Whatever happened to administrative reforms?

Can we resolve corruption without administrative reforms? I have been struck by how silent the current debate on anti-corruption has been on the question of administrative reforms. Even the far more complex and arguably controversial issue of political and electoral reforms have found place in the debate but no one seems to be talking about administrative reforms. And yet most observers of Indian democracy would agree that the administrative structure as it exists today, the rules and structures that govern it have created a perverse incentives structure that makes accountability almost impossible. No surprise then that corruption, particularly the day to day corruption that most in India are subject to, proliferates unchecked.

In fact, I would go so far as to argue that administrative failure can stymie even the most well intentioned and well implemented anti-corruption system. This was brought home to me on a recent trip to Andhra Pradesh (AP) to study the states’ social audit system under the MGNREGA.  For the uninitiated, AP is the only state in India that has institutionalized social audits (pioneered by the Right to Information movement, social audit is a citizen led process of cross verifying government records with monies spent on the ground. All audits are followed by a public hearings (Jan sunwai’s) where government officials are invited to publically respond to audit findings) in the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Program (MGNREGA). Since 2006 when the MGNREGA was launched, the state has undertaken over 1,736 audits and inspected over 50 lakh government records making AP the only state in the country to have willingly opened itself up and invited public scrutiny. Addressing corruption and improving accountability was the primary objective behind initiating the social audits. The political system beginning with then Chief Minister, YS Rajashekhar Reddy, put its weight behind the effort and in its early days this political support went a long way towards quelling political opposition to the process.

I’ve been studying this process from its early days. In 2007, my colleague Salimah Samji and I studied the effects of the process to find that social audits seemed to have a significant impact on people’s awareness levels and some positive impact on people’s perceptions of the government (the study was conducted through the World Bank. Details are available on our website at the following link). Early on, social audit champions in the state recognized that effective grievance redressal – taking strong action against errant officials – was the key to making social audits a strong anti-corruption and accountability tool. After many experiments, in early 2010 a vigilance structure was introduced headed by a vigilance officer (a retired civil servant) at the state level and supported by a district level vigilance officer. The vigilance officers only responsibility is to follow up on issues that emerge out of social audits, ensure recovery (the official term for recovering corrupt money) and ensure errant officials are brought to book.

What did we find? The good news first. Social audits have been an extremely effective vehicle to bring out corruption and maladministration. All officials we spoke to (even those that critique the system) attested to this. What was interesting was that everyone felt that the public nature of the audit and the fact that through the public hearing officials have to respond to social audit findings are a very powerful tool to bring out such problems. And the figures prove it. According to the latest data social audits have resulted in unearthing corruption worth over Rs. 100 crore! And better still the process enables auditors to pin point responsibility to specific officers. We analyzed social audit data from 13 districts in the state to find that the top 5 officials responsible for most issues unearth include: Field Assistant (38%), Branch Post Master (11%), Additional Program Officer (8%), Technical Assistant (6%) and MPDO (5%). The top nature of complaints found in the social audits include: fraudulent muster rolls (14%), misappropriation of funds (11%), wages not paid (5%) and delay in payments (3%).

But the problem is that very little happens after that. Only 25% of the total money identified as money lost to corruption has actually been recovered. And even fewer officials have been held to account. We analyzed data on irregularities committed by officials and action taken to find that out of 19,488 officials who have been identified as having committed irregularities, action (dismissal, inquiries, suspension) has only been taken on 9,809! This, despite a vigilance structure that has both senior politicians and bureaucrats supporting it.

The problem does not lie so much with the social audit process. The social auditors seem to be doing their job fairly well- the very fact that these issues are brought out in the public domain is an indicator of that. The problem does not even lie with the vigilance structure as such – it has all the right ingredients including a senior, official who operates with a high degree of autonomy. The problem lies with the administrative system within which the process operates.

