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[Hindi] Why is Accountability so Important in India? Watch this video to learn more.

पूर्वी बिहार के पूर्णिया के दूर कोनों में बसे हुए एक स्कूल को सरकार से आग बुझाने के यंत्र की खरीददारी के लिए धन प्राप्त हुआ । यह धन इस निर्देश के साथ प्राप्त हुआ की सभी स्कूल पर्याप्त रूप से आपातकालीन स्थिति से निपटने के लिए तैयार हों।  इस बात से किसे आपत्ति हो सकती थी ? 

सिवाय ऊपर लिखे गये पूर्णिया के इस स्कूल को, जिसको अपने भवन निर्माण के लिए पैसा ही नहीं मिला था! 

“भवन रहित” विद्यालय (जैसा की सरकार के अभिलेखों में परिभाषित है) में पूर्णिया अकेला नहीं है! 

गत वर्षों में हम ऐसे बहुत से उदाहरणों से रूबरू हुए हैं जहाँ मूलभूत सुविधायें (स्कूल, क्लिनिक, आंगनवाड़ी केन्द्रों), पंचायतों एवं नगरपालिकाओं पर सरकारी धन व्यय करने के निर्देश जमीनी हकीकत से कोसों दूर होते हैं!

सरकार स्कूल, क्लिनिक, आंगनवाड़ी केन्द्रों, पंचायतों एवं नगरपालिकाओं जैसी संस्थाओं के माध्यम से नागरिकों को मूलभूत सुविधाऍं प्रदान करती है। पिछले कुछ सालों में एकाउंटेबिलिटी इनिशिएटिव को ऐसे कई उदाहरण मिले जहाँ यह देखा गया है कि मूलभूत सुविधाऍं प्रदान करने वाली संस्थाओं को सरकार द्वारा दिया गया व्यय करने का निर्देश वास्तविक ज़रूरतों से कोसों दूर है। 

ऐसा क्यों होता है? क्यों भारत के विकास के लिए सरकार की तरफ से किये गये  खर्च का ज़मीनी हक़ीक़तों से कम सम्बन्ध है?

इसका एक महत्वपूर्ण कारण यह है की जनता का पैसा केंद्र सरकार से जमीनी स्तर तक टुकड़ों में, घुमावदार भूलभुलैया के माध्यम से प्रवाहित होता है। यह भूलभुलैया अस्पष्ट है और इसको ट्रैक करना बहुत मुश्किल है जो फिर विलम्ब, अकुशलता और दुरुपयोग का कारण बनती है ! परिणामतः ये व्यय प्रबंधन प्रणाली के विकृति को प्रोत्साहित करती हैं। 

Why is Accountability so Important in India? Watch this video to learn more.

Tucked away in the far corners of Purnea in eastern Bihar, Accountability Initiative researchers encountered a school that had recently received government money to purchase fire extinguishers. This money had been provided with instructions from the State government to ensure that all schools were adequately equipped to deal with emergencies. Who could object to that? Except this school was still awaiting money needed to start construction on its school building!

The “building-less” school (as defined in government records) in Purnea is not alone. Over the years, we have come across scores of instances where government funds reach last mile facilities (schools, clinic, Anganwadi centres), Panchayats and municipalities with instructions for expenditure that have little connection to ground realities.

Why does this happen? Why does development expenditure in India often have such little relevance to the everyday realities on the ground?

One important reason for this is that public money travels from the Union government to the ground through a fragmented, circuitous maze. This maze is opaque and difficult to track thus causing delays, inefficiencies and misuse. The result is an expenditure management system that encourages distortions.

Watch our video to learn more about the complicated world of development finances and how Accountability Initiative research aims to untangle some parts of the public finance web. 

BASIC TENETS OF DECENTRALISATION

Governments around the world are increasingly elected on a platform of greater citizen participation. The antagonist for progress in effective decentralisation is poorly conceived policies where design don’t match objectives. Roy Bahl makes a neat attempt to explain the vital guidelines for designing the implementation strategy for fiscal decentralisation. In this part of our blog series, we shall look into these rules of implementation:

Rule #1: Fiscal Decentralisation as a comprehensive system

Decentralisation can only take place when it can build itself into a comprehensive system. A strong locally elected council, locally appointed officers, local taxing powers and autonomy to spend along with hard budget constraints are a must. Additionally, these local governments (LG) must have borrowing power and intergovernmental fiscal transfer with limited expenditure mandates from the central authorities.

