2018 Archives - Page 9 of 37 - Accountability Initiative: Responsive Governance

Challenges in the implementation of School Management Committees: A case study

The School Management Committee (SMC), is a legal provision^[1] for a partnership between community and school. The point is to implement a shared vision for a ‘good education’ for the neighbourhood’s children. It is based on the belief that even people with little personal experience of schooling, have a vision for their children’s futures and can make considered decisions about their educational goals. It follows that they can therefore also contribute to the plans of the local school to implement these goals in the school years. Given this, it requires both parties to collaborate in a participatory partnership to see this process through from start to finish.

In fact a community’s preparation to participate is as complex a journey, as is building the will and competencies of the bureaucracy to allow for it. While an idealistic policy and equally hopeful law is in place, they are not buttressed with institutional capacity to build the required skills, leave alone attitudes to render effective implementation. Even knowledge, the relatively uncomplicated component of competency, is not communicated in full. Over the years, Accountability Initiative’s (AI) contributions have aimed at easing access to the latter. Good minds are at work across the nation, assisting solutions to the challenges cited above. Everyone agrees that reform is a slow undertaking. What is not slow however, is the retort which has become a refrain, that the real and hidden cause of sluggish progress is a lack of personal integrity amongst stakeholders. AI has been building an argument against this contention in its work understanding governance. Considering this, our focus has been on frontline bureaucracy.

AIs team documents and analyses the everyday professional realities of the experiences of this layer, and analyses the complexities of the variables involved so as to provide implementing agencies (both government and non-government) with a clear and substantiated canvas on which to draw strategy for reform.

But, reality can be confusing. But, reality can be confusing. Truth is a point of view. As decisive and compelling as AI would like its advice to be, the truth is a tangled web and therefore solutions are seldom quick-fixes.

The Motiala (name changed) government Primary School is a case study, where all the stakeholders involved, can tick off the checkboxes on all the compliances on all manner of monitoring formats, but even then, the intent of the policy remains unserved. The school in Motiala is one of six that AI has been working with in Rajasthan for over a year^[2].

The current Principal of the government Primary school in Motiala was appointed to her post in 2014, after serving approximately 17 years in the school^[3]. Suitable to her station as a young lady from a respectable family, she occupied herself with continuing her education after school. Quite pointlessly, (and alarmingly) she completed a Bachelor’s in Education and a Master’s Degree in the same year (1992), then proceeded to complete yet another Master’s Degree three years later (1995). She then promptly applied for a PhD, which has remained unfinished as she busied herself applying for a government teacher’s job the year after (1996). She was selected to join a school in a Block of District Jaipur.

Whatever wisdom supported the formulae that the Rajasthan government used to deliberate this posting, the need or demand for service notwithstanding, the distance of the school from their home not being kosher; the appointment and hence the job was not approved by her family.

The process was repeated again in 1997, and once again she was selected for duty in the very needy Block. The difference was that the posting was in a village where her uncle was the Sarpanch. As requested by her family, the Sarpanch ‘approached’ the Block Education Officer (BEO) to facilitate a transfer.

The BEO of the block she was posted in earlier spoke to BEO of the block in which she wanted the posting; who, further pressured by her significantly established businessman brother, handed-over the decision of where she would be posted entirely to the family. She reports with pride that her father, mother and brother proceeded to tour the schools with available vacancies until they selected Motiala as it was at a convenient distance from their home and later, her marital home. The village has been her home away from home. She will tell you with pride that the villagers consider her a ‘gav ki beti’ (a daughter of the village). They keep a familiar watch over her that she finds comforting. The interactions are in terms of making them making sure she gets to and from school safely; and attends all social occasions celebrated by the significant families in the village. There has never been an SMC meeting in this school, save for one held on AI’s insistence^[4]. The ‘beti’ being a regular visitor in homes of the most influential villagers, the Principal can’t imagine why there may be a need to hold a meeting. That the school may be excluding members of the community fails to occur to her.

There were a 110 children in the 2-room school when she joined as one of two teachers, the other being the acting Head Master. By 2009, when he was promoted, he taught her how to maintain all manner of administrative documentation, as the single pre-requisite to her becoming a Principal. This and the just-in-time problem-solving support she receives from the Nodal Officer is the only hand-holding that she has received to help her take on leadership of the school. She holds her lineage responsible for her losses too, as she blames being in the ‘General’ category to be the reason she has not been promoted yet. Her aspiration is to become a Second-Grade teacher, which will qualify her to teach classes 6-12 in a higher secondary school. In keeping with her lukewarm ambitions for her career and insignificant commitment to the mission of her job, she had plans to retire if the process of promotion takes too long or if the ensuing posting is inconvenient. After all her husband has a secure job in a leading public sector organisation and comfortable enough somehow to retire whenever he is ‘in the mood’. The recent demonetisation has required her to be ever so slightly concerned about holding a job, as it has hit her maternal home’s businesses in hundreds of lakhs; to the extent of making her father unwell.