Consider this. At the mandal level the chief implementing officer for MGNREGA is the Mandal Parishad Development Officer (MPDO). The MPDO reports to the Panchayati Raj department-PRD (separate to the Rural Development Department that implements the program). As the key implementing official at the  mandal level (the last mile implementation point), the MPDO is not just powerful but also responsible for all action taken based on social audit findings. At the district level the program is managed by a Project Director (PD), accountable to the Rural Development Department (RD). The PD presides over the social audit public hearing and takes decisions on actions to be taken.  But when it comes to the MPDO, all the PD can do is send a recommendation to the Panchayati Raj Department (PRD) for removal of an MPDO. Senior officials in RD, the department to whom the PD is accountable to, have no authority over the PRD and thus can do nothing if PRD chooses not to take action against MPDO’s.

It gets more complicated. Our analysis finds that the Branch Post Master (responsible for MGNREGA payments at the post office) is often implicated in corruption cases during the social audits. But the Branch Post Master (BPM) reports to the postal service that is outside the disciplinary purview of the MGNREGA officials. Thus, just as in the case of the MPDO, the only action that a PD can take against an errant BPM is to recommend that the Superintendent Post Master (SPM) take action against him or her. The list goes on!

No surprise then, that the social audit is not as effective as it could be in curbing corruption. The problem is that the MGNREGA (and any other government scheme) is being implemented through an administrative structure that is simply not designed for accountability. Departments function in vertical silo’s, multiple agencies get involved in undertaking and implementing programs each with different reporting structures that operate parallel to one another, this results in confusion and often  roles and responsibilities overlap enabling each level of the system to pass the buck on to the other. Given the loopholes, no grievance redressal system will be good enough. Building anti corruption systems into a leaky pipe requires a systematic approach that both plugs the leaks and also creates disincentives for corruption through a system of strong enforcement measures. The current anti corruption debate, especially the debate on the Lok Pal, is focused almost entirely on the question of anti enforcement measures and little attention has been paid to the larger question of the leaky pipe itself.

And so it comes back to administrative reforms. The sad truth is that none of this is new and we even have a menu of solutions. In 2005, the UPA government appointed the second administrative reforms commission which over a period of 4 years came out with 11 thick volumes of analysis and recommendations for administrative reforms. Like most committees these reports are gathering dust and the idea of administrative reforms has faded from public discourse. If we are serious about anti-corruption then we need bring administrative reforms back in the debate.

Analysis of the Jan Lokpal Bill

The Jan Lokpal is being hotly debated in the country today. This note by Mr Venkatesh Nayak of Human Rights Initiative seeks to encourage informed debate on the subject.

In the words of the author ” This note is also a work in progress. Any comments on this note are welcome. The authors only wish to encourage informed debate on the subject across the country. Please feel free to circulate this note amongst your networks.”

Public comments on Electronic Service Delivery Invited

The Department of Information Technology, Government of India has uploaded the text of the Draft Electronic Service Delivery Bill, 2011 (Draft ESD Bill) on its website seeking public comments on its contents. The Draft Bill is accessible at: http://mit.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/DraftEDSBill_11042011.pdf

What is the Draft ESD Bill?

As part of the National e-Governance Plan several missions and projects are in place that aim to modernise government business and service delivery processes by using computers and other electronic devices.

More than a lakh Common Service Centres have been established across the country to provide servioce delivery to people through electronic means. These could be receipt of forms and applications, issue or grant of any license, permit, certificate, sanction or approval and the receipt or payment of money by whatever name called in a particular manner. Signature certifying authorities, Unique Identification (UID) number delivering authorities are doing their work. Yet several departments and authorities continue to deliver services manually. Any citizen who has tried to access any public service delivered manually knows how cumbersome it is. there is not enough transparency in the system and this leads to corruption.

The Government of India plans to bring in a law that will compel its public authorities and the State Governments to deliver all public services electronically by a deadline in the near future. if the Draft ESD Bill becomes law they will be compelled to do so. Electronic Service Delivery Commissions will be established at the Central and State level for aiding and monitoring the implementation of this law. The Draft Bill requires proactive disclosure of all norms of services that will be provided electronically. The Commissions are competent to receive complaints from citizens about non-compliance with the provisions of this proposed law. The Commissions can impose fines on Head of the Department or his/her subordinate for non-compliance with the provisions of the proposed law.

What can you do?

