Blog Post Year: 2018

India and the Failed States Index: 12 Counts of Failure

Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace have been publishing the Failed States Index since 2005. The 2010 Index uses 90,000 publicly available sources to assess 177 countries and rate them on 12 metrics of state decay—India ranked 87 and received a score of 77.8.

Higher scores on a metric indicate a greater degree of failure. The scores used are from the Fund for Peace publication as there appears to be some inconsistency in the Foreign Policy publication’s score.

No.

Metric

India’s score

1

Mounting demographic pressures

8.3

2

Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons, creating complex humanitarian emergencies

4.9

3

Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia

7.3

4

Chronic and sustained human flight

6.7

5

Uneven economic development across group lines

8.9

6

Sharp and/ or severe economic decline

5.0

7

Criminalization and/ or delegitimization of the State

5.5

8

Progressive deterioration of public services

7.0

9

Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights

6.0

10

Security apparatus operates as a “State within a State”

7.1

11

Rise of factionalized elites

6.0

12

Intervention of other states or external political actors

5.1

 

Total

77.8

While the most recent analysis of the scores is not yet available, past assessments by the organizations and recent news are useful in deciphering the factors that may have contributed to these scores.

1) The score on the demographic pressure metric is due to high population density relative to food supply and other essential resources in the country, and pressures from skewed population growth that have led to a “youth bulge”.

2) India does not have a major refugee or IDP problem but does have a manageable influx of refugees from Tibet, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.

3) Group grievance scores are high primarily in Kashmir, as a result of the rise of militant groups, communal violence, and tensions between India and Pakistan. An increasingly violent Maoist insurgency and the rise of Naxalism have also exacerbated grievances.

4) Human flight indicators remain high for India as a significant percentage of the country’s educated population leave tostudy or find jobs elsewhere.

(5) and (6) The Indian economy has rapidly developed and established itself as the world’s second-fastest growing economy. India’s recently updated foreign direct investment policy (2005) has helped further open markets. And India’s significant economic growth (GDP increased by 6.8 % in 2009 despite a global recession) has been inequitable, as a large section of the population lives in poverty.

7) Politicians running campaigns and being elected to office while on trial for criminal charges have undermined state legitimacy. While Indian law prohibits convicted criminals from holding office, nothing prevents them from doing so until they have been convicted. Apart from the growth of crime syndicates linked to government officials, there is endemic corruption and widespread resistance to accountability and transparency—something the recently passed Right to Information Act may improve.

The FfP’s most recent assessment of India’s core state institutions:

8) The quality of public services is severely lacking, especially in rural areas. Nonetheless, government efforts to improve health and education services (such as through the NRHM) have contributed to an improving score on this metric. Significant efforts this year—the Right to Food Act and the Right to Education—may further help.

9) India has a decent human rights record, having recently made concrete steps toward expanding the rights of womenand LGBT populations. However, the state is sometimes accused of preventing human rights organizations from entering Kashmir.

10) The rise of militant groups as well as the power wielded by Kangaroo courts and unofficial governing bodies in rural areas impact performance on this metric. Populations often turn to these bodies to address their grievances due to social custom or a lack of confidence in elected officials.

11) Communal, caste and regional tensions are sometimes reflected in government which has led to the factionalization of elites, but this is often mitigated by India’s functioning democracy.

The quality of public services is a metric that India consistently performs poorly on. Whereas demographic pressures fluctuate with factors like natural disasters that lead to a massive loss of life, the progressive deterioration of public services can perhaps more effectively be tackled through systemic reforms and improved accountability. It’s important to note that India’s score of 7.0 on this metric puts it behind countries like Ghana, Kazakhstan, Namibia that it is more developed than in other categories.

The writer is an intern at the Accountability Initiative.

CWG 2010 here we come…but at what cost?

Delhi is a city under siege! Over the last year, a silent army of civil engineers, urban planners, construction workers and contractors have brought this to a standstill. Signs of the siege are everywhere – on uneven sidewalks and pavements which threaten to send pedestrians sprawling, on roads and flyovers where monstrous potholes threaten to swallow unsuspecting motorists and bring the city to a grinding halt. The mission? Make Delhi ready and able to host the Commonwealth Games (CWG) in October this year.