The Motiala school has 30 children (21 girls and 9 boys)^[5]. It is RTE compliant in terms of infrastructure and staff. DISE data lists 7 other government schools in an area spanning a 2.5 square kilometers. The closest is 500 meters away from this one, with 22 enrolments, and 2 teachers, was opened because of an initiative taken by a resident, then an officer in the education department. Because it was located in its own habitation^[6] (‘dhaani’), and not the centre of the village and thereby not as accessible to all habitations, the villagers protested and asked for this school to be opened. The fact that there were also 10 private schools in the same Gram Panchayat, is some form of commentary on the quality provided by the government school. The fact that there is hardly any teaching at either school, with all children bundled into one classroom with a single teacher, concerns no one.

Conversations at the State about Motiala inspire no interest. For the scale at which the government operates, the financing of 7 schools with enrolments of 20-100 each, is an insignificant loss, despite DISE 2015-16 reports 33,298 Primary and 20,820 Upper Primary Single-Teacher Schools; which may have very similar stories. They are forgotten as no one can find any technical fault with the existing arrangement. Those who can, refuse to prioritise children’s learning over political or personal advantage.

[1] Clause 21 of the Right to Education Act (2009), which specifies that all schools (except unaided schools or those that do not receive any grants from Government or local authority to meet expenses)

[2] Accountability Initiative has been working in the Bassi block in Rajasthan, to ascertain the challenges to the education management as it takes on the task of running effective SMCs. Of the many levels of education bureaucracy we work with, there are 6 principals of schools who are provided inputs on coaching SMCs on fiscal literacy.

[3] Joined mid-year 1997. Appointed Principal end of year 2014

[4] Please watch a video of AI Paisa Associate Tajuddin Khan report on the successful SMC meeting

[5] Class 1: 4 girls and 4 boys, Class 2: 3 boys and 2 girls, Class 3: 1 boy and 5 girls, Class 4: 0 boys and 6 girls, and Class 5: 1 boy and 4 girls.

[6] A habitation has only 5-10 households

The Role of the School Leader in ‘Successful Implementation’

We are almost as pleased with the school leaders of two of the six schools we work with in Rajasthan, as we are with our own efforts with them¹.

They have been constant in their undertaking to meet the demands of the order that put us in their schools several times a month. It has taken an enduring effort for them to take us with them in the journey along the continuum of truth about the existence, attendance, participation and action taken by the School Management Committees (SMC) in their schools. There is a fabric of fragmented information amounting to half-truths that an outsider must traverse, before crossing over the imaginary line, to being allowed to tacitly acknowledge the unspoken, to being included as an insider in the whole truth. For example, it has gone against the grain of the dutiful school leader to expose his vulnerability to caste and class prejudice, and the intrinsic relationship he thinks it has, to successful leadership of the political drama at play in the neighbourhood of the school.

Nothing gladdens the heart of the implementor on a schedule, more than partners in the field who will do as they are told. For the more authentic experience, just the right amount of strain and discomfort tinges the later romantic telling of it more righteous. The ‘achhe’ school leaders, are those who have been most cooperative. They have listened, and argued just enough to convince us that they are thinking about what we proposed, and then accepted what we have asked them to do. The token twinge of assertiveness is more a reflexive herd instinct of being indignant when challenged, than it is a recognition of choice to agree or disagree. The culture does not encourage the level of thought needed for the latter. It does encourage steadfast commitment to conformity. The self satisfaction possible for all concerned, with this form of ‘successful implementation’ is tempting, barring the following exceptions.

Results don’t sustain without constant, mechanical supervision. Academically pristine solutions are compromised in contextual relevance. For instance, rules dictate that SMC executive committees are to share responsibility for school quality in partnership with Government staff; through monthly meetings. The prescribed constitution of the committee requires that generations of social difference be ignored under the untrained aegis of the school principal. Yet, the whole system leans, like an overweight ballerina on pointe, on the shoulders of the sincere school leader, who wants only to do his job, upset no one, and file his reports on time. To this end, he ensures that he harbours no opinion, not even a latent vision for his own school, lest it be contrary to the many knee-jerk super solutions that his school suffers, supposedly to gain sanction.

While this article is a caustic complaint about this school leader and his kind in the front-line bureaucracy, what alternative can I propose? What would the ideal principal do? What kind of preparation would a thinking, questioning, discerning manager who understands the intent of policy and can represent the complex nature of context, need? Is it pragmatic to ask the system to produce a rebel that will be its downfall? What would the brief be?

While it is convenient to allocate blame to the thick-skinned frontline bureaucrat, how comfortable are we with as many degrees of quality in outcomes as there are bound to be difference in vision and competencies, cultural context and political will. Everyone agrees that there should be rule followers. Not everyone can be a rule maker. But who is to decide who gets what role?

The simple answer to that question is that the administrative mechanism has a formula that it has and will continue to use. While it may seem to entertain a different conception, its own existence is tied to the decision that managerial processes and structures will not change, certainly not en mass. What is a simple school leader meant to do but agree and plug on.

In following blogs, I will explore courageous efforts at mass change and their consequences on systematic change.

1Accountability Initiative has been been working in the Bassi block in Rajasthan, to ascertain the challenges to the education management as it takes on the task of running effective SMCs. Of the many levels of education bureaucracy we work with, there are 6 principals of schools who are provided inputs on coaching SMCs on fiscal literacy.