It is laudable that the Government is seeking people’s views on the Draft Bill’s contents. This Draft Bill is aimed at improving transparency and accountability in electronic delivery of public services. As it has a bearing on corruption and accountability it is important that people send their views to the Department of Information Technology on its provisions.   Please send your views to: abhishek at gov dot in with Draft ESD Bill mentioned in the subject line of your email. No deadline has been stipulated in the public notice accessible at: http://mit.gov.in/content/draft-electronic-service-delivery-bill-1

 

Progress of States in RTE implementation

It has been a year since the beginning of the implementation of the Right to Education (RTE) Act. The Act lays down a number of things to be done at the level of the Central and the state governments. As per the Act, the state governments have to issue notifications with respect to setting up certain bodies, and specifying certain policies.

The Ministry of Human Resources & Development (MHRD), Government of India (GoI) has, very recently, come out with a report which analyses the extent to which the state governments have taken these steps. The report specifically looks at the following:

  1. Notification of the State Rules: The State governments are required by notification, to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act.
  2. Constitution of State Commission for Protection of Child Rights / REPA: As per the Act, the State Commission for Protection of Child Rights (SCPCR) has an important role to play. It is supposed to (a) examine and review the safeguards for rights provided by the Act and recommend measures for their effective implementation; (b) inquire into complaints relating to child’s right to free and compulsory education;
  3. Notification of Academic Authority: As per the Act, the State governments are supposed to set up an academic authority whose main function would curriculum and evaluation procedure.
  4. Policy on Eight Year Elementary Education
  5. Policy on No Detention
  6. Policy on No Corporal Punishment: The Act says that no child would be subjected physical punishment or mental harassment.
  7. Policy on No Board Examination up to Elementary Level: As per the Act, no child would be required to pass any board examination till completion of elementary education.
  8. Policy on Banning private Tuition:The Act lays down that no teacher would engage himself or herself in private tuition or private teaching activity.
  9. Policy on Banning Screening Procedure and Capitation Fees: The Act says that no school would collect any capitation fee and subject the child or his or her parents or guardian to any screening procedure.
  10. Policy on Minimum Working Days and Instructional Hours: The Act specifies the minimum number of working days / instructional hours, separately for the primary and the upper primary sections. For the primary section, the minimum number of working days are 200 and the minimum number of instructional hours are 800. For the upper primary section, the number are 220 days and 1000 hours.

I have created an index which assigns a value of 1 for each of the items. The maximum value of the index would be 10 and the lowest value would be zero. So how are the states doing? This is indicated in the following diagram:

The diagram indicates that out of 28 states, 10 (slightly more than one-third) states have value of index less than or equal to 5. Three states- Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Sikkim have full scores i.e. they have issued all the relevant notifications and out the policies in place. Surprisingly, states like Goa, Karnataka and Kerala, which have traditionally been better performers, have scores less than 5.

If we look item- wise, 23 states have put in place a policy on eight year elementary education and no corporal punishment, followed by setting up the academic authority, no detention policy and no board exams up to elementary level (21 states). Very few states have issued notification regarding the rules or set up the academic authority (only 11-12 states), as indicated in the following table:

 

Item No. of States
Notification of State Rules 11
Constitution of SCPCR/ REPA 12
Banning Private Tutions 16
Ban on Screening Procedure and Capitation Fees 16
Minimum Working Days and Instructional Hours 18
Notification of Academic Authority 21
No Detention 21
No Board Exams up to Elementary Level 21
Policy on 8 Year Elementary Education 23
No Corporal Punishment 2

The report has not included the progress of states in setting up of a State Advisory Council, (mentioned in the Act) which is supposed to advise state governments on effective implementation of the provisions of the Act.

Tools and institutional frameworks to promote Active Participation

In the last blog post, I introduced the concept of active participation. In this blog post, I talk about the various mechanisms by which active participation can be promoted in a country.

The post has been divided into 2 parts. The first part is a summary of various institutional frameworks meant to promote active participation. The second part is a list of various tools/processes which have been specifically created to facilitate active citizen participation.

