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Life Hacks to Avail Government Benefits and Services

Knowing about government schemes, their benefits and how to avail basic public services should be essential courses taught in schools, especially in a large welfare State like India. In the absence of formal education on these topics, we must turn to one another to learn the how-tos and mistakes to be avoided when trying to navigate this very complicated maze.

In this 7 part blog series, we share stories of brave Indians who took on the mighty Indian bureaucracy to avail benefits and services that were rightfully owed to them. Some were successful in their journey while some continue to fight the good fight. However, all of them have come away with battle scars and life lessons that the reader could learn from.

In her debut blog, Kriti Seth will share the experience of a Delhi based Anganwadi Worker’s struggle to gain access to clean drinking water in the city. This story becomes all the more interesting as Kriti herself was made to chase around Delhi Jal Board (DJB) officials in her attempt to get to the bottom of it!

In another blog, I will pen down the ongoing story of a man’s mission to get his child admitted to a private school under the quota reserved for students from economically weaker sections under the Right to Education Act (RTE Act 2009). The story will trace how, despite having the requisite documents and support from the right people, the path to gain admission in the school continues to be beset with frustrating hurdles.

In his blog Dinesh Kumar, my colleague in Bihar, will share the story of his relative who fought against a nexus of corrupt ration dealers and a hostile bureaucracy to successfully retrieve ration that was rightfully due to him, through the Public Distribution System (PDS).

From rural Bihar we shall travel to the hills of Solan, Himachal Pradesh, where Indresh Sharma, will describe how his motivated friend got tangled up in a road construction related dispute with panchayat and land department officials, and how he was made to pay the price for demanding information through the Right to Information (RTI) Act.  

In the penultimate blog, Taanya Kapoor will take up a story of the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh, where the mandatory requirement of Aadhaar enrolment to avail key public services and direct benefit transfers has affected the most marginalised, particularly by restricting their access to cash for daily use.

The contexts in which these stories are set may appear disparate at first, but the emergent themes and struggles of these citizens are what unifies them. Through this blog series we also hope to throw light on some of the institutional reasons which make access to public services for the common man a frequently difficult process. What is it that stops us from accessing what is rightfully ours? The last blog in the series will briefly discuss these issues, apart from summing up the lessons learnt, tips and tricks that can make working with the system a bit easier.

After all, why should accessing something as basic as clean drinking water in a city as developed as Delhi be a herculean task? Watch out for the next blog in this series to know!

Perceptions and Incidence of Corruption – a Critical Analysis

The Corruption Study 2017 has covered both the perceptions of corruption that citizens have and the incidence of corruption that they face. Simply put, a study on perception – whether of corruption or anything else – is essentially an opinion poll. The base survey question is, ‘Do you think if corruption exists or whether it has increased?’ On the other hand, a study of the incidence of corruption would be based upon responses to a more pointed question, whether the interviewee has experienced corruption personally in the period of time the survey covers, say, for example, whether she has paying a bribe in the previous year.  Incidence of corruption studies have a much greater value for both consumers and providers of public services. If the study were one only of perception, then the message going out to the public service provider concerned would be that measures to improve people’s perception would suffice, to cure the problem. However, if incidence of corruption data is available, then the focus is directly on cleaning up corruption prone services. There is no room for merely restricting oneself to good public relations, which is what one would do, to improve citizens’ perceptions.

Much of the initial part of the study – the first nine pages of the 20 page report (excluding abstracts and extracts) – is focused on the results of the perception surveys and are of little value to those interested in curing public services of corruption.

It is in the data availability on incidence of corruption that the report falls short of expectations. The report, while it gives service wise details at the national level of the incidence of corruption, is unable to give similar details at the State level. To illustrate, while the study has enough data to say that overall for the country as a whole, citizens reported the greatest incidence of corruption with the police services (34 per cent), land and housing services (24 per cent) and judicial services (18 per cent), it does not reveal the same level of detail State wise. Thus, while those interviewed reported high incidence of corruption in Karnataka (77 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (74 per cent) and Tamilnadu (68 per cent), a departmental break up of these figures were not provided. The report admits that state wise variation for each public service was not measured by the study as a lesser proportion of surveyed households at the state level had reported interacting with a particular public service during the last one year, while asserting that the sample was significant to draw a conclusion about a public service at national level. This admission then begs the conclusion that the sample sizes for the study were too small to address the key questions attempted to be probed.