Accountability Initiative 2016: The Year Gone By

Season’s Greetings! 2016 has been a hectic year for Accountability Initiative (AI), as we continued in our effort to deepen understandings of the everyday workings of the local administration and drew on our research to focus attention on the critical question of how to build state capability to bridge the gap between policy and implementation and deepen accountability for public services in India.

February

AI began the year with the launch of our new and improved website. Our effort through this year has been to use our website as a platform to share our publications, blogs, and opinion pieces. We are also experimenting with new media (audio and visual) to facilitate meaningful public conversations on accountability in India.

March

In March, we released our annual budget publication – the State of Social Sector Expenditure 2015-16. This publication consists of a collection of budget briefs which analyse trends in budget allocations and expenditure for key social sector schemes financed by the Government of India. This year, we reported on the following schemes: Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), National Health Mission (NHM), Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) and Swachh Bharat Mission – Gramin (SBM-G).

Soon after, Yamini Aiyar and Sharanya Bhattacharya published a special article in the Economic & Political Weekly on the local bureaucracy called The Post Office Paradox. Using the case of education delivery, this paper attempts to probe an administrator’s perspective in resolving the implementation problem at the last mile. The study is based on detailed primary fieldwork in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh along with quantitative time-use surveys conducted in Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Himachal Pradesh. It endeavours to trace the cognitive maps of administrators by capturing how last mile public servants see themselves and their jobs and how notions of job performance are internalised and interpreted within the administrative context of elementary education in India.

April

In April, the PAISA for Panchayats report and policy brief was released. The PAISA for Panchayats research project extends AI’s PAISA methodology to track fund flows and implementation processes to the Panchayat level. This report is the first in a series of reports being undertaken through this project. This study analysed trends in fiscal devolution in Karnataka. This state level analysis was complemented with a primary survey of 30 Gram Panchayats in one district to capture the quantum of money spent in a Panchayat in the state.

May

In May, we supplemented our report on the State of Social Sector Expenditure 2015-16 with an in-depth analysis of state finances in 19 states to understand the effects of the 14th Finance Commission recommendations on state finances. Along with an overview report, we published a detailed study for five key states – Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.

We launched a new study aimed at understanding the on-going effort by the Delhi Government to improve education outcomes in secondary schools. The objective of the study is to track the implementation of the reform process to understand how they are interpreted, absorbed or resisted at various levels. This study will explore three main research questions:

(1) How do the stakeholders in the Delhi school system perceive the objectives of ongoing education reforms?

(2) How do stakeholders (e.g., teachers, mentor teachers, school management committees, and education officials) support or resist the reform and how does this influence its implementation?

(3) To what extent are the ongoing reforms resulting in classrooms that work differently than “business-as-usual” in contexts of low and high capacity?

June

In June, we organised a panel discussion to discuss our reports on the state of social sector spending. These reports were launched against the backdrop of the 14th Finance Commission recommendations and sought to facilitate a dialogue on the emergence of a new narrative of devolution and social sector spending.

July

In July, we partnered with the Central Square Foundation to bring together education practitioners to debate the role of India’s frontline education bureaucracy. The meeting provided a platform to share learnings and discuss ways to engage with bureaucrats on education reform.

August

In August, we released a series of blogs to deepen public discussion on our recent research on fiscal devolution and social sector spending in India. The series focussed on the implications of the 14th Finance Commission’s recommendations on social policy financing in India.

In the same month, we took our PAISA for Panchayats work to Kerala. For this study, we have partnered with the state government and KILA (the government’s institutional arm for building local government capacity). The primary objective of the study is to understand the fiscal health of rural local governments in Kerala. The study will also investigate the efficiency of the current public finance management system and offer recommendations on how to ensure greater transparency and predictability in fund flows to local governments.

September

In September, we organised a week long PAISA course. The PAISA course is AI’s flagship capacity building initiative. The objective of this course is to build a cohort of fiscal detectives at the frontline. Through the course, these detectives are skilled to track fund flows and engage the local administration in a dialogue on deepening accountability for public service delivery. This course is currently designed for AI’s PAISA Associates. The September module focussed on understanding the role of state and Union Finance Commissions in the functioning of the government. It also included modules on accountability and citizen-led participation.

Avani Kapur and Ambrish Dongre from AI published a paper in the Economic & Political Weekly that analyses trends in elementary education financing. This commentary also indicates how the Centre could best incentivise states to spend differently on elementary education.

October

October marked the two year anniversary of the Swachh Bharat Mission. AI contributed to the public discussion by releasing findings from a national survey on the implementation of the Swacch Bharat Mission. The survey was undertaken in December 2015 and covered a sample of 7,500 households across 10 districts in 5 states in the country. The survey findings were also shared with the media through an article written for NDTV.com.

Yamini Aiyar contributed to a podcast produced by the Centre for Policy Research ‘Thoughtspace’ on our research on the frontline bureaucracy in India. Titled ‘Bureaucracy from a Bureaucrats Perspective’, this podcast highlighted key findings from our research and argued for the importance of studying the organisational culture and norms that make up the Indian state. This, it was argued, is crucial to understanding why the Indian state suffers from an implementation problem and under what conditions this can be reversed. This podcast also discussed our future research plans on this topic.