 

The Delhi Government has already announced that it will not have funds to undertake new projects in the forthcoming fiscal year. Moreover, according to the HLRN report funds marked for social sector expenditure have already been reallocated by the Delhi Government for the CWG.

The games have been heavily criticised and not only because preparations for them have thrown everyday life in the city completely off kilter. Concerns have been raised about the ‘game worthiness’ of several venues, the hurried efforts to ‘beautify’ certain sections of the city, the efforts to ‘clear’ the city of slum dwellers, beggars and hawkers which in practice has meant the demolition slums across the city leaving thousands homeless. A recent report by the Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) titled “The 2010 Commonwealth Games: Whose Wealth? Whose Commons?” puts a spotlight on some of these issues. Using the Right to Information Act 2005, HLRN accessed a copy of India’s Bid Document for the CWG games as well as information from different departments on the monies spent so far on the games. Their findings are staggering:

CWG Factoids

 

  • The bidding process from start to finish cost India Rs 137 crore. The Bid Document included an unprecedented offer by India to provide free luxury accommodation, travel and trips to participants, delegates, officials.
  • India made a last minute offer of $7.2 million or Rs 32.4 crore to train all Commonwealth Games athletes’ which apparently ensured India’s bid for the games.
  • The proposed expenditure on sports infrastructure for the games was pegged at Rs 150 crore in the Bid Document but a whopping sum of Rs 3390 crore has already been spent on building stadiums. That’s a shocking 2160% increase on the initial budget!
  • Official and unofficial estimates of the total cost of the games range from Rs 10,000 crore to Rs 30,000 crore;

The sheer volume of money being pumped into the CWG is unprecedented. To put things in perspective in this year’s Union Budget allocations for the CWG increased by a jaw dropping 6235% (from Rs 45.5 crore in 2005-06 to Rs 2,883 crore in 2009-10) (HLRN figures).  Is this a case of misplaced priorities or are there really substantial gains to be had from hosting the games? In theory, the CWG games are supposed to put Delhi on the world map, bring in foreign investment, tourism and generate jobs, but international experience suggests that this is not always the case.

Several studies have shown that the economic  benefits of mega-sporting events such as the Olympic Games or World Cup are hugely over-estimated. In a post-games scenario, many countries have struggled to earn back in revenues the huge amounts invested. For instance, American cities hosting the 1994 FIFA World Cup earned $ 4 billion in revenues from hosting the games but they collectively lost between $ 5.5 billion and $ 9.3 billion. Many countries are overwhelmed by debt – after barely pulling off the Olympic Games in 2004, Greece struggled to keep public debt down, the effects of which are being felt now. The costs continue to escalate for years after with countries having to find resources to manage and maintain games venues.

 

In true sarkari style, things will be completed in breakneck speed, we’ll put on a grand old show and maybe we’ll even win a medal or two.

There are also questions about who really benefits from such events? South Africa has spent 3.5 billion pounds on  preparations  (1.72% of its GDP)  to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, but there are concerns that most of the facilities will really benefit tourists and the middle class rather than South Africa’s urban poor. Over and above the, investments in infrastructure mean budget cuts for other sectors. The Delhi Government has already announced that it will not have funds to undertake new projects in the forthcoming fiscal year. Moreover, according to the HLRN report funds marked for social sector expenditure have already been reallocated by the Delhi Government for the CWG. Couple this with the city wide drive against hawkers and beggars and it’s no wonder many have termed the CWG ‘anti-poor’ in its approach.

It is perhaps keeping of all of these factors in mind, that the Government of New Zealand recently refused to support the country’s bid to host the 2018 Commonwealth Games because at $600 million it was too expensive. If only, such prudence had prevailed in Delhi. Come October, Delhi will play host to athletes’ and tourists from countries across the Commonwealth.  In true sarkari style, things will be completed in breakneck speed, we’ll put on a grand old show and maybe we’ll even win a medal or two. But let’s not kid ourselves; we’re in for some tough times ahead – fiscal and otherwise.

Mandakini D Surie is a Research Associate with the Accountability Initiative.

 

If Only Khoslaji Had the RTI………..