Why is this important?

A well formulated structure with downward accountability to the local population will ensure that efficiency gains that are at the heart of fiscal decentralisation is not lost. Optimal efficiency occurs when service delivery to citizens are locally directed and are not delivered as directed by the Center.

Real World Examples: Karnataka made its intergovernmental transfer to LGs transparent by replacing ad hoc grants with a formula based transfer. However, the state controls what the local bodies do by tying the fund transfers to expenditure mandates it defines. This negates the potential gains from efficiency that can be achieved through decentralisation.

Rule #2: Finance follows function

The second basic rule discusses the process of how functions determine the finances of LGs. Here the emphasis is in the order. Expenditure assignment should always be assigned first and only then the revenues be assigned to LGs.   

Why is this important?

Expenditure needs for LGs needs to be addressed before tackling the question of revenue assignments. For example public utility like bus charges can be financed through user charges. But to do so the LG would need to know if transportation comes under their functional domain. 

Real World Examples: The Indian Constitution allows for 29 subjects that could be devolved by the states to the LGs. Number of functions allocated to LGs in India varies dramatically from state to state and as a logical corollary so do the revenue streams.   

Rule #3: Strong Central ability to monitor and evaluate decentralisation

The role of the Central agency is not nullified but enhanced through decentralisation. As imperative it is to devolve fiscal resources, so is tracking these financial resources by the Central authority. Effective decentralisation is almost impossible without a strong, fiscal analysis unit that can so that that each responsible department and office in-charge can plan better and is accountable for the finances spent at the local level.

Real World Examples: Information Kerala Mission (IKM) was established by the state government of Kerala to assist in collating data on LG finances that could help the State Finance and State Planning Commission to make well measure and hence well thought out recommendations.

Rule #4: There cannot be a one size fits all intergovernmental fiscal transfer

There is no need for a uniform intergovernmental fiscal system under which all sub national governments must operate as each one have different capacities to finance and deliver services. In fact a better route is to explicitly recognise the differences between LGs and make necessary fiscal arrangements – smaller LGs could rely more on grants whereas larger LGs could rely more heavily on local taxation. These rules should also be flexible enough to change when smaller government grows into a bigger one.

Real World Examples: Large cities (Example NYC) in American states are given special fiscal powers. In India, North Eastern states get more fiscal support through grants from the Center compared to southern Indian states who depend on own source revenues.

Rule #5: Give local governments significant taxing powers

Significant taxing powers should be provided to LGs as voters will hold their elected officials accountable if public services delivered to them are financed through their taxes. These taxes should be a noticeable burden to local voters and whose benefits from such services should not be transferred to residents outside the jurisdiction. Choice of tax is important and should depend on ease of administration, involves local residents and is administered on locally produced goods.

Examples of such tax forms include individual income tax, motor vehicle and fuel tax, property tax, user charges, etc.

Rule #6: Central government should abide by the fiscal decentralisation rules that they make

Fiscal decentralisation implies stepping away from a paternalistic approach to governance but it is the Central authority that determines the rules. These rules take the form of implementing regulations. Failure to adhere to such rules can lead to the flypaper effect. Some forms in which rules are not kept by the Central authority include underfunding functions transferred, abolition of local taxes, etc.Transparency in rules is not sufficient, there must be adherence to rules.  

Real World Examples: As per AIs Panchayat Finances study in Karnataka in FY 2014-15 INR 16,239 was appropriated from the LG by the state government for expenditure through line departments (de concentrated agencies of the state).  

Rule #7: Keep it simple

Capacities of LGs are limited and hence intergovernmental reform should be driven by simplicity. The basic rule to protect simplicity is achieved by limiting the number of objectives to be accomplished by each policy instrument. For instance, local sales taxes if imposed to promoted economic development through exemptions will attract administrative cost of regulation. This diverts tax administration from its primary purpose i.e. revenue collection. Similarly when Central governments impose conditional grants for expenditure on LGs they must consider the enforcement costs incurred by LGs versus the benefits attached to such tied money. 

Rule #8: Design intergovernmental transfer system keeping in mind decentralisation reform

Intergovernmental transfer has two dimensions: size of the divisible pool (vertical fiscal balance) and distribution of this pool amongst LGs (horizontal fiscal balance). There are many ways to structure a fiscal transfer system – the choice should be based on the objectives that is intended to be achieved from the decentralisation reform.