According to the report, in each State, a sample of around 150 households was covered from at least 2 districts (one of these districts covered was the state capital) spread across 10-12 locations (rural and urban). In all, more than 200 clusters were covered during the study. Thus, only around 3000 households were covered in the study. Furthermore, the number covered in each cluster were just 15 households, on an average. If a more reliable measure of the incidence of corruption is to be obtained, a much larger sample size ought to have been covered, in the nature of 3000 individuals in each State at the very least. If on an average, only 150 households were surveyed in each State, it provides a pitifully small base on which serious conclusions about the incidence of corruption cannot be built.

The quandary is that if a State is concerned about the results of the survey and wants to do something concrete about curing corruption, it cannot draw any conclusions from the survey to focus on areas of priority, such as a few corruption prone services. All India data on department wise incidence of corruption is of no use for a State intent on cleansing its system.

The focus of the survey on the easier task of gauging the perception on corruption, draws it into making premature conclusions about certain policy measures aimed, amongst other things, on reducing corruption. For example, the report finds it pertinent to mention that the period from November 2016, following demonetisation, did not have much effect on the main findings. Yet, later on in the report, it dwells a great deal on reporting the perception of people that demonetisation is predominantly beneficial in reducing corruption. As reiterated, this is nothing more than an impression, and has little value in real governance. If the study felt that it was premature to investigate whether demonetisation has had any effect on the incidence of corruption, reporting citizens perceptions that demonetisation would hit corruption is nothing more than kite flying.

This report focuses only on a few services to citizens by governments; however there are several transactions of the government, such as the sale of the rights to exploit natural resources, or the procurement of goods and services by the government, that are much more corruption prone. How does one measure the extent of corruption in such cases and the success of process changes that limit discretion and increases transparency? More of that in my next blog.

Water Problems in a South Delhi Slum – Challenges of Access, Usage and Awareness

This is the second part of an eight-part series on the challenges and life hacks in experiencing and accessing government benefits and services. 

The problem of acute shortage of clean drinking water is old for the streets of Gola Kuan, Okhla Industrial Area. Supriya (name changed) who works as an Asha (Anganwadi) worker in the community of Gola Kuan has been a witness to this problem since the past five years. The Tanker which is supposed to supply water in that community (a facility which started since Aam Aadmi Party came to power) caters to the basic needs of only twenty families out of a hundred, she explained. “The quality of water is poor and cannot be used for drinking purpose as there are foreign particles in it and it tastes bitter. Also, the water received through the pipeline is contaminated.”

Housewives have to walk some long distances to get water from the bore well. This also increases the economic burden on their families as they have to spend approximately Rs. 1000-1200 per month to buy clean drinking water from private shops. Families thus have to resort to adding chlorine tablets in the water as an alternate measure to keep their water clean (procured and distributed by Asha Workers under ‘family planning’).

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The difference between “access to water” and “access to clean drinking water” is often not very well acknowledged by the Babus. ­Further, the issue is compounded by the fact that there is a lack of awareness on the right departments and authorities to approach in order to register complaints. 

“..Vidhayak ke paas jaate hein. AAP sarkaar ke vidhayak ke paas mei 2 baar gayi thi. Likhit roop se kuch nahi diya tha bas bola tha unhe ki dikkat bohot hai. Unhone kaha ‘hum dekhenge’.”

(We went to the MLAs office. I went to AAP Party’s MLA who is in power to register the complaint. I did not submit any letter or form. I verbally communicated the problem and he said that he will look into the problem.)

Yes, approaching the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) would have crossed most of our minds. However, there were some crucial factors that the people of Goal Kuan had to weigh before settling for a course of redressal in this case. Instead, they approached the MLA in the area as a way to navigate the risks and bureaucratic hassles that came with the DJB (such as spending the whole day at the adhikaari’s office without the assurance of getting redressal and losing a day’s wage).

“..Vidhayak yahi ilaake mei rehte hein. Unke paas jana zyada araamdayak lagta hai. Vaise bhi madam itne saal hogaye koi dhang se toh kuch karta hai nahi. Agla MLA aayega toh election ke time pe suvidhayein mil jayengi uske baad ka koi nahi dekhta. Tanker ki suvidha bhi election ke baad AAP Party ke aane par hue thi. Usse pehele kabhi kuch nahi hua.”

(The MLA lives in this area. It is more convenient to approach him. Madam, it’s been so long since anyone addressed this problem – no one takes proper action to address it. We’ll get some services around elections but no one looks after the service once the election phase passes. The tanker facility also started after elections when AAP Party came to power.)