One of the most difficult things to get in Delhi is land for your house. Even more difficult is figuring out whether the land is legal or illegal, whether the land deal is genuine or if someone is trying to trick you and make you a victim of a land fraud scam. Considering all the hassles, you might just choose to buy a flat, more so a flat which is built and allocated through the government, only to find out that there is no water in the taps, an electric current is running freely all over the place and the whole area just across the street is some kind of a hub for household industries and it just wont let you sleep. Even worse is that you open a shop on what you consider perfectly legal land only to discover after a few years that a huge crane is standing in front of your house, ready to tear apart the shop on the ‘now encroached’ land. For all of this and more, there is now a one pill cure for all the ailments in the form of the Right to Information Act.

A closer look at the RTI applications submitted to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) reflects the power of information to bring about a more transparent and accountable system of governance. The RTI also helps citizens to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and the associated corruption which have harassed the ‘common man’ for ages. Many of these applications are inquiries about a piece of land and its use, or a flat which a person is either currently using or plans to acquire in the future. There are some which are concerned with general queries about the maintenance of colonies, parks and the associated area in a particular locality. While these cater to the interests of an individual or a group of citizens, there are others which are relevant to the general public as a whole and question the DDA on planning, implementation and malfunctioning of public works. Besides this, there are also questions on corporate houses, various government departments who seek to benefit from the information gained about any kind of prevailing contract, prospective work or just a suspected case of corruption which negatively affects their interests.

The most surprising thing about applications to the DDA is that its pretty evident that a lot of DDA officials are using the RTI to settle intra/inter-departmental issues and raising questions about the general functioning of the DDA. These musings within the DDA often take the shape of settling personal vendettas using RTI. But these cases are an exception, rather than the norm.

The role of RTI in raising awareness and generating public opinion can’t be denied. From the welfare of the poor and the homeless to the banning of sale of narcotic substance, citizens have tried to question the government on many important issues. They have tried to direct government’s attention towards forgotten matters and bring out the flaws in our system of governance. The most important flaws, which courtesy RTI, are out in the public is the tremendous gap between existing policies and their implementation. By focusing on it citizens have certainly helped in improving their lives, the lives of the people around them and most importantly the state of governance. With the increasing awareness amongst citizens about the the value of RTI as a tool, one can picture a more accountable, transparent government in the future.

Alas, only if the fictitious Khoslas of “Khosla Ka Ghosla” fame had been able to use the RTI, they would not have fallen victim to a land extortion racket.

Abhishek is an intern with the Accountability Initiative. He is a graduate from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.

After the Tsunami: Malaysia’s Transformed Political Landscape in 2004 Continues to Test its Democracy

The documentary Selapas Tsunami (After the Tsunami), assesses the sweeping political changes brought about by the results of the 12th General Election in Malaysia, and discusses the ramifications these changes have had on government accountability and the building of an inclusive democracy. The film raises powerful arguments for decentralization—the benefits of greater regulation at the local level, the friction between federal power and local control–and highlights the inevitable backlash from an old guard that is uncomfortable with the transparent new model of democracy.

Effect information campaigns have on political behaviour

What effect do information campaigns have on the political behaviour of citizens and their representatives?

In a democracy, having cast their votes and investing their elected representative with the power to govern them, citizens have a right to know how they are being governed, and to demand detailed scrutiny of the process. In this sense, information about their government is something that citizens have a reason to value intrinsically. But access to information is also seen as being instrumental in improving the quality of democracy in many different ways.

For instance, one hypothesis that was at the heart of information campaigns preceding the recent parliamentary elections in India was that access to information about elected representatives enables citizens to make informed voting decisions, which in turn would mean better quality of representatives. An informed electorate would also mean that it is in the incentive of the representative to perform better in order to win back the votes. The media and the civil society organizations enthusiastically carried out many campaigns leading up to the elections, informing electorates about their representative’s performance, assets, criminal backgrounds, and so forth, in the hope that their voting decisions be based on information on substantive indicators rather than caste, religion or region.

 

Admittedly, changes in political behaviour of both citizens and elected representatives, happen over sustained periods of time, and are very difficult to measure.

Satark Nagarik Sanghathan (SNS) is one such organization. SNS works at the grassroots with the residents in some of the South Delhi slums, assisting them in their use of the RTI Act to improve access to public services.  Also, like they had done for the MLA elections in late 2008, SNS ran an information campaign leading up to the recent MP elections. Employing the RTI Act, and other means, they accessed information about the performance of MPs along important indicators like the level and quality of participation in the Parliament and standing committees, and the manner in which they spent the discretionary constituency development funds that each MP is allocated. Using this information, they brought out MP Report Cards, which were publicized widely in collaboration with the mainstream newspapers. Focus Group Discussions and door-to-door campaigns were conducted in selected slums to disseminate this information to the citizens. This was in addition to the more sustained campaign and discussions in which SNS educates the citizens about the roles and responsibilities of Councillors, MLAs and MPs, so that citizens know what they are entitled to, what to expect of their elected representatives, and who to approach for what kind of grievance.