Institutional Frameworks

Popular Legislative Initiative : The right to propose legislation is granted by the constitution in some countries (Austria, Poland, Spain). In Switzerland, citizens can request changes to the constitution by collecting 100000 signatures of eligible voters within a period of 18 months.  Their proposals may take the form of a general proposition or a fully-drafted constitutional text, which cannot be modified by either the Parliament or the Government. A US citizen group is campaigning for introducing legislative initiatives in the US through an amendment to the constitution and an Act called the Democracy Amendment and the Democracy Act respectively. You can read about it here

Citizen initiated referenda : The 1993 Citizen Initiated Referenda Act of New Zealand provides for the holding of referenda initiated by citizens to indicate the views held by the people on specific questions – the results are however not binding.

Law 69 : Law 69 was ratified in Tuscany in 2007 and gives citizens the right to petition for deliberative, participatory processes to address local problems. A local authority then determines an appropriate process on the principles of inclusivity and deliberation and, crucially, funds the process. The relevant agency is then legally required to act on the public’s recommendations. The law encourages and supports, but does not require, public participation.

Social partnerships: Social partnership model are collaborative models between the government and interest groups, where the interest groups are closely integrated into the formal political process. There are a number of different formalized social partnerships.

In Austria,  social partnerships are defined by the“Agreement of the Social Partners” that originated in 1957”. By this agreement, policy-making is a collaborative exercise between associations representing employers, associations representing employees, many others such diverse groups and government representatives. Any individual or corporate body, by law has to register as a member of the various chambers. These chambers have the right to appraise bills and formulate bills. And thus, these chambers allows for direct citizen participation.

In Netherlands the Social and Economic Council’ is an independent body from the government, which is financed by industry. The SER’s role in the legislative process is that it must be consulted on all important measures (national and international) in the economic and social field by the Dutch government. It may be asked questions at any stage in the legislative process or it may forward opinions on its own initiative’. though the government is not obliged to adopt them. These opinions do, however, carry significant weight since they have the support of the employers’. and employees’ associations and therefore they tend to be accepted. The Belgian Central Economic Council plays a similar role in Belgium.

Administrative bodies for promoting active-participation : Netherlands has established an “Expertise Bureau for Innovative Policy-Making” . The task of the Bureau is to collect know-how and expertise regarding innovative decision-making, new relationship between the public and administrative units, and the use of ICT applications as a decision-making resource.

Policies for promoting active-participation : Canada, Finland, Netherlands have made it a policy priority to come up with new ways of increasing citizen engagement.

Tools/Processes to facilitate citizen participation

Citizen Fora – Provides a means to deliver policy proposals generated by citizens or their representative organizations directly to policy-makers

Citizen Juries – Allows a group of citizens –selected to reflect the population at large, to question experts in a quasi-courtroom setting and to offer recommendations after deliberations.

Dialogue processes – Enables governments to engage large number of citizens directly in the process of identifying and developing policy solutions.  Involves organized meetings, kitchen-table talks, individual submissions, submission of a workbook etc.

Consensus conferences – Enables a panel of laymen (non-experts) with access to a range of experts, to discuss a complex issue over several days and report on its conclusions

E-governance based tools – The e-Democracia project in Brazil relies on the use of social media, combined with offline legislative events (any of the above) to engage citizens in the law-making process. It also involves the use of lawyers who convert non-legal comments by participants into legal-technical language.

Deliberative opinion polling : Deliberative polling combines random sampling of public opinion on a specific issue with small-group discussions. Rather than simply determining existing public opinion, a deliberative poll aims to understand what public opinion would be if the public were well-informed and had carefully discussed a particular issue.

Now that this blog post has introduced various frameworks and tools to promote active participation, my next blog post would talk about the various technology tools that can promote active participation.

From Consultation to Active Policy Making – Lessons from the Jan Lokpal revolution.

Engaging citizens in policy-making is a sound investment and a core element of good governance.  It allows governments to tap wider sources of information, perspectives and potential solutions, and improves the quality of the decisions reached. Equally important, it contributes to building public trust in government, raising the quality of democracy and strengthening capacity. [i]

In the absence of avenues of participation, citizens rightfully take up means to get their voice across to government. This might sometimes lead to adoption of extra-constitutional methods which might be termed blackmailing. This is what was seen in the Jan Lokpal Issue.