Where is the solution?

The Delhi Jal Board promises to supply sufficient quantity of water to its people. Approximately 1000 liters  of water is to be provided to each family at a gap of 2 days or a week depending on the requirement, explained the DJB ‘helpline’ spokesperson when I phoned in. Talking about this particular area, pipelines are spread across the whole zone and tankers have been sent ‘hamesha se’ to cater to the needs of its people, explained an adhikari of DJB.

Well, it might sound easy at first to just pick up your phone, dial the toll free number and reach out to the authorities, as it has been advertised. But is it as convenient as it sounds? When I finally got through to the Delhi Jal Board’s ‘helpline’ the spokesperson suggested that I contact the Executive Engineer of that area. Navigating the matrix of zones and departments (like Water, Water sewer, Water maintenance etc.) listed on the DJB website and deciphering the confusing acronyms to finally get the appropriate phone number was a challenge to a comparatively technically sound person like me. The Executive Engineer further directed me to contact the Junior Engineer, without fully acknowledging the concern and information that I needed. On learning that I was no victim of this problem the Junior Engineer nullified the questions raised by saying:

“..Madam kya baat kar rahe ho aap. Yahan koi dikkat nahi hai. Paani properly supply hota hai. Aap office mei jaake baat karo.”

(Madam, what are you saying? There is absolutely no water problem (with respect to quality or quantity) in this area. Sufficient water is supplied. You please go to the office and have a conversation with the concerned person.)

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Can a family of five living in a small room with an open drain right at the entrance of the room struggling to meet the need of ‘do waqt ki roti’ be expected to go through this whole maze for a ‘quick and easy  redressal’? The lack of awareness on  the ‘redressal systems’ and the problem of approachability attached to it ­­doesn’t make for a very clear cut and convenient option for many. This is especially so for those who have to anyway fight daily battles of managing ‘dihaadi’, ‘paisa’ and ‘beemari’.

Possible measures to address water woes in Delhi

  • DJB Helpline Number:  1091 (Toll-free)
  • DJB Website: Homepage – http://bit.ly/1BqF6uh Contact address –  http://bit.ly/2rWWixc
  • Other links: Citizen’s Charter charting out all possible procedural steps to be undertaken in case of water related troubles – http://bit.ly/2shyL7F
  • DJB representatives actively acknowledge problems and respond to complaints on their social media page (Facebook) – https://www.facebook.com/delhijalboardofficial/
  • In case the Citizen is aware of the ‘Zone Number’ of his/her area, then he/she can directly contact the ‘Junior Engineer’ associated with that area (number available on http://bit.ly/1CrOvAN)
  • Other contact persons: MLA or local representative of that area can be personally contacted regarding such issues.

 

The ‘Avoiding Accountability’ Series – A Case Study of Public Housing in Karnataka

In his series, T.R Raghunandan, author of Raghu Bytes (a collection of blogs on bureaucracy, governance and accountability) unpacks the successes and failures of accountability measures in the public housing sector in India. He does this by investigating how housing policies are designed, passed on and finally reach the beneficiary.

In his first blog, The Public Housing Sector – A Case Study of Karnataka, Raghu takes off the series by setting the context of public housing in Karnataka and the existing housing demands in the state. Further, he describes the subtle politics involved in decision-making for housing programmes and its impact on   the programme itself.

The second blog, Beneficiary Selection for Housing Programmes, describes the actual process of beneficiary selection and the various powers at play at the local and state levels.

Rural Housing Wars in Karnataka; the Empire Strikes Back and Gets Shot Down, talks about the battle between Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and local governments in deciding the scale and character of who should benefit from the programme.

This conversation continues in the next blog, Frontal Assault Turns to Stealth: MLAs Sneak Back, building on how politics intrudes the intentions and implementation of the programme. It also speaks on the counter actions that emerged as a result, enabling a more participatory model of implementation.

The next blog, Law, Technology and Tensions, brings to light measures of accountability put in place, especially with new technology mediums. He offers the mixed impact this has had on the governance of the programme and the potential it could serve.

In his final blog, Saturation and Collaborative Construction; A Way Out of the Conundrum, Raghu brings the story to its finality by sharing learnings on the entire exchange between and within government that eventually led to way in which this programme was delivered at the last mile. He further presents the challenges to expect for this programme bringing the series to a close.