I was part of a team from Accountability Initiative, which had the opportunity to qualitatively study the effect of SNS’s information campaign on the citizens in the slums. We were interested in the effect on their ‘political behaviour’, which we defined in a broader sense than merely voting decisions. We were also interested in other forms of demand-making on political representatives that take place between elections, and perhaps more ambitiously on how the residents in the slums defined themselves in relation to their representative.

Over a period of one month, we spoke to the residents of five selected slums where SNS works. The study is still ongoing, and we are hoping to get some inputs from the elected representatives themselves, for a comparative perspective. Admittedly, changes in political behaviour of both citizens and elected representatives, happen over sustained periods of time, and are very difficult to measure. As we progress with the study, we will have more postings about it. But at this stage, there are a couple of interesting preliminary observations about collective action and leadership, which we can talk about.

 

Women who had higher than average levels of education that their neighbours, and who came from less patriarchal family backgrounds are more likely to become resident activists of the organization.

First is observations related to ‘collective action’ for accountability. Who participates in the SNS meetings, and why? We found that the attendance in SNS meetings is predominantly by women, but this could be because the men are away at work during the day. Not all the women seem to retain what is discussed in the meetings, but they still turn up, some of them avidly. In many cases their motivation behind going to the meetings is the hope that SNS will help them access what they are personally entitled to, especially in cases where these entitlements are well defined – for example, ration cards, and SC cards and so forth. It would appear then, that collective action is more forthcoming when there is expectation of entitlements that are selective, tangible, and well defined.

A second observation is about leaders and change agents. We found that in most of the camps there were one or two women who were more engaged in SNS meetings than others. Women who had higher than average levels of education that their neighbours, and who came from less patriarchal family backgrounds are more likely to become resident activists of the organization. They also had significant spill-over effects on their immediate community, and were approached by others for discussing their grievances. Identifying and working with such change agents at the interface might be critical to any successful intervention of this sort.

Although it is early days, we observed that there is an incipient shift in the way these residents demanded services from the state. While traditionally, they worked through their pradhans, through strategies like appeasement or corruption, the information campaigns, and the Right to Information Act appear to have allowed people to start asserting their demands through the argument of rights and entitlements.

In our future posts we will have done more research to be able to talk about what effect the information campaigns had on the kind of demands made on the elected representatives, and if this has had any effect on how the representatives perceive the citizens.

Bala Posani is a Senior Research Analyst at Accountability Initiative.

Making good on promises: Union Budget 2009

On July 6th 2009, the new United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government will conduct its first major business activity since coming in to power: present the annual budget. Much hope resides on this budget.  The President’s address before the first session of Parliament laid out the UPA’s governance agenda  for the next five years. Many promises of action are made in solemn speeches, but in most cases they are also quickly forgotten. The question to be asked of the budget is this: Will it live up to the promises made? The President laid out 10 broad areas which the present government will focus on. Among the usual issues of security, social welfare, fiscal management, and infrastructure, the speech specifically mentioned the “consolidation of the existing flagship programmes for employment, education, health, rural infrastructure, urban renewal and introduction of new flagship programmes for food security and skill development” and “governance reform”.

The two issues are interlinked. A lot of the problems that the flagship programmes suffered from during the tenure of the last UPA government had to do with failures in governance – basically the lack of a culture of accountability. For instance, the curious case of unutilized funds. According to estimates, more than Rs.50,000 crores that were committed to these flagship programs in the previous government are lying unutilized. This amounts to a loss of 1% of GDP. How do we make sense of this? And do we know enough about how the money is being spent, and by who? Who do we hold accountable for this?