For instance, if tax is shared based on what is collected within the boundaries of the LG then two things happen – (a) Local autonomy is preserved on money spend and (b) Favor the growth of rich LG. In contrast, if money was shared based on a formulae it could still preserve autonomy but would give an opportunity to redistribute resources towards those LGs which have a weak revenue base.  

Rule #9: Fiscal Decentralisation should keep in mind all three levels of government

Typically there are three levels of the government – Centre, state and LGs. The key policy issue for reform at a LG level is whether the Centre will cover all levels of the government or the states will be left to design their internal program.

Real World Examples: In China and the US, states determine distribution within its boundaries. In India there is freedom of the states to design resources to LGs but the Centre provides guidelines that states are expected to follow. A recent such reform is the GPDP or Gram Panchayat Development Plan guideline.

Rule #10: Impose a hard budget constraint

There should be a match between the expenditure responsibility and revenue assignment such that autonomous LGs balance their budgets (i.e. revenue = expenditure). For this to work the Central government should not provide deficit grants and bailouts as they work as an insurance cover to LGs from prudent fiscal management.

Real World Examples:  Michigan State in the US was unable to support its largest city Detroit when it fell into financial misery. Detroit became one of the biggest US cities that had to file for bankruptcy.

Rule #11: Intergovernmental systems are transitional, plan accordingly

Disparities amongst region within a country/state change, areas of investment change, capacities of local governments change and hence intergovernmental systems should be clear but flexible. Ways to being flexible while keeping the process transparent include: Establishing a grants commission that reviews allocation of fiscal transfers and local tax structures every few years and review to determine whether any LG can graduate to the next class of local fiscal autonomy. 

Real World Examples: India has national and state finance commissions that determine allocations of fiscal transfers between Centre, state and LGs.  

Rule #12: There must be a strong support for fiscal decentralisation

In spite of decentralisation being a favored and popular policy reform it has few enthusiastic champions especially in developing and transition countries. It is important to have a strong internal champion to ensure that rules are clearly apprehended and effectively implemented.

Real World Examples: In pre independence India MK Gandhi was an early champion. There are numerous other examples from Shri MY Ghorpade in Karnataka who was the minister for rural development in the state to Aam Aadmi Party in contemporary Indian politics structuring decentralisation through their mandate for Mohalla Sabhas.

 

Understanding India’s bureaucracy through the IAS officer

Accountability Initiative deconstructs the Indian bureaucracy through the IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officer in a series of blogs by T R Raghunandan, a former bureaucrat himself, (referred to as Raghu here on) summarised below:

In the blog, Uneasy Lies the Head that Wears the Additional Crown, Raghu breaks down the hierarchy of the Indian bureaucracy, explaining the various designations at different levels, and what these mean in terms of the power wielded.

In the next blog, taking off from the introductory one, Raghu details the Bureaucratic Review Process, unpacking the elaborate appraisal system, which is designed to ensure that the best talent reaches the top.

The third blog, How Commonplace is ‘Outstanding’?, explains how the gradation of officers during the review process is carried out; the hurdles in it; and the common use of ‘outstanding’ for 90 percent of the officers, reflective of the bureaucracy’s avoidance of confrontation in its internal dealings.

In the following two blogs, A Digression into Ethical Dilemmas and Ambition, Ethical Dilemmas and the Bureaucracy, Raghu shares his views on the ethical factors, which are likely to render ineffective a peer based confidential appraisal system–part of a new set of changes introduced.

In the last two blogs on this topic, The Loneliness of the Ethical and How Honest Is Honest?, Raghu shares examples of the ‘loneliness of those who take an ethical stand, in the face of large numbers of those who do not’, and explains why a ‘shared understanding of what integrity is’, and a ‘culture of acceptance of honest criticism up the hierarchy’ (both currently lacking) are pre-requisites for a system of 360 degree appraisal to work as intended.

To read more blogs by T.R Raghunandan, follow Raghu Bytes.

The views shared belong to individual faculty and researchers and do not represent an institutional stance on the issue.

Beyond Toilet Construction – Challenges for Swachh Bharat Mission (Urban)

Can constructing toilets end open defecation if they are not used? What might seem like a facetious question is actually of critical importance to India’s flagship sanitation programme.

It has now been two years since the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) was launched, and 30 years since India recognised Sanitation as an issue needing active government intervention with the formulation of the Central Rural Sanitation Programme. Despite a steady march of over two decades, the SBM was lauded as a giant leap forward, and rightly so.

Arguably for the first time, the SBM acknowledged the equivalence of urban and rural sanitation. Furthermore, the diversification of success indicators promised a progressive and holistic approach. For example, the urban mission guidelines expressly state the need to target sustainable behaviour change through concerted Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) campaigns. And while 100% access to sanitary toilets remains a prerequisite, it is not seen as an end in itself.

Even the most inveterate cynic would find little to criticise about the principles on which the SBM is based. This does however mean that the Ministry of Urban Development, and State and local governments, have a difficult challenge to meet these raised expectations by 2019. It would not be inopportune to consider their progress at this juncture.

As of December 2016, over 27 Lakh Household toilets and more than 1.28 Lakh Community toilet blocks, have been constructed under the urban mission. Despite significant state variations, this amounts to 35% of toilet construction target in 40% of mission period, which the government opines is “broadly on course”. But toilet availability is understood by the mission as a necessary but not a sufficient precondition to ending open defecation. It knows that building toilets does not equal ending open defecation, and yet, the implementation of the programme does not reveal this insight.

Informal conversations with government officials, across levels, find that the focus thus far has been on driving the administration to meet toilet construction targets. This is being done using all means, fair and foul. An Accountability Initiative survey conducted across 5 states last year, reveals that the MIS numbers are not inoculated against inaccuracies and overreporting, which government officers acknowledge informally. Still, even assuming that the numbers are verified, does it mean that urban India is 35% along the way to being open defecation free? Not quite.

Several factors, practical and cultural, inhibit toilet usage, especially over a period. Lack of water and sewerage connections, poor construction quality and lax maintenance, difficulties with managing faecal sludge, all combine to either prevent toilets from being used consistently, or force people to relapse into open defecation as the toilets become unusable. Research on the subject finds that in households which have gained access to toilets for the first time in the recent past, one or more members of the households, often children and men, resort to open defecation.

This reinforces the need for IEC, which is government parlance for social and behaviour change communications (SBCC). The mission recognizes this, and earmarks as much as 15% of the outlay for this component, with 12% to be granted to the states for the purpose, in the guidelines. Thus far however, this has only been on paper. IEC expenditure was 4% of total expenditure in 2014-15, which was further reduced to 1% over the next year. In 2016-17, towards the end of the third financial quarter, a little more than Rs 40 crores has been released by the centre to 7 states under this head, which is about 1.75% of the total SBM Urban budget for the year. Barring a mad rush to reach out to people in the final quarter, it is unlikely that the targeted 345 Crores will be spent.

These numbers tell us only half the story, ignoring the qualitative aspects of the issue, and as worrying as the numbers might be, there are more reasons for concern. To begin with, it must be understood that SBCC is studied and practiced by organizations around the globes, many of whom are partnering with the Government of India on this and other issues. There is thus a rich repository of case studies and best practices for India to learn from. To that extent, there is no need to invent the wheel, but there is a need to use it correctly. For example, SBCC best practices advocate an integrated and strategic approach focussing not only on individual behaviour change, but on social norms. It advices a judicious mix of mass media, mid media, interpersonal communications, and attention to building capacity. Most importantly, there is a need to understand that SBCC is not a PR exercise.

None of this is a revelation. And while the SBM Urban guidelines are sketchy on IEC strategy, the rural guidelines go into significant details to emphasise just these aspects. And yet, SBM IEC spending seems to be limited to only mechanical tasks such as plastering the SBM logo across village walls and printing pamphlets, or for organizing events. These might aid the brand recognition of the mission, but are unlikely to inform, educate, or communicate. Other initiatives such as the concept of Swachagrahis, were created keeping in mind the importance of interpersonal communications. But as of now, only about 19,431 Swachagrahis have been ‘identified’ according to government data, of whom 6500 are in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh alone. West Bengal, for example, has only 15 Swachagrahis, which is less than the number identified in Chandigarh. The reach and impact of these Swacchagrahis can only be evaluated when enough of them are working on the ground. As of now, there aren’t.

So why is the SBM lagging? Much of the responsibility must be shouldered by the states, and the vast disparity in levels of implementation does indicate this. Nevertheless, there is something to be said about the approach itself. Political pressure and high visibility in a thus far ignored sector are heartening, but their unanticipated fallout can be the sacrifice of quality and thoroughness at the altar of monthly targets. The SBM guidelines set high standards of performance. It is essential to ensure that they aren’t rendered solely aspirational.

Making High Policy in Secret

In my last blog, I has asked how policies were actually made in the government. The answer is, they are made confidentially. Or at least, all efforts are made to keep matters confidential.

Passionate advocates for transparency and accountability – there is a natural presumption here that both go hand in hand; it is presumption that I refute – will rail at this. But it is clear that setting the rules of the game, beyond a point, cannot be taken through a totally transparent process. 

Confidentiality is necessary in policy decisions, because every such decision creates winners and losers out of stakeholders. In most cases, one cannot give losers advance warning, so that they can artificially position themselves as winners. Of course, hints can be dropped that one or the other policy is on the way, so that those who inadvertently make mistakes, or are found to be on the wrong side of policy can make the necessary corrections.

So what exactly do I mean by these abstract thoughts?

Let me give you an example; and there cannot be any better than the current demonetisation exercise.

Let us picture that we were the Prime Minister and we were against the menace of black money. Surely, we would be making speeches and delivering warnings that black money is a menace and that those who accumulate black money will be at risk of being caught and punished.

What are the current instrumentalities that we have on hand to deliver on this threat?

We could intensify raids on those who are suspected to hold black money. They could be our fellow politicians, our industrialist friends who funded our party’s political campaign. They could be our relatives. The risks of going against individuals are plenty. For one thing, we could alienate them for life. Second, raids and investigations are costly to conduct and coordinate. Furthermore, they involve large numbers of people to actually conduct them, and unreliable people in the implementation chain could play havoc by allowing criminals to escape. We also have the example of a previous Prime Minister trying such tactics and that leading to him losing his seat. I speak of Prime Minister V.P. Singh.

So then, we are looking at a path breaking, broad spectrum instrument that can deliver effectively, have a surprise effect and also create political ripples, by reinforcing your reputation as a doer.

Demonetisation presents itself as a pretty good tactic, if judged by these yardsticks. It is the mosquito spray, as opposed to raids, which are like attempting to slap mosquitoes into oblivion.

But then, mosquito sprays have this odd knack of killing a lot of innocent, useful insects as well.

Clearly, they need to be protected. Or if their populations reduce, they need to be nurtured back to the balance that existed.

Which means demonetisation has to be quickly followed by re-monetisation – an injection of balance.

But remonetisation of an extraction of 86 percent of currency in the system is a gargantuan exercise. Certainly, it is not going to be achieved unless there are massive arrangements downstream. Printing arrangements have to be readied, ATMs have to be re-calibrated, Banks have to be on their toes and perceptions have to be managed through the media, to mitigate against rumours, or your political rivals turning on you.

How are you going to manage that?

Utmost secrecy is the answer.

But then, utmost secrecy will also place accountability squarely on yourself, if something goes wrong.

In my next blog, I explore whether there can be a compromise between maintaining utmost secrecy and collective decision making.

Incubating and Selling Policy – A Case Study of Demonetisation

Over the last month, the demonetisation saga has been holding centre stage in India. On 8 November, the Prime Minister announced the decision of the government to declare that from that midnight onwards, Rs. 1000 and Rs. 500 currency notes would not be legal tender. The reasons given for this decision were that it would hit terrorist funding and criminal activities such as counterfeiting and that it would directly render valueless the vast stores of cash stashed away as illegally acquired proceeds of corruption, or as tax-unpaid money. While doubts were expressed about whether the move will achieve the intended results, there was no escaping the fact that the move had widespread popular support, particularly amongst the middle class, which saw at last, a redemption of the promise for effective action in this direction.

It was but natural for people to assume that the government was well prepared to handle the massive transitions that would result from this dramatic announcement. After all, all governments deserve the benefit of the doubt for their actions. During the first few days following the announcement, there were some rumblings at the inconvenience caused by it. However, the general mood of the people as they stood in serpentine queues to deposit the high denomination notes that they held, as also to withdraw money in hundred rupee notes and the new denomination of Rs. 2000, was that it was all to be endured in the national interest.

Then, matters bean to unravel.