The series serves as an example of prominent factors that influence the delivery of public programmes (including the power play inherent in its application) as well as gives insight on the importance of participation, efficiency and accountability for publically run welfare programmes in the country.

Rural Housing Wars in Karnataka; the Empire Strikes Back and Gets Shot Down

This is the third part of the Raghu Bytes series on ‘Avoiding Accountability’.

The genesis of the war between the Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and the local governments (Gram Panchayats) on the issue of selection of beneficiaries for rural housing programmes, goes back to October 2003. The Panchayat Raj Act of Karnataka was amended to strengthen Grama Sabhas – assemblies of the people – and left no room for doubt that the latter had the final word in identification and selection of beneficiaries and prioritization of beneficiary lists. Section 3(3)(b) of the amended Act provided that Ward Sabhas would identify the most eligible persons from its area for beneficiary-oriented schemes on the basis of previously stated out criteria and prepare lists of eligible beneficiaries in order of priority and forward it to the Grama Panchayat. These lists were then to be placed by the Grama Panchayat before the Grama Sabha, which under Section 3A (3) (c) would consider the Ward Sabha lists and prepare the final lists of eligible beneficiaries in order of priority. For good measure, the law also provided that once such detailed beneficiary lists were prepared by the Grama Sabha; they could not be changed by any higher authority. By positioning the Grama Sabha as the sole platform that protects the right of every citizen to participate in decision making, a major step towards realising self-governance was achieved.

It was significant that these amendments were passed unanimously by the State Assembly after detailed scrutiny by an all-party Select Committee. So, the MLAs knew very well what they were doing.

However, through a process of slow cerebration by which MLAs realized they were shortchanged, the Government turned the clock back in April 2007 by amending Sections 3(3) (b) and 3A (3) (c), stating that if the Grama Panchayat fails to discharge its duties in respect of housing schemes or programmes, then a committee headed by the member of the legislative assembly of the constituency shall select the beneficiaries from the list prepared by the Grama Panchayat.

At one stroke, the law made the local legislator the final arbiter over decisions of the Grama Sabha. The proviso to the law was dangerously open ended. Who was to decide that a Grama Panchayat has failed to discharge its duties? Who would constitute the committee? What was the need to specifically mention housing schemes? Would this proviso be expanded to take away all the powers of the Grama Sabha in respect of all Schemes of the Government? What makes the MLAs or government official, who are far removed from village citizens, better able to decide who should benefit from a scheme, that the rural voter who knows intimately every resident of her/his village?

The amendment of the law, piloted hurriedly through the legislature and passed unanimously without discussion, triggered widespread protests across the State, by NGOs and Panchayat elected representatives. The local press front- paged the protests in a big way. That in turn influenced the Governor, to whom the State government had sent the law for final approval. Delegations of aggrieved NGOs and Panchayat representatives petitioned the Governor to return the law to the Government for reconsideration, which he did with alacrity.

By then, other political development escalated in the government. The coalition that ruled in the State broke down, and Presidents rule was imposed. The amendment fell by the wayside.

While those who protested against the amendment gloated at the unlikely victory, some of us who looked ahead were sure that the matter would not end here. Any new government would also push for such amendments. The power of patronage that MLAs would gain by distributing houses to the poor was too precious to be relinquished.

It was a friend running an NGO who came up with a good idea on how to prevent further such incursions into the powers of the Grama Sabha. ‘We must propagate the notion that anybody who dares to diminish the powers of the Grama Sabha is destined to lose power’, he said, in all seriousness. ‘Its bad vaastu in case you touch the Panchayat Raj Act’. He wagged his finger at me threateningly. Vaastu is, loosely put, an Indian system of Feng Shui.

I agreed with him heartily. Government should also have a Tantrik appointed as Deputy Secretary in the Panchayat Raj Department, fully equipped with Voodoo dolls of individual MLAs and stick pins into them in case they cast covetous eyes on the powers of the Grama Sabha, I suggested.

Frontal Assault Turns to Stealth: MLAs Sneak Back

This is the fourth part of the Raghu Bytes series on ‘Avoiding Accountability’.

When a new government took charge in Karnataka in 2013, the ethos of the ruling party remained the same as before. There was an outward commitment to decentralisation and empowering of the Panchayats, but behind the scenes, the compulsion was to give MLAs more powers of decision making locally.

This parallel stream of thought continues till this day. The Panchayat supporters in the ