are used to dispense patronage – these are problems faced by most public sector programs. It’s a disaster because it encourages MP’s to overstep their domain, performing a function that is not officially their and weakening the constitutional separation of roles and responsibilities across jurisdictions. All this has serious consequences on strengthening accountability. Let’s consider the arguments.

The first issue is that MPLADs assigns executive functions to legislators and thereby confuses the separation of powers – after all should MP’s be administering funds and determining their specific resource allocation? This creates a conflict of interest between the legislator and the executive and seriously compromises the oversight function that legislators ought to play. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission used this critique to recommend that the scheme be abolished.

Another argument, made by the 2002 National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), is that the MPLADS scheme violates the distribution of powers between the union, states and local governments as defined in the constitution. Therefore, it is inconsistent with the spirit of federalism. The NCRWC report points out that all the activities on which MP’s can spend their funds are already on state lists. Furthermore, the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments mandated that many of these become activities to be undertaken by Panchayats and Municipal governments. Thus the scheme seriously undermines local bodies by creating incentives for MPs to provide basic civic services such as roads, bridges and street-lights that are constitutionally the responsibility of local governments.

In the present system, individual MPs decide how to spend the money and funds are disbursed through the district administration. Local bodies are neither consulted nor involved in the details of execution despite the fact that articles 243G and 243W of the constitution entrust local bodies with the powers to prepare and implement plans for economic development and social justice. In recognition of this problem, the National Advisory Council in a report to the government in 2005, recommended that the scheme guidelines be changed to require that the funds be spent through local bodies. These criticisms point to two much deeper, unresolved questions confronting our democracy. First, what is the role of the MP, the MLA and the local body representative? Second, what do we, as voters, hold them accountable for?

From an MP’s perspective, the MPLAD scheme is important because it allows them to tangibly and quickly respond to their constituents’ needs. At election time, these achievements can be drawn upon to highlight the MP’s performance. After all, what happens in Parliament is so far removed from the typical voter, that this becomes an easy way for an MP to demonstrate five years of work. Nevertheless, this presents a dilemma. Since the constitution already demands that these functions be performed by local governments, not the MP, who should be held accountable by the voter? This dilemma has significantly obfuscated accountabilities and confused voter expectation.

However, the bigger question we need to ask is: should this be the role of the MP? India decentralized because it recognized that local governments are best suited to assess local needs and are better placed to respond to them than State or Center. Local governments were created and entrusted with this responsibility by virtue of their ‘localness’ – an MP typically represents 10-15 lakh voters, while a Gram Panchayat represents on average 3000 voters – and because they can be held directly accountable for fulfilling these needs. Ironically, Panchayats and Municipalities are starved for funds to perform their constitutionally assigned roles, while MPs, thanks to the MPL LADS enjoy the privilege of an uninterrupted yearly flow of funds to do the job of Panchayats and Municipalities. Given that local bodies are better placed to deliver civic services then it may be wiser to devolve funds directly to them rather than to the MPs.

This is not to suggest that the MP is not responsible or accountable for the development of his or her constituency. Rather, it suggests that the MP should do what he or she is best equipped to do. Instead of directly spending money on civic services an MP ought to be lobbying for funds from the central government to reach local bodies and pushing for appropriate policy decisions. To ensure that services reach their constituents, the MP should monitor the functioning of the local bodies and leave them to do what they are best equipped to do: provide the civic services demanded by their constituents.

The MPLAD scheme has been dogged by controversy since its inception. By putting its weight behind the scheme, the Supreme Court has simply given legitimacy to a scheme that is fundamentally unconstitutional and this is a real blow to democracy.

Yamini Aiyar is the Director, Accountability Initiative.