For one, it is virtually impossible to track many of the government expenditures in real time. In the present system, a large part of social sector expenditures are incurred through a mechanism known as Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS). Within CSS, funds from the central government are ‘off-budget’ i.e. they by-pass the state government treasury and go straight from the central government coffers to bank accounts of the specially created state implementation societies.  Ironically, this procedure was put in place to get away from the red-tapism of the bureaucracy but it has created more problems than it has solved. Legally, state level societies cannot be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). Instead, audits are undertaken by private auditors. These are neither regular nor uniform in their methodology and process. Worse, these reports are not easily available in the public domain making it impossible to track social sector funds.

In addition, one of the primary reasons why funds might be lying unutilized is that the implementation societies in the States can carry forward the allocated funds from one year to the next.

Governance reforms that address these aspects in strengthening transparency and accountability in public planning and expenditure processes are critical to making sure the desired outcomes from the flagship programs are attained. Of course the budget cannot do everything at the same time. After all it is only a statement of revenue and expenditure of the government. But seeing as the flagship programs will undoubtedly get more allocation in this year’s budget, it does present us with an opportunity to bring in new initiatives that would go a long way in improving accountability within the system. A revamped outcomes budget, and extending the mechanism of mandatory social audits in these schemes are some thoughts. The budget can also announce the setting up of  an Independent Evaluation Office, and adequately fund this important body. These would be the first few steps towards “re-energizing government and improving governance”. The President’s speech promised that this will be the case. But will it happen?

Dr. Anit Mukherjee is a Fellow at National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi.

Whose Right to Education?: Building Schools and Rewarding Voters in Tamil Nadu

How do politicians in democratic settings influence the allocation of public goods?  This is a question that gets right to the heart of the accountability debate. Bureaucracies often set up geographic or need-based norms for basic services such as education, health, and sanitation.  Yet it is perhaps India’s worst-kept secret that the de facto and de jure allocation of services can diverge significantly on account of influential politicians seeking patronage or “pork barrel” for their constituencies. Despite a large number of qualitative studies that examine this influence, there are few quantitative studies in India that try to measure the extent to which India’s elected representatives skew the overall allocation of public goods in a given sector.

It was in this spirit that my colleague Neelanjan Sircar and I went about trying to estimate the influence politics has on the construction of new public primary (and upper primary schools) in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.  As political scientists, we were motivated by two questions. First, is the construction of public schools linked to the political process so that the building of new schools operates on a political budget cycle?  If such electioneering exists, it begs a second question of how public investments are targeted. That is, can we detect political motivations in the targeting and placement of new public schools?

In our analysis, we focused on the influential role of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs).   MLAs are one of the most important, yet among the least understood, cogs in India’s patronage machine.  Over forty years ago, Bailey’s (1963) study of the Orissa assembly perhaps best sums up the enduring conventional wisdom about MLAs:

“[Their] MLA is not the representative of a party with a policy which commends itself to them, not even a representative who will watch over their interests when policies are being framed, but rather a man who will intervene in the implementation of policy, and in the ordinary day-to-day administration. He is there to divert the benefits in the direction of his constituents.”

Understanding state-level dynamics is crucial because most education and other large public goods initiatives emerge from centrally sponsored schemes and projects (and are often bolstered by state-level matching funds or complementary programs) where the states have broad discretionary authority. For example, this is the framework for India’s most recent flagship primary education program, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA). Furthermore, as far as the construction of schools (or other local public works projects) is concerned, the MLA is able to simultaneously please two constituencies: his friends, local contractors and suppliers; as well as the broader population of citizens he or she represents.<br /><br />For our analysis, we consider all public school construction between the years 1977 and 2007 in Tamil Nadu.  In terms of timing, we find that there is a significant spike in school construction immediately following the inauguration of a new state government.  This post-election jump makes intuitive sense since all governments want to appear as if they are doing “something” — especially if that something will help distinguish them from their predecessors.  Furthermore, in the case of Tamil Nadu, post-election investments in public works (as opposed to pre-election works) are even more sensible given the state’s exceedingly high rates of electoral volatility and unpredictable voter behavior.

To examine the issue of geographic targeting, we map assembly constituencies to administrative blocks using GIS (in Tamil Nadu, they make a relatively neat match).  We do find evidence of the political targeting of new school construction.  In most years, areas in which voters elect MLAs affiliated with the future ruling coalition benefit disproportionately in terms of the number of new public schools the government decides to build in those areas.  For instance, when AIADMK re-captured control of the state in 2001, it was AIADMK constituencies that received the bulk of the largesse when it came to building and establishing new public schools.

But politicians are a crafty bunch.  The ruling party does not always blindingly shower its supporters with new public works; they also take into consideration the nuances of electoral dynamics.  For instance, there are deviations from rewarding one’s “core” supporters in those years with exceptionally high levels of electoral competition within constituencies. When more than half the ruling coalition’s victories come in closely-fought (“swing”) constituencies (as they did in the elections of 1980 and 2006), we find that the ruling party alters its post-election targeting strategy to reward pivotal “swing” areas.

We interpret this as the constraining effect of electoral competition: while there may be a bias of rewarding their most ardent supporters, politicians must abide by electoral realities. In swing constituencies where the margin of victory is slim, politicians must make desperate promises to sweeten the pot. In the elections of 1980 and 2006, there were a disproportionate number of such constituencies; hence, benefits flowed to those areas disproportionately.

This research is still in its preliminary stages but it provides initial evidence of the kinds of influence many suspect MLAs of having on public works, even in the era of decentralization.  In the coming months, we hope to update this work and expand it to other states as well.  For instance, it might be interesting to ask how the Left Front government of West Bengal allocates public works to those areas under opposition control.  Does Mayawati privilege Dalit areas in UP where community infrastructure is desperately needed?  In the coming months, I will post some of these initial drafts on my website: http://www.columbia.edu/~mv2191

Milan Vaishnav is a PhD student in political science at Columbia University.  He is visiting the Accountability Initiative in August.

Lok Adalats: Justice or Judicial Efficiency?

I recently had the chance to travel to Ahmedabad on a reconnaissance trip to explore the possibility of a certain research project. We wanted to know if Lok Adalat (People’s Court) could be extended in its present scope to serve as a possible recourse for grievance redressal in service delivery cases. In recent years there appears to be a shift towards a rights based framework for service provision, with citizens being able to access state services through an argument of rights and entitlements – the right to food, the right to education, right to employment, and so forth. In this context of rights and entitlements, judiciary would seem a logical forum for citizens to seek redressal for their grievances in accessing these services.

 

The main idea behind having them was to improve access to justice at local levels, and ease the burden on the regular courts due to millions of petty cases that clog up their scarce resources, awaiting settlement.

The choice of Gujarat was because it afforded us the possibility of partnering with Research Foundation for Governance in India in Ahmedabad, who have considerable expertise in legal research and advocacy. Gujarat also happens to be a state where Lok Adalats are conducted actively. This is an ongoing exploration, and I managed to get some inputs from Senior Judges in Gujarat on what they felt on  the matter. Going forward, we hope to present the case more formally. At this point, from my own witnessing of the processings at the Lok Adalat, and reading around the issues, there are some initial questions that cropped up about merits and constraints of Lok Adalats themselves, which is what this blog post is about. This is also perhaps apt, given the current focus on judicial reforms in India.

Lok Adalats were introduced in India in the early 80s. The main idea behind having them was to improve access to justice at local levels, and ease the burden on the regular courts due to millions of petty cases that clog up their scarce resources, awaiting settlement.  Lok Adalats were to provide a speedy, fair and deliberative form of alternative dispute settlement mechanism, drawing on traditional methods of conciliation where the presiding judge – who is an experienced adjudicator with legal acumen and a record of public service – effects an understanding between the claimants, and settles the cases as compromise between the two sides. In most cases claims are for small amounts of money, and relatively minor issues related to traffic accidents, marital disputes, land disputes and so forth. Ordinary courts refer cases to Lok Adalats if they feel the case can be settled through compromise. There is no appeal against the decision reached at Lok Adalat, although if no compromise is reached, the claimants can go back to the courts that referred them there.

I had the opportunity to sit and observe the cases being disposed. While I was sat there, about 15 cases came up – mostly related to Prohibition offences and minor crimes and accidents, and on an average they took about 3-5 minutes each – something that in the normal procedure of regular courts would take much longer, and in worst cases, take years to even come up for hearing. Fines were imposed, compensations were awarded, and compromises reached. They had a target to cover 2000 cases within the day, and seemed well set to reach the target. I was impressed by the speed and efficiency with which the cases were being dealt. However, there were some larger questions that came up in my mind from my research and from observing it all happening.

 

One can think of other important ways of ‘disciplining’ our regular courts, which can have substantial results in speeding up the delivery of cases as well.