November

In November, we released a five part blog series titled ‘Symbols of Bureaucracy’. Based on the research team’s personal experiences, this blog series was an effort to give readers a sneak peek into the world of India’s frontline bureaucrats. More importantly, it attempted to push readers to rethink and question some of the common myths and narratives associated with government officials in the country.

December

We closed the year with a blog series on the Indian Administrative Services. Written by our advisor Mr. T. R. Raghunandan, himself a retired IAS officer, this series is a humorous, insiders take on key processes such as the performance review in the IAS which shape the organisational culture and morale of the IAS. The series was published on his blog – Raghu Bytes.

Through the year, we have worked to support on ground reform in public education in India by engaging directly with School Management Committees (SMC). This year, the SSA decision makers in Rajasthan incorporated AI’s suggestions in their revised training manual for education managers and heads of schools to work in collaboration with SMCs. For the first time, the PAISA approach to fiscal literacy is included as an intrinsic part as a means to achieving learning outcomes.

Collective Responsibility – or Dilution of Accountability?

In my last blog of 2016, I had asked the question whether there could be a middle path between the imperative of maintaining absolute confidentiality and collective decision making. I had used the current hot-potato of demonetisation as the case study for the purpose. As matters have progressed, clearly, it is seen that apart from a closed inner political circle – not everybody in the Union government cabinet seems to have been taken into confidence – participation in the decision making process has been confined to the Secretaries of the Finance Ministry and the Governor of the Reserve Bank.

Considering the sensitivity of the decision to declare currency notes of the total value of 86 per cent of the cash in circulation as invalid, there can be no questioning of the need to confine participation in policy making to a select few. However, it is when things go wrong – and indeed they have gone seriously wrong – that the need to fix accountability emerges.

Whilst in theory it is easy to say that accountability for miscalculations of the enormity of the problem and the mismanagement of downstream actions ought to be fixed on those concerned, in reality, as events show, this is nearly impossible to be done.

In the eye of the storm is the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), an independent, autonomous institution with strong statutory regulatory powers. If there is any one institution that has had its credibility seriously eroded due to the demonetisation exercise, it is the RBI. Both on giving the nod for the demonetisation exercise as also in managing the downstream exercise of remonetisation, the RBI seems to have committed serious errors of judgment and decision making.

On the merits of the demonetisation exercise per se, given that one of the main original objectives was to catch those stashing away black money unawares, the RBI seems to have ignored its own estimation of the size of the black money economy in the country. Given that nearly all the demonetised bank notes have been deposited back in the banks during the grace period provided, it seems that the objective of rendering valueless stashes of black money, has not been fulfilled. Then comes the later idea of promoting a cashless economy. It is not known whether the RBI endorsed this idea in the first place, or is now compelled to defend it because of the failure of the first objective.

On the management of the remonetisation exercise, the blame cannot be shared – the RBI has to take nearly all of it. Yet, in defence of the RBI, it would not have been possible for it to beef up its note manufacturing capability in advance of the demonetisation exercise. If it had taken advance action for printing new notes, the secret of demonetisation would have been inevitably leaked; and that would have been another kind of disaster. Having said that, subsequent delays in printing and distribution of new notes and glitches with ATM machines, led to the RBI taking decisions on a daily basis on the amounts of money that could be withdrawn, or deposited. The panicky reaction of the RBI did nothing to enhance its reputation.

What has driven the final nail in the coffin of the RBI’s credibility has been its obdurate silence. It might have hoped that the silence would be interpreted as that which a higher authority has the latitude to maintain, but on the other hand, that has only further lowered the perception of the RBI in the eyes of citizens.

Yet, the question is, can the RBI be nailed for this?

From what one can see, the answer is a bland ‘no’.

Let us consider the exchanges between honourable members of the Parliamentary Committee set up to seek information on the demonetisation exercise and the RBI a few days back and you will see what I mean.

In came our honourable MPs, bowling with guile and venom. Does the RBI know how much value of old notes have been deposited in the banks? They asked.

No, said the Governor of the RBI. The notes are still being counted. In other words, he ducked under the bouncer.

Wait a minute.

As far as I know, nearly every bank branch in India is computerised. Besides, even if they are not, every bank branch has to close its accounts every day. The deposits, cash balances, bank entries in the day book and the accounts registers, have to be tallied and noted. No teller or cash disbursing or cash receiving official can go home on any day, without actually counting the day’s receipts and withdrawals. That has been the way banks have been run for decades.

Considering the levels of computerisation and networking in banks, it would be the height of incompetence if banks were not able to mention to the last detail on a daily basis, the amounts of money that have been deposited in the form of old notes. Clearly, the RBI governor should have these details on his fingertips? Surely, he should be able to give a figure correct as to the previous evening – or even if some latitude is to be given – a few evenings before the appearance before the Honourable Committee?

Yet, when more probing questions were asked, a member of the Parliamentary Committee, no less than a former Prime Minister, rose to the defence of the RBI governor, informing him that it was not necessary that he responds. Answering these questions asked would undermine the image of the RBI, he said.