The first signs that all was not well came about when the new Rs. 2000 notes did not fit into the ATM machines. Then, it was discovered that even when dispensed, these notes were of no use, because of the absence of small change in the form of sufficient numbers of Rs. 100 notes. Instances of deaths of people waiting in queues began to trickle in. Initially, the discordant voices did not find their way into the media; some of them did see sense in the move, whilst others were known to be overtly partial in favour of the government.

However, a month later, it is clear that the move has had unprecedented and adverse repercussions on the economy. Industries are being shut, rural markets have no buyers and agricultural produce is rotting. There is an inestimable opportunity cost in the idle time spent by countless people standing in queues waiting to retrieve their legitimately earned money from the banks. The mountains of black money that were expected to be unearthed have turned out to be molehills and neither have the cupboards of the corrupt burst open, scattering skeletons everywhere. Actions such as a renewed amnesty scheme that allows those who stashed away black money to walk away after paying fifty percent taxes on the declared income – a significant come down from the complete loss that they were to endure if high denomination notes were deemed valueless – do not seem to be effective.

In the meantime, the Prime Minister has changed the narrative by extolling the virtues of a cashless economy. The bureaucracy has been kick started into action, to artificially drive people into preferring cashless transactions over those transacted using currency. This has put the fragile cashless system under strain, leading to breakdown and claims of unreliability. Cash based transactions continue to suffer, because no currency notes of the right denominations are available. As people with no slack to endure even the slightest blip in their economic activity are caught between an inaccessible cashless system and a cash starved market place, their desperation is evident.

In the meantime, politicians of all hues and opponents of the government have been quick to point out happenings that seem to cloud the issue even further; of sudden international remittances of funds a few months before the announcement, of large purchases of land by politicians using hard currency, of illegally stashed away money being returned to banks through ‘money mules’ (those who stand in queues to hand over others money into their accounts for a commission), of companies promoting cash transactions gaining huge market shares; all insinuating that a favoured few had insider knowledge of the impending announcement and had taken advance action to avoid its repercussions or were making windfall profits from business opportunities.

If one were to step back and survey the mayhem, the big picture is that policy making has been hasty and ill thought and there has not been any leisure to seek repentance. The Government is clearly now in panic mode and decisions seem more of the knee jerk reaction type at the moment.

How could this happen?

How are policies actually made in the government? Are there not any safeguards in decision making? If something goes wrong in policy making, who is accountable?

These are questions that will be explored in greater detail, in this new blog series.

Exploring the ‘symbols’ of Indian Bureaucracy

The Public Administration team at the Accountability Initiative (AI) brings to you a five part blog series that attempts to unpack some of the frequently heard terms and phrases in the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy in India. Based on the team’s personal experiences, these stories give the readers a peek into the peculiar world of Indian bureaucrats. More importantly, it gives us the opportunity to rethink and question some of the common myths and narratives generally associated with government officials in the country.

Blog 1: The ABCs of Indian Bureaucracy – A Primer

The blog series begins with an introduction to the ‘Administration in Alphabetic Order’. Here the blog lists some of the frequently used terms and phrases spanning the entire English alphabet (A to Z). It then guides the series presenting terms based on the first four alphabets –

A for Authorisation

B for Babu

C for Circular

D for Deadlines

Read full blog Click here 

Blog 2: Of Authorisation Letters, Samosas and Chai

The second blog represents the letter ‘A’ for Authorisation. Here we understand how ‘authorisation’ is perceived in the corridors of Indian bureaucratic offices. We see this through letters of permission, the weight of the signatory and the demeanor of the receiver on viewing the authorisation letter. As a start, it clearly unravels the subtle prerequisites (Letters, Samosas, Chai) that ensure work gets done in a government office.

Read full blog Click here 

Blog 3: B is for Babu

Blog three of the series delicately exposes the world of the ‘babu’ (babudom). It introduces us to the essential employee of any government office without whom no work can get finished. A bulk of the work in any bureaucratic office involves filing, maintaining and transmitting information. It is the ‘babu’ who takes responsibility of this tedious, yet essential task. Despite their importance in the system, a number of issues surround them.

Read full blog Click here 

Blog 4: A Circuitous Journey

The bureaucratic ‘circular’ (usually sent by a higher authority) is vital for most work to get done in a bureaucratic office. This blog discusses the nuanced journey of this circular and the power it can have on driving action and affecting results.

Read full blog Click here 

Blog 5: How Important are Deadlines in the Bureaucracy?