Two major lessons have emerged from Lok Janpal revolution – one good, and one bad. The good news is that citizens in India are ready to participate in the framing of laws. Civil society (particularly the middle class) seems to have “re”cognized its power on governance. The bad news is that to most people, the only visible and effective avenue of participation seems to be extra-constitutional. Though the Government of India has always provided avenues for public consultation, people have not taken to it or do not consider it effective. [To understand the various ways in which the Government of India allows citizens to engage with policy-makers, please see this PRS blog.] And so now, people have started clamoring for a new level of participation in framing of laws – which is active participation.

3 levels of citizen participation

OECD has identified 3 levels of citizen participation – Information, Consultation and Active Participation.

Information                                      Consultation                              Active participation

Figure : Courtesy OECD

The first level of citizen participation : Information

The first is when the government provides enough information for people to make informed decisions. This level does not allow for feedback or active participation and is the level at which the Right-To-Information act works. The demands of the people reach the government through media and pressure groups.

The second level of citizen participation : Consultation

The second level is that of consultation. Consultation is seen as a two-way relationship in which citizens provide feedback to the government. It is based on the prior definition by government of the issue on which citizens views are being sought and requires the provision of information.  Governments define the issue, set the questions (or ask for comments) and manage the process, while citizens are invited to contribute their views and opinions.

A few problems with consultation :

  1. Firstly, consultation avenues , especially in India, are usually unknown to the general public.
  2. Secondly, having set the terms of consultation, the process does not allow for widening the debate. To take a simple example – a consultation question might be “How to increase the enrollment levels in school?” However, this might be just a subset of the larger question of “How to ensure the quality of education for every child in India?” A consultative process does not allow for such a move in the discourse. If on the other hand, this were a natural conversation between the people and the government on an equal footing, then this move in discourse would have been captured, and probably the priorities of the bill changed. Thus a fixed consultation usually does not allow for an in-depth exploration of the issue so as to allow the power of a discourse to decide the priorities.
  3. Thirdly, most opinions seem to come from single-issue advocates, and so have an activist-bias. This leads people to discredit it. This lack of buy-in by all stakeholders affects the final implementation of the policy.
  4. Fourthly, outsiders involved in policy are usually allowed to make only spasmodic or single issue inputs but are not required to sustain their interaction, confront trade-offs or to meet the objections of other outsiders with opposite views.

Third level of citizen Participation: Active Participation

Active participation is regarded as a relation based on partnership with the government, in which citizens actively engage in defining the process and content of policy-making.  It acknowledges equal standing for citizens in defining the agenda, proposing policy options and shaping the policy dialogue. And most importantly, it emphasizes collaborative setting of priorities and agendas.

“Active Participation” to tame the wickedness of policy making

Policy making is a wicked problem. To see why it is so, please check this brief by the Australian Public service commission.

It’s in the DNA of wicked problems, that they can only be solved by active collaboration and shared understanding between all participants.So an active, collaborative partnership is not only desirable (as shown by the clamor for public participation in the framing of the Lokpal Bill), but is probably the only way in which the wickedness of public policy can be tamed. A collaborative model of policy-making between the government and the citizens would ensure that better decisions are taken and that there is a sense of ownership in the people, leading to better implementation.

Now that this blog post has introduced the concept of active participation, the next blog post would talk about various avenues of “Active Participation” that has been created in various countries. The blog post after that would talk about how technology can aid in “Active Participation”


[i] Citizens as partners (OECD publishing, 2001), http://books.google.co.in/books?id=XFZxZG-yupsC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false.

How to improve Judicial Accountability – Resolutions from the RTI convention

Last month, Accountability Initiative was invited to facilitate a discussion on Judicial Accountability at the RTI convention, held by NCPRI.  The topic for brainstorming was “How can RTI be used to promote transparency and accountability in judicial institutions?” The discussion largely centered around the RTI, but a few other pertinent matters were also discussed (see discussion on National Judicial Council Bill below). Following are the resolutions from the meeting.

Section A : Proactive Disclosure

The first centered around voluntary disclosure of information under section4(1) of the RTI act. Presently, the information proactively disclosed by the courts is sparse and inadequate. The following demands were made by the group. It was also noted that disclosure of this information should not be a one-time affair, but rather a regular exercise.

  1. Indexed list of case numbers along with the case orders should be available in the public domain.  Information should be provided of the entire history of a case, including all orders, all applications made in the matter and each date of hearing. A summary of how long a case has been before the court would also be useful . The Delhi High Court has a system in place, where once you type in a case number, it gives you details of how long a case has been before the court and so on. Though it’s not available to the general public, or infact even to all judges, this computerization should be made the norm across all High Courts
  2. Category-wise  pendency of cases in Courts should be made public.  Categories can be civil appeals, criminal appeals, election petitions, civil suits etc
  3. The comparative formula for calculating disposal should be universal across all High-Courts. Right now, in some courts, if a case by 10 petitioners is disposed, it is counted as 10 disposals, while in other courts, it’s considered to be 1 disposal. There are many such inconsistencies, and this is why it is necessary that the formula for calculating disposals should be made universal.
  4. Expenditure transparency  : Courts should declare how their allocated budgets are being used. In addition, names of contractors to whom contracts have been awarded should be made public.
  5. Administrative structure of the high court – Composition of committees and various sections of the High Court should be available online for anyone to peruse. There was an allegation that a number of courts do not have their sexual harassment committees in place. So it was specifically noted that the names of members constituting the sexual harassment committee should be made public.
  6. Minutes of meetings of all full court meetings and all administrative committees should be made public
  7. Numbers and pendency of disciplinary proceedings and orders : Without taking names of individuals, details should be made available about the numbers and pendency of disciplinary proceedings against court staff.
  8. Basic infrastructural facilities available in a court : Courts provide a number of facilities such as crèche, drinking water, etc. Details such as the timings for which the facilities are available, location of the facilities and procedure by which these facilities can be availed should be available online. Some of facilities specifically mentioned during the session were crèche, drinking water,  sanitation, legal  assistance, free legal aid (with list of legal aid lawyers and their contact details), filing facilities, facilities to obtain certified copies, approved formats & pro-formas for different registries
  9. Annual RTI performance report – An annual RTI report with details of numbers of applications received,number  of applications pending, number of applications dismissed etc should be made available in the public domain.
  10. Service conditions and perks of judges – Details of the service conditions and perks of judges should be in the public domain. In addition, details of official travels (both domestic and foreign) of judges, including mode of travel and expenses, should also be available.
  11. A personnel map of the court – with all appointments of all court staff should be made public. It should contain details of how a particular appointment was made (either through judges’ personal capacity, employment exchange etc) and details of where they are posted.
  12. High Court calendar, working hours and overtime hours of all employees should be online
  13. Sanctioned posts and vacancies for all posts – should be made available in real-time
  14. Reservation for all posts –should be made available
  15. Legal services authority performance – Expenses, account details, annual accounts and traveling expenses

Section B : National Judicial Council Bill

The second discussion centered around the National Judicial Council bill which seeks to set up a judicial council to inquire into complaints against errant judges. For a detailed discussion of the bill, please check this link. The unanimous opinion was that this bill needs to be opposed.  The participants agreed that the bill is an attempt by the executive to dominate and control the judiciary and that it strikes at the very heart of judicial independence and for these reasons, it should not be countenanced.

However, everybody agreed that there is a need to look into the issues raised by the bill pertaining to misconduct by judges and grievance redressal and a mechanism should be set in place for this issue. A larger consultation and a comparative study of other legal jurisdictions is necessary for this purpose.