I would have imagined exactly the opposite.

Clearly, fixing accountability for the bad management of demonetisation is going to be a slippery thing.

[Hindi] Why is Accountability so Important in India? Watch this video to learn more.

पूर्वी बिहार के पूर्णिया के दूर कोनों में बसे हुए एक स्कूल को सरकार से आग बुझाने के यंत्र की खरीददारी के लिए धन प्राप्त हुआ । यह धन इस निर्देश के साथ प्राप्त हुआ की सभी स्कूल पर्याप्त रूप से आपातकालीन स्थिति से निपटने के लिए तैयार हों। इस बात से किसे आपत्ति हो सकती थी ?

सिवाय ऊपर लिखे गये पूर्णिया के इस स्कूल को, जिसको अपने भवन निर्माण के लिए पैसा ही नहीं मिला था!

“भवन रहित” विद्यालय (जैसा की सरकार के अभिलेखों में परिभाषित है) में पूर्णिया अकेला नहीं है!

गत वर्षों में हम ऐसे बहुत से उदाहरणों से रूबरू हुए हैं जहाँ मूलभूत सुविधायें (स्कूल, क्लिनिक, आंगनवाड़ी केन्द्रों), पंचायतों एवं नगरपालिकाओं पर सरकारी धन व्यय करने के निर्देश जमीनी हकीकत से कोसों दूर होते हैं!

सरकार स्कूल, क्लिनिक, आंगनवाड़ी केन्द्रों, पंचायतों एवं नगरपालिकाओं जैसी संस्थाओं के माध्यम से नागरिकों को मूलभूत सुविधाऍं प्रदान करती है। पिछले कुछ सालों में एकाउंटेबिलिटी इनिशिएटिव को ऐसे कई उदाहरण मिले जहाँ यह देखा गया है कि मूलभूत सुविधाऍं प्रदान करने वाली संस्थाओं को सरकार द्वारा दिया गया व्यय करने का निर्देश वास्तविक ज़रूरतों से कोसों दूर है।

ऐसा क्यों होता है? क्यों भारत के विकास के लिए सरकार की तरफ से किये गये खर्च का ज़मीनी हक़ीक़तों से कम सम्बन्ध है?

इसका एक महत्वपूर्ण कारण यह है की जनता का पैसा केंद्र सरकार से जमीनी स्तर तक टुकड़ों में, घुमावदार भूलभुलैया के माध्यम से प्रवाहित होता है। यह भूलभुलैया अस्पष्ट है और इसको ट्रैक करना बहुत मुश्किल है जो फिर विलम्ब, अकुशलता और दुरुपयोग का कारण बनती है ! परिणामतः ये व्यय प्रबंधन प्रणाली के विकृति को प्रोत्साहित करती हैं।

Why is Accountability so Important in India? Watch this video to learn more.

Tucked away in the far corners of Purnea in eastern Bihar, Accountability Initiative researchers encountered a school that had recently received government money to purchase fire extinguishers. This money had been provided with instructions from the State government to ensure that all schools were adequately equipped to deal with emergencies. Who could object to that? Except this school was still awaiting money needed to start construction on its school building!

The “building-less” school (as defined in government records) in Purnea is not alone. Over the years, we have come across scores of instances where government funds reach last mile facilities (schools, clinic, Anganwadi centres), Panchayats and municipalities with instructions for expenditure that have little connection to ground realities.

Why does this happen? Why does development expenditure in India often have such little relevance to the everyday realities on the ground?

One important reason for this is that public money travels from the Union government to the ground through a fragmented, circuitous maze. This maze is opaque and difficult to track thus causing delays, inefficiencies and misuse. The result is an expenditure management system that encourages distortions.

Watch our video to learn more about the complicated world of development finances and how Accountability Initiative research aims to untangle some parts of the public finance web.

Making High Policy in Secret

In my last blog, I has asked how policies were actually made in the government. The answer is, they are made confidentially. Or at least, all efforts are made to keep matters confidential.

Passionate advocates for transparency and accountability – there is a natural presumption here that both go hand in hand; it is presumption that I refute – will rail at this. But it is clear that setting the rules of the game, beyond a point, cannot be taken through a totally transparent process.

Confidentiality is necessary in policy decisions, because every such decision creates winners and losers out of stakeholders. In most cases, one cannot give losers advance warning, so that they can artificially position themselves as winners. Of course, hints can be dropped that one or the other policy is on the way, so that those who inadvertently make mistakes, or are found to be on the wrong side of policy can make the necessary corrections.

So what exactly do I mean by these abstract thoughts?

Let me give you an example; and there cannot be any better than the current demonetisation exercise.

Let us picture that we were the Prime Minister and we were against the menace of black money. Surely, we would be making speeches and delivering warnings that black money is a menace and that those who accumulate black money will be at risk of being caught and punished.

What are the current instrumentalities that we have on hand to deliver on this threat?