The final blog of the series discusses the peculiar relationship bureaucrats have with the concept of a ‘deadline’. It links with the factors discussed in the previous blogs that drive official work in a government office. Sometimes it is more potent than any other factors even though the bureaucracy is notorious for missing deadlines. What explains this paradox? Why do the factors discussed in this series continue to hold such a sway on the system? This blogs dissects these questions to illustrate how deadlines are important in fixing work priorities as well as the vicious cycle which keeps the narrative of the apathetic bureaucracy alive.

Read full blog Click here 

 

False News and Anger

In last week’s blog, I wrote about the challenges of converting information to content that can make people angry, because anger is a great motivator; a call to action. However, there is a flip side to that coin. If the objective of making people angry takes precedence over the information itself, then we have a far more dangerous problem to contend with; the strong incentive to generate false information.

Generating false information to divide and polarise people is as old as the origin of language and communication. However, possibly never has it been so easy or convenient to do so, than today. Social media networks can make false news go viral even in the natural way, but when manipulated, can spread it with unimaginable speed. Apart from the content itself being false, such as, for instance, a doctored video that shows communal trouble, the popularity of the content can be faked, in order to trigger greater, genuine popularity. It is an open secret that posts that rapidly ascend to the top as ‘trending’ ones, on Twitter, reach that status because of fictitious followers and automatic retweets. Thus, when a genuine follower sees the Tweet, she is impressed by the support it has already received. The social media falsehood industry has thus developed two specialisations, namely, the falsehood creating one and the popularity boosting one.

The intriguing question is whether social media platforms such as Facebook, can be pilloried for false information that is spread on it. This question has moved centre-stage as politicians have begun to woo Mark Zuckerberg, the Facebook supremo. Donald Trump, the US President-elect, has gone so far as to credit Facebook for his victory.

There are two views on blaming social media. Those who fault it point to the fact that the algorithms that drive content onto one’s feed are not transparent, and are often at loggerheads with one’s own convictions and beliefs. That it happens is not disputed; I have personally been annoyed by Facebook sending me unsolicited content that is contrary to my political, social and environmental ideology. However, it is possible to ensure that such content does not come one’s way. When I deleted such posts, a pop up from Facebook prompted me to answer questions as to why I found the content inappropriate and on repeated occasions I clicked on the box that it goes contrary to my beliefs. Over time, I have noticed that Facebook has stopped beaming such content my way. The other view is that on social media, as in any other interaction, it is open to us to choose the communities and people with whom we ought to interact. If we don’t and we are swayed by content – whether genuine or false – to change our beliefs, then the fault is entirely ours.

I am torn between which views I should take; my heart says to go with the first, that social media is to blame for the power and adverse effects of false information, but my head says that it is up to us to acquire the capability to sort out the wheat from the chaff.

Last night, I had an opportunity to test myself on whether I should follow my head or my heart, when I received a WhatsApp forward of a blog that purported to reveal a deep international conspiracy to flood India with counterfeit currency. A check of the blogger showed that she, he or it, had not been a consistent blogger for any length of time; this was the first blog of any substance. Second, the blogger’s name seemed to be a crude attempt to evoke nationalistic feelings. Third, the blog casually mentioned two Indian universities that people of a certain political disposition love to hate, as being the recipients of large quantities of counterfeited money. It did so without even pretending to produce evidence. If one recognised these signs, clearly, in my mind, the news was false. However, the comments section of the blog were revealing. Many of those who commented on it were anonymous or operated under pseudonyms. They were abusive and insulted anybody who attempted to question the content and the veracity of the blog. Clearly, what could be seen was how the false information generator and the false information populariser, were operating in tandem.

So what is the lesson for those who want to negate the damage done by false news? The easy response would be to rant, or to demand action upon the social media platform concerned. The more difficult one would be to swiftly counter false news with the right information.

I would opt for the latter. If we are not happy with what we see on social media, it is our responsibility to use our power and that of our organisations to create content to refute false news, rather than waste time resenting it.

How Important are Deadlines in the Bureaucracy?

This is the final blog of a five-part series to unpack the meaning of some of the frequently heard terms and phrases in the Indian bureaucracy.

Webster’s definition

Deadline:

1. A date or time before which something must be done

2. A line drawn within or around a prison that a prisoner passes at the risk of being shot (archaic)

Bureaucratic translation:

A date or time before which something must be submitted to higher authorities. Often treated as a relative concept despite being accompanied by circulars promising action against non-compliers.   

In our previous posts, we discussed how the work lives of bureaucrats are guided by a volley of circulars, orders and procedures. Deadlines are another factor which shape work priorities. Now, deadlines are something that professionals have to deal with on a regular basis. In the world of the bureaucracy, however, bureaucrats share a peculiar relation with the concept.

Two types of deadlines; too many deadlines

I have seen the bureaucracy tackle two types of deadlines – one is connected to routine administrative work. For teachers to continue teaching students, infrastructure should be in place, salaries must reach teachers on time, staff should be given regular in-service training etc. So a salient role of the bureaucracy is to make sure these tasks are planned, implemented and monitored on a timely basis. The second type is the one dictated by political masters, usually connected to their pet projects. It’s harder to predict when such a type of deadline might be dropped on the bureaucracy since the tasks may not have been planned well beforehand. In that sense, this second type of deadline is more disruptive.  

Once a deadline is set at short notice, one sees offices abuzz with activity. Papers fly, circulars and office orders are frantically framed and pushed down the chain of command, meetings are hastily convened to discuss how work must now be re-prioritised, and go-to babus in various government offices are pushed to their limits. In my experience of studying the education bureaucracy, I have noticed mild to severe chaos ensue once a new deadline is set because the bureaucracy is often seen struggling to juggle multiple deadlines. The persistent feeling is that there are too many deadlines and most of these crop up at short notice because of the whims of those in command – either in the bureaucracy or in the political space. Planning is generally viewed as a futile activity as the expectation is that more tasks will be dropped on their heads which would mean more deadlines to battle. 

Obvious and thinly veiled threats of action being taken against those who fail to meet the deadline are reinforced through more circulars with ominous clauses, “discussions” in government meetings and increasingly on ‘official’ WhatsApp groups. The peculiar thing is that despite these efforts, missing deadlines is more often than not the norm.

And the issuing of circulars once deadlines are missed – the ones that carry more warnings around action being taken against errant officials – is treated as a ritual in itself.

But work does come in eventually. The system trudges along and delivers in its own time and action is rarely taken if initial deadlines are missed. The impression one gets is that the bureaucracy is not interested in respecting deadlines, and once deadlines are missed, the circulars that are issued and the personal calls that are made to officials are all just rhetoric.

Whose deadline is it anyway?

If we ask why this happens, we will come back to the issues affecting the bureaucracy which have been discussed in the previous posts. Managing a multi-layered, diffused and a highly interdependent public bureaucracy is a massive challenge to begin with. It is bound by orders, circulars, procedures and guidelines to keep parts of it from turning rogue at any point. What does not help is the fact that there is an apparent staff and infrastructure crunch, limited technological literacy, and officials are primarily held accountable for maintaining and transmitting data rather than ensuring high quality services are delivered. Officials often share with us that they deliberately choose to not penalise subordinates if they are unable to deliver on time because “who will do the work then?”

So how important is one deadline over another in the bureaucracy? As important as the degree of heat faced by senior bureaucrats from the hands of their political masters. When a type-2 deadline is imposed routine administration work takes a back-seat and then we see it quickly piling up. Thus begins a vicious cycle – because action will not or cannot be taken against officials who fail to deliver on time, officials’ incentive to even stick to timelines is reduced. This pushes the pace of work back further. Moreover, data that has already been transmitted gets requested in different formats and points in time owing to poor data management which exacerbates the situation. As do half-baked plans that are pushed down from the top resulting in more chaos below and rendering the Deadline relatively meaningless.

Symbols of bureaucracy

This blog series has been an effort to showcase a slice of life inside the mid-level bureaucracy by decoding the meaning of some of the commonly heard terms and phrases. If you look at the terms closely, as listed down by us in the first blog of this series, you will get a sense of the kind of activities the system tends to prioritise. The takeaway is that the bureaucracy tends to make certain activities the end-all of their responsibilities, say creating inspection reports or following rules with blinkers on even if the rules end up causing more harm than good, because of practices that have congealed into a set of norms over the decades. Getting out of this procedural rut and an introspection on the actual requirements of the bureaucracy – be it in the space of capacity building or work rationalisation – is the need of the hour if we have to bring about positive and sustainable improvements in public service delivery. 

 

Vincy Davis works with the Public Administration team at Accountability Initiative. Currently, she is conducting field work for a project which involves analysing the implementation process of key government interventions in education in the NCT of Delhi.