Section C : Appointment transparency

Since the judiciary is not democratically appointed and doesn’t have transparency and accountability in its functioning, it can only derive legitimacy from a transparent appointment procedure. The groups demanded that the following be made transparent

  1. The procedure of appointment
  2. The criteria of appointment  for senior advocates
  3. Information submitted by applicants for appointment to the bench should be made public.
  4. In addition to above demands for transparency, it was demanded that the provision for CJI’s prior permission for investigation should be deleted
  5. There was also a demand to repeal Judges (Protection act) 1985 and to review the decision of the Supreme Court in the Judges case.
  6. There should be an audit of how High Courts implement the RTI rules
  7. The charges for an application should be uniform and reasonable across all High Courts.
  8. Applications should not be rejected for not conforming to the format
  9. Some of the courts (Madras HC) require that the petitioner come in person to testify. This is wrong.
  10. No verification should be needed
  11. The penalty clause should be better implemented and should not be lesser than Rs 250.
  12. Names and addresses of the PIO’s and appellate authority should be easily available. The PIO’s should be well-publicized.

Section D : RTI rules in courts

  1. There should be an audit of how High Courts implement the RTI rules
  2. The charges for an application should be uniform and reasonable across all High Courts.
  3. Applications should not be rejected for not conforming to the format
  4. Some of the courts (Madras HC) require that the petitioner come in person to testify. This is wrong.
  5. No verification should be needed
  6. The penalty clause should be better implemented and should not be lesser than Rs 250.
  7. Names and addresses of the PIO’s and appellate authority should be easily available. The PIO’s should be well-publicized.

Dating data – What are the characteristics of dream government data?

The lack of good quality government (GOI) data and the idiosyncrasies in whatever data that does exist is a recurring theme in office conversations and the blog during or just after the budget brief season.  This year was no different: we sat around a round table and analysed eight centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) in the social sector, sifted through reams of data on government schemes till we knew government websites better than the government itself[1], checked, cross-checked, rechecked, re-cross-checked, and for good measure, re-rechecked and re-re-cross-checked our numbers, and despite (or perhaps because of) all these measures, we were often left holding our heads in our hands in abject dejection and despair.

Which brings us to the question – what exactly is good quality data? We deliberated on this for some time and came up with a few possible criteria which may be used to judge data quality. We will leave aside the question of authenticity of government data, as it’s nearly impossible to verify that and concentrate on other broader categories.

  1. Coverage:  To evaluate the performance of a CSS during one year, we need data on how much money has been allocated, released and spent during that year. In addition, we need data on outputs and outcomes for that scheme. So one way of judging the quality of data for a CSS, would be to see how comprehensively it covers input, output and outcomes.
    1. Inputs: These consist of monies that flow into the scheme from any source. This money may be plan/non-plan allocations or grants from GOI or state governments, or discretionary grants from the central and state finance commissions. This concept may be simple enough to understand. However, we need to keep in mind that there are nuances to it – The entire allocation may not be sanctioned for release during the financial year; what is sanctioned for release may not be released and sometimes the entire release may not get spent! To take an example, `100 might be allocated, `90 might be sanctioned for release, `80 actually released (the remaining might be classified under strange categories such as “funds in transit” as in the case of MGNREGA) and only `50 might be actually spent during an FY.  So finally, what should we treat as inputs? To make this a little more concrete (pun intended), let’s take the example of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (a CSS for the construction of rural roads).  The value of proposals approved (this is similar to planned allocations) for the scheme in 2008-09 was Rs.22,027 crores , the release was Rs.8,660 crores, while the actual expenditure was Rs.2,84,913 crores!!! (Weird, right? How can expenditure be more than release?!) Arguably, we should consider the money spent as the pure input, but this data is often not available and even if available has a lag associated with it (we’ll come to this point later).
    2. Outputs: Now, money that is put in has to be used for something. (Of course some of it may get diverted to non-productive use but that is also not the focus of this article.) To continue with the PMGSY example, the output would be the number of roads built or the length of roads constructed during a period of time. For NRHM, the output would be the number of SCs/PHCs/CHCs constructed.
    3. Outcomes: in most cases, especially when we look at the social sector, outputs are not the end-all, we generally have broader goals in mind and CSS’s are simply tools to achieve these goals. Simply increasing the road length under the PMGSY does not serve any useful purpose unless the number of unconnected habitations does not decrease with time.
  2. Periodicity : Secondly, in order to see if there have been changes in the way that money is allocated/released/spent, or to analyse if there have been any improvements in outcomes, we need data that is published at regular intervals. While financial data (when available) is available and needed on an annual basis, social outcomes are generally slow-moving.  So while allocations, release and expenditure may show variations from year to year, depending on government priorities, political will and changes in administrative machinery, outcomes like the number of unconnected habitations/IMR/MMR may take a while to show some improvement. Hence, while annual data may be needed for deconstructing inputs, a slightly lower periodicity may be tolerated for outcomes. However, intertemporal analysis becomes difficult and certain nuances may be difficult to capture if the gap between two observations is too large, so we need an optimal periodicity, depending on the type of variable we are interested in.
  3. Lags : In an ideal world, most data should be available in real time. Only thing is, it’s not. And sometimes, there are inadmissible delays in bringing data out into the public domain (eg. The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan website had not been updated since September 2008 was finally updated in January 2011. Also, while we know the budgetary allocation for a scheme in 2011, we will only get to know the actual expenditure incurred in 2013. Now, in 2011, we did not find any data more recent than 2008-09 for certain schemes such as the Mid-day Meal Scheme. Incidentally, some departments have an MIS in which data is updated on a day-to day basis (Total Sanitation Campaign and PMGSY in our budget brief series). While this is really impressive, such a system is not without its quirks. For instance, when the MIS for PMGSY is updated, not only do the latest numbers change but previous FYs’ data also change! While this is justified for some variables (read the BB to know which ones, and why!), one would hardly expect the number of roads or the road length to decrease over a few days! We really couldn’t figure this one out – Anirvan’s theory, that aliens had developed an inordinate fondness for PMGSY asphalt was shot down cruelly (along with the spaceship, I might add). He has never been the same since.

It can be argued that with the advent of the Right to Information Act (RTI), our life as “seekers of data” should have become easier, but here too the process is not that straightforward.  For instance, when we filed an RTI requesting for information for the state share under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), we were informed that the state shares are only available with respective state government (please note that under this programme, state share accounts for as much as 50 percent of the total allocations, so how is the central government keeping a track on the performance of this scheme?!). Another anomaly, even when our RTI’s were successful (I.e. we got the information we asked for), it didn’t match the data available on the GOI website! (for more details, please see here)

This makes us believe that the issue isn’t just about the data is not being made publicly available at regular intervals or for different parameters, but that data is just not available even with GOI– a scary thought – how does GOI function without knowing how much money is being spent on schemes or how they are performing.

Now, this blog was initially meant to be a humorous rant on the strange things that a hunter-gatherer of government data encounters till better (or worse) judgement took over. So, to end on a lighter note, did you know that Anganwadi helpers are supposed to[2] cook and serve food to children and marchers? What marchers are, we can’t even begin to guess. Let us know if you do.


[1] This incidentally is no exaggeration: it so happened that we had requested some information for state share for NRHM (which is supposed to be 15 percent of the total allocation) during a meeting with the Health State Secretaries. We were however informed that the information is not available. Strangely, later we were able to get some of this information (albeit only for 2007 and 2008) through the State Plan Approval documents.

[2] Click here for a comprehensive list of roles and responsibilities of Anganwadi Workers and Anganwadi Helpers – definitely worth a read!


Bribe Bandh

We would like to bring to the attention of all our readers, an initiative called Bribe Bandh – which seeks to lobby with the Government to ratify the UN Convention against Corruption. India is a signatory to the Convention. But signing alone is of no use. The government is under no pressure to make its anti-corruption laws stricter unless it ratifies the Convention. 

What will happen if India ratifies the Convention?

– Politicians and bureaucrats can be jailed for trying to influence courts and cops.

– Politicians and bureaucrats can be jailed for favouring business houses or lobbies.

– Corrupt business people can be jailed for bribing; their companies will be punished too.

– Money earned wrongfully, through corruption, can be forfeited.

– Paying bribes abroad will become punishable under the Indian law.

 

For all our readers who are interested in joining the campaign, you can just click on the link on the Bribe Bandh page.

 

Technology and Accountability – Lessons we can take from the rest of the world.

This powerpoint presentation is a compendium of a lot of ideas which bring together technology and accountability. It would certainly give a lot of food for thought for anybody planning to come for our bar-camp on June 5th and 6th.

Technology and accountability – ideas