We could intensify raids on those who are suspected to hold black money. They could be our fellow politicians, our industrialist friends who funded our party’s political campaign. They could be our relatives. The risks of going against individuals are plenty. For one thing, we could alienate them for life. Second, raids and investigations are costly to conduct and coordinate. Furthermore, they involve large numbers of people to actually conduct them, and unreliable people in the implementation chain could play havoc by allowing criminals to escape. We also have the example of a previous Prime Minister trying such tactics and that leading to him losing his seat. I speak of Prime Minister V.P. Singh.

So then, we are looking at a path breaking, broad spectrum instrument that can deliver effectively, have a surprise effect and also create political ripples, by reinforcing your reputation as a doer.

Demonetisation presents itself as a pretty good tactic, if judged by these yardsticks. It is the mosquito spray, as opposed to raids, which are like attempting to slap mosquitoes into oblivion.

But then, mosquito sprays have this odd knack of killing a lot of innocent, useful insects as well.

Clearly, they need to be protected. Or if their populations reduce, they need to be nurtured back to the balance that existed.

Which means demonetisation has to be quickly followed by re-monetisation – an injection of balance.

But remonetisation of an extraction of 86 percent of currency in the system is a gargantuan exercise. Certainly, it is not going to be achieved unless there are massive arrangements downstream. Printing arrangements have to be readied, ATMs have to be re-calibrated, Banks have to be on their toes and perceptions have to be managed through the media, to mitigate against rumours, or your political rivals turning on you.

How are you going to manage that?

Utmost secrecy is the answer.

But then, utmost secrecy will also place accountability squarely on yourself, if something goes wrong.

In my next blog, I explore whether there can be a compromise between maintaining utmost secrecy and collective decision making.

BASIC TENETS OF DECENTRALISATION

Governments around the world are increasingly elected on a platform of greater citizen participation. The antagonist for progress in effective decentralisation is poorly conceived policies where design don’t match objectives. Roy Bahl makes a neat attempt to explain the vital guidelines for designing the implementation strategy for fiscal decentralisation. In this part of our blog series, we shall look into these rules of implementation:

Rule #1: Fiscal Decentralisation as a comprehensive system

Decentralisation can only take place when it can build itself into a comprehensive system. A strong locally elected council, locally appointed officers, local taxing powers and autonomy to spend along with hard budget constraints are a must. Additionally, these local governments (LG) must have borrowing power and intergovernmental fiscal transfer with limited expenditure mandates from the central authorities.

Why is this important?

A well formulated structure with downward accountability to the local population will ensure that efficiency gains that are at the heart of fiscal decentralisation is not lost. Optimal efficiency occurs when service delivery to citizens are locally directed and are not delivered as directed by the Center.

Real World Examples: Karnataka made its intergovernmental transfer to LGs transparent by replacing ad hoc grants with a formula based transfer. However, the state controls what the local bodies do by tying the fund transfers to expenditure mandates it defines. This negates the potential gains from efficiency that can be achieved through decentralisation.

Rule #2: Finance follows function

The second basic rule discusses the process of how functions determine the finances of LGs. Here the emphasis is in the order. Expenditure assignment should always be assigned first and only then the revenues be assigned to LGs.

Why is this important?

Expenditure needs for LGs needs to be addressed before tackling the question of revenue assignments. For example public utility like bus charges can be financed through user charges. But to do so the LG would need to know if transportation comes under their functional domain.

Real World Examples: The Indian Constitution allows for 29 subjects that could be devolved by the states to the LGs. Number of functions allocated to LGs in India varies dramatically from state to state and as a logical corollary so do the revenue streams.

Rule #3: Strong Central ability to monitor and evaluate decentralisation

The role of the Central agency is not nullified but enhanced through decentralisation. As imperative it is to devolve fiscal resources, so is tracking these financial resources by the Central authority. Effective decentralisation is almost impossible without a strong, fiscal analysis unit that can so that that each responsible department and office in-charge can plan better and is accountable for the finances spent at the local level.

Real World Examples: Information Kerala Mission (IKM) was established by the state government of Kerala to assist in collating data on LG finances that could help the State Finance and State Planning Commission to make well measure and hence well thought out recommendations.

Rule #4: There cannot be a one size fits all intergovernmental fiscal transfer

There is no need for a uniform intergovernmental fiscal system under which all sub national governments must operate as each one have different capacities to finance and deliver services. In fact a better route is to explicitly recognise the differences between LGs and make necessary fiscal arrangements – smaller LGs could rely more on grants whereas larger LGs could rely more heavily on local taxation. These rules should also be flexible enough to change when smaller government grows into a bigger one.

Real World Examples: Large cities (Example NYC) in American states are given special fiscal powers. In India, North Eastern states get more fiscal support through grants from the Center compared to southern Indian states who depend on own source revenues.

Rule #5: Give local governments significant taxing powers

Significant taxing powers should be provided to LGs as voters will hold their elected officials accountable if public services delivered to them are financed through their taxes. These taxes should be a noticeable burden to local voters and whose benefits from such services should not be transferred to residents outside the jurisdiction. Choice of tax is important and should depend on ease of administration, involves local residents and is administered on locally produced goods.

Examples of such tax forms include individual income tax, motor vehicle and fuel tax, property tax, user charges, etc.