Foremost, I was struck by the ‘paternalism’ of the proceedings. Given the general air of obsequiousness in many bureaucratic spaces in India where citizens engage the bureaucrats as supplicants more than as rights-bearing citizens, some amount of paternalism from the officials was expected in the proceedings. But given the absence of advocates in most cases, and absence of appeal against the conclusions reached, it would appear that the discretion given to the judges can be overbearing and coercive, especially if the claimant in question is poor and otherwise disempowered. A compromise is no doubt willingly reached by all parties concerned, but due to the subjective nature of the judge’s discretion, and the general notions of justice on which Lok Adalat is based – rather than juristic legality – unequal power equation between the claimants, or between the claimant and the judge, can raise questions about the ‘fairness’ of the compromise arrived at. This is made more serious by the fact that a case can be transferred to the Lok Adalat if a court judge feels that a compromise can be reached, even if the claimants themselves do not feel so.

To be sure, these are not questions unique to Lok Adalats. Some of the regular courts also suffer from these and other problems. And even if in theory there are problems that can be identified, Lok Adalats have in practice disposed of cases with an efficiency that regular courts will have difficulty matching. But judicial efficiency is not the same thing as justice. And there are studies that show that this is not entirely a theoretical concern (For instance see here and here). Also, one can think of other important ways of ‘disciplining’ our regular courts, which can have substantial results in speeding up the delivery of cases as well. At which point one needs to wonder if availability of alternative dispute settlement avenues like the Lok Adalats could actually be diluting the constituency for these important reforms within our judiciary.

Bala Posani is Senior Research Analyst at Accountability Initiative

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

The tabling and subsequent withdrawal of the Judges (Declaration of Assets and Liabilities) Act, 2009 by the Law Minister Veerappa Moily has raised several key questions pertaining to the power of the RTI Act 2005 and judicial accountability. The subsequent hue-and-cry among the opposition & civil society organizations and the media interest generated on what seems to be a double standard adopted in the implementation of the RTI act by shielding of judges from scrutiny has confined the bill in its current form to the dustbin. Reforming and making the judiciary more accountable indeed is the need of the hour, however, successive governments have failed in taking any meaningful steps in this direction, under pressure from both the judiciary itself and political considerations.

 

By excluding judges from declaring their assets, the big fear is that it will indicate that they are a separate class of citizenry, an argument which would take on a different dimension if extended to our politicians and other public servants.

A CMS-TI study threw light upon the reasons for corruption in the judiciary. From misuse of power by judges without fear of any action being taken, a tedious impeachment process (no judge has ever been impeached by Parliament since Independence) and above all, the inefficient pace at which cases move through the courts all make it possible for people wanting to pay to speed up the system and get favourable judgements, to be able to do so.

Arguments for the Bill in its current form come from well-regarded members of the legal fraternity. It usually boils down to the possibility of harassment of judges handling controversial cases. Though this may be true, the question remains whether a blanket law allowing non-disclosure of assets will do more harm than good. Public perception of the independence and incorruptibility of the Judiciary will definitely take a hit. By excluding judges from declaring their assets, the big fear is that it will indicate that they are a separate class of citizenry, an argument which would take on a different dimension if extended to our politicians and other public servants. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who watches the watchers?) seems appropriate here.

Abhijit Patnaik is Senior Researcher at the Accountability Initiative.

Opening up or Ushering in: The Panchayati Raj amendments, Activists, and Public participation

Over the 25th and the 26th of July I was in Pondicherry, to participate in a workshop around the theme of public consultation and citizen participation in urban governance. ‘Opening Up or Ushering In’ was the rather enigmatic name for the workshop that mystified most of the participants. It was only later that we got an inkling into this framing of the workshop. Given that public consultation and citizen participation that have become rather fashionable catchwords; are these processes being used to open up spaces for citizens to participate in the articulation of plans and projects in their cities and neighbourhoods, or usher in technocrats and their consultancies under the guise of public consultation and participation? You have to admit with me that the organizers were more than clever in their framing of the workshop title, as well as placing on the agenda, an interesting issue for debate.

 

The question that needs to be seriously posed is if this association with the State executive, right from the time the GBA joined the Task Force, an association entirely outside of a legal process, was useful or not.