**Rule #6: Central government should abide by the fiscal decentralisation rules that they make**

Fiscal decentralisation implies stepping away from a paternalistic approach to governance but it is the Central authority that determines the rules. These rules take the form of implementing regulations. Failure to adhere to such rules can lead to the flypaper effect. Some forms in which rules are not kept by the Central authority include underfunding functions transferred, abolition of local taxes, etc.Transparency in rules is not sufficient, there must be adherence to rules.

Real World Examples: As per AIs Panchayat Finances study in Karnataka in FY 2014-15 INR 16,239 was appropriated from the LG by the state government for expenditure through line departments (de concentrated agencies of the state).

Rule #7: Keep it simple

Capacities of LGs are limited and hence intergovernmental reform should be driven by simplicity. The basic rule to protect simplicity is achieved by limiting the number of objectives to be accomplished by each policy instrument. For instance, local sales taxes if imposed to promoted economic development through exemptions will attract administrative cost of regulation. This diverts tax administration from its primary purpose i.e. revenue collection. Similarly when Central governments impose conditional grants for expenditure on LGs they must consider the enforcement costs incurred by LGs versus the benefits attached to such tied money.

Rule #8: Design intergovernmental transfer system keeping in mind decentralisation reform

Intergovernmental transfer has two dimensions: size of the divisible pool (vertical fiscal balance) and distribution of this pool amongst LGs (horizontal fiscal balance). There are many ways to structure a fiscal transfer system – the choice should be based on the objectives that is intended to be achieved from the decentralisation reform.

For instance, if tax is shared based on what is collected within the boundaries of the LG then two things happen – (a) Local autonomy is preserved on money spend and (b) Favor the growth of rich LG. In contrast, if money was shared based on a formulae it could still preserve autonomy but would give an opportunity to redistribute resources towards those LGs which have a weak revenue base.

Rule #9: Fiscal Decentralisation should keep in mind all three levels of government

Typically there are three levels of the government – Centre, state and LGs. The key policy issue for reform at a LG level is whether the Centre will cover all levels of the government or the states will be left to design their internal program.

Real World Examples: In China and the US, states determine distribution within its boundaries. In India there is freedom of the states to design resources to LGs but the Centre provides guidelines that states are expected to follow. A recent such reform is the GPDP or Gram Panchayat Development Plan guideline.

Rule #10: Impose a hard budget constraint

There should be a match between the expenditure responsibility and revenue assignment such that autonomous LGs balance their budgets (i.e. revenue = expenditure). For this to work the Central government should not provide deficit grants and bailouts as they work as an insurance cover to LGs from prudent fiscal management.

Real World Examples: Michigan State in the US was unable to support its largest city Detroit when it fell into financial misery. Detroit became one of the biggest US cities that had to file for bankruptcy.

Rule #11: Intergovernmental systems are transitional, plan accordingly

Disparities amongst region within a country/state change, areas of investment change, capacities of local governments change and hence intergovernmental systems should be clear but flexible. Ways to being flexible while keeping the process transparent include: Establishing a grants commission that reviews allocation of fiscal transfers and local tax structures every few years and review to determine whether any LG can graduate to the next class of local fiscal autonomy.

Real World Examples: India has national and state finance commissions that determine allocations of fiscal transfers between Centre, state and LGs.

Rule #12: There must be a strong support for fiscal decentralisation

In spite of decentralisation being a favored and popular policy reform it has few enthusiastic champions especially in developing and transition countries. It is important to have a strong internal champion to ensure that rules are clearly apprehended and effectively implemented.

Real World Examples: In pre independence India MK Gandhi was an early champion. There are numerous other examples from Shri MY Ghorpade in Karnataka who was the minister for rural development in the state to Aam Aadmi Party in contemporary Indian politics structuring decentralisation through their mandate for Mohalla Sabhas.

Understanding India’s bureaucracy through the IAS officer

Accountability Initiative deconstructs the Indian bureaucracy through the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officer in a series of blogs by T R Raghunandan, a former bureaucrat himself, (referred to as Raghu here on) summarised below:

In the blog, Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Additional Crown, Raghu breaks down the hierarchy of the Indian bureaucracy, explaining the various designations at different levels, and what these mean in terms of the power wielded.

In the next blog, taking off from the introductory one, Raghu details the Bureaucratic Review Process, unpacking the elaborate appraisal system, which is designed to ensure that the best talent reaches the top.

The third blog, How Commonplace is ‘Outstanding’?, explains how the gradation of officers during the review process is carried out; the hurdles in it; and the common use of ‘outstanding’ for 90 percent of the officers, reflective of the bureaucracy’s avoidance of confrontation in its internal dealings.

In the following two blogs, A Digression into Ethical Dilemmas and Ambition, Ethical Dilemmas and the Bureaucracy, Raghu shares his views on the ethical factors, which are likely to render ineffective a peer based confidential appraisal system–part of a new set of changes introduced.

In the last two blogs on this topic, The Loneliness of the Ethical and How Honest Is Honest?, Raghu shares examples of the ‘loneliness of those who take an ethical stand, in the face of large numbers of those who do not’, and explains why a ‘shared understanding of what integrity is’, and a ‘culture of acceptance of honest criticism up the hierarchy’ (both currently lacking) are pre-requisites for a system of 360 degree appraisal to work as intended.

To read more blogs by T.R Raghunandan, follow Raghu Bytes.

The views shared belong to individual faculty and researchers and do not represent an institutional stance on the issue.

Beyond Toilet Construction – Challenges for Swachh Bharat Mission (Urban)

Can constructing toilets end open defecation if they are not used? What might seem like a facetious question is actually of critical importance to India’s flagship sanitation programme.

It has now been two years since the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) was launched, and 30 years since India recognised Sanitation as an issue needing active government intervention with the formulation of the Central Rural Sanitation Programme. Despite a steady march of over two decades, the SBM was lauded as a giant leap forward, and rightly so.

Arguably for the first time, the SBM acknowledged the equivalence of urban and rural sanitation. Furthermore, the diversification of success indicators promised a progressive and holistic approach. For example, the urban mission guidelines expressly state the need to target sustainable behaviour change through concerted Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) campaigns. And while 100% access to sanitary toilets remains a prerequisite, it is not seen as an end in itself.

Even the most inveterate cynic would find little to criticise about the principles on which the SBM is based. This does however mean that the Ministry of Urban Development, and State and local governments, have a difficult challenge to meet these raised expectations by 2019. It would not be inopportune to consider their progress at this juncture.

As of December 2016, over 27 Lakh Household toilets and more than 1.28 Lakh Community toilet blocks, have been constructed under the urban mission. Despite significant state variations, this amounts to 35% of toilet construction target in 40% of mission period, which the government opines is “broadly on course”. But toilet availability is understood by the mission as a necessary but not a sufficient precondition to ending open defecation. It knows that building toilets does not equal ending open defecation, and yet, the implementation of the programme does not reveal this insight.

Informal conversations with government officials, across levels, find that the focus thus far has been on driving the administration to meet toilet construction targets. This is being done using all means, fair and foul. An Accountability Initiative survey conducted across 5 states last year, reveals that the MIS numbers are not inoculated against inaccuracies and overreporting, which government officers acknowledge informally. Still, even assuming that the numbers are verified, does it mean that urban India is 35% along the way to being open defecation free? Not quite.

Several factors, practical and cultural, inhibit toilet usage, especially over a period. Lack of water and sewerage connections, poor construction quality and lax maintenance, difficulties with managing faecal sludge, all combine to either prevent toilets from being used consistently, or force people to relapse into open defecation as the toilets become unusable. Research on the subject finds that in households which have gained access to toilets for the first time in the recent past, one or more members of the households, often children and men, resort to open defecation.

This reinforces the need for IEC, which is government parlance for social and behaviour change communications (SBCC). The mission recognizes this, and earmarks as much as 15% of the outlay for this component, with 12% to be granted to the states for the purpose, in the guidelines. Thus far however, this has only been on paper. IEC expenditure was 4% of total expenditure in 2014-15, which was further reduced to 1% over the next year. In 2016-17, towards the end of the third financial quarter, a little more than Rs 40 crores has been released by the centre to 7 states under this head, which is about 1.75% of the total SBM Urban budget for the year. Barring a mad rush to reach out to people in the final quarter, it is unlikely that the targeted 345 Crores will be spent.

These numbers tell us only half the story, ignoring the qualitative aspects of the issue, and as worrying as the numbers might be, there are more reasons for concern. To begin with, it must be understood that SBCC is studied and practiced by organizations around the globes, many of whom are partnering with the Government of India on this and other issues. There is thus a rich repository of case studies and best practices for India to learn from. To that extent, there is no need to invent the wheel, but there is a need to use it correctly. For example, SBCC best practices advocate an integrated and strategic approach focussing not only on individual behaviour change, but on social norms. It advices a judicious mix of mass media, mid media, interpersonal communications, and attention to building capacity. Most importantly, there is a need to understand that SBCC is not a PR exercise.

None of this is a revelation. And while the SBM Urban guidelines are sketchy on IEC strategy, the rural guidelines go into significant details to emphasise just these aspects. And yet, SBM IEC spending seems to be limited to only mechanical tasks such as plastering the SBM logo across village walls and printing pamphlets, or for organizing events. These might aid the brand recognition of the mission, but are unlikely to inform, educate, or communicate. Other initiatives such as the concept of Swachagrahis, were created keeping in mind the importance of interpersonal communications. But as of now, only about 19,431 Swachagrahis have been ‘identified’ according to government data, of whom 6500 are in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh alone. West Bengal, for example, has only 15 Swachagrahis, which is less than the number identified in Chandigarh. The reach and impact of these Swacchagrahis can only be evaluated when enough of them are working on the ground. As of now, there aren’t.

So why is the SBM lagging? Much of the responsibility must be shouldered by the states, and the vast disparity in levels of implementation does indicate this. Nevertheless, there is something to be said about the approach itself. Political pressure and high visibility in a thus far ignored sector are heartening, but their unanticipated fallout can be the sacrifice of quality and thoroughness at the altar of monthly targets. The SBM guidelines set high standards of performance. It is essential to ensure that they aren’t rendered solely aspirational.