 

I would like to reflect on this idea within the Goan context, returning in the process, to a theme that I have not taken up for some time, that of the frustrated moment of the Goan revolution. What has not ceased to amaze is the manner in which, despite constantly brandishing the issue of public participation and decentralization, most of the groups in the fray have been singularly unable to actually realize the objective. All of this despite the fact that the GBA, at that time the more powerful among these groups, held the trumps at a crucial moment in the struggle.

Trying to understand why they failed to seize the moment, two options emerged. One, because of the conviction by some of the more prominent Margao activists that decentralization was a bad thing, the average citizen would make a mess of the powers they were given. The second, because for the architects and urban planners involved in the movement, participation and consultation began and ended when they were ushered into the planning process. In their well-intentioned estimation, this was also participation and consultation, so at least they were taking the process somewhere. As the recent ‘stepping down’ of Edgar Rebeiro has shown us, this assumption was not just terribly naïve, but eventually impotent as well. Participation is not achieved until the entire body of citizenry is enabled to participate in planning. The question that needs to be seriously posed is if this association with the State executive, right from the time the GBA joined the Task Force, an association entirely outside of a legal process, was useful or not.

The reason for distinguishing between the two reasons stated above, is because I would like to distinguish between a conscious option to prevent genuine and large-scale participation (in the first case), and a misunderstanding as to what participation and consultation actually means. In the second case, the error is possibly unconscious, the result of a blinkered vision engendered by one’s professional training. It is a different matter that this professional training is rooted in the same fear of the ‘ignorant masses’ held by our Margao activists. When imbibed through education however, it gets internalized unconsciously. That these professionals belong to a class that in any case has a tendency against mass participation and towards a surprisingly firm belief in its own capacities does not help them in thinking out these biases that are educated into them.

To be sure, these biases have a longer history, as displayed in the history of the anti-colonial struggle in British-India. The early forms of the ‘national struggle’, in particular the demands of the liberals and Swarajists, was not for ‘freedom’. Whenever this potentially explosive term was used, it was in fact rather ambivalently articulated. Their aspiration was in fact for a greater ‘share’ in the governance of the country, as reflected in the demands for greater opportunities in participation in central and provincial legislatures and executive councils. There was no contemplation of universal participation for all Indians, the attempt was to only share the pie of governance with the white man. It was only later, in the event of the failed expectations of the Indian National Congress on most offers of constitutional ‘reforms’ that the discourse and practice got radicalized to lead to the situation of a robust non-cooperation against the British Raj. Popular support was garnered through the eventually unrealized promise to the unwashed masses of their having a say in the future, in matters of governance.

 

Any action (radical or otherwise) has to necessarily acknowledge that the goal of the movement is nothing less than a legally recognized system of meaningful consultation with the citizens in their wards, and an effective system of participation in village-level and city-level meetings.

What we must not forget is that there existed right from the very beginning a tension between the freedom struggle led by Gandhi, to whom we can trace this liberative notion of local self governance, and the representative ‘consultative’ democracy that eventually triumphed. This latter form took for its inspiration the structures of the colonial State, and this is why today, we experience nothing less than a colonial violence, as demonstrated by the recent changes effected to the Goa Panchayati Raj Act by the representatives in the legislative house. The fight in Goa, for greater transparency and more participation in governance is in fact a continuation of this unresolved fight against colonialism, and one can see uncanny resemblances. The State apparatus in Goa is that inherited from the Raj, the GBA-mobilization was led by elites for whom sharing of power is sufficient.

It now looks as if this earlier history from British-India is repeating itself. The failed expectations of the leadership of the GBA are prompting queries if we should not now push forward into more radical measures against the Government. As suggested on numerous occasions, that may not be such a bad idea. However, this radical action CANNOT be the goal of the movement. Any action (radical or otherwise) has to necessarily acknowledge that the goal of the movement is nothing less than a legally recognized system of meaningful consultation with the citizens in their wards, and an effective system of participation in village-level and city-level meetings. It is because of our longer history, where colonial institutions and logics have prevailed over the genuinely participatory logics that we have to make sure that in the next mobilization that seems to be imminent, we ensure that the lessons from the history of both the Indian anti-colonial struggle (popularly called the freedom struggle) and the ‘Save Goa’ campaign are not forgotten.

What we need is an opening up, not an ushering in.

Jason Keith Fernandes is a columnist for the Gomantak Times. Click here for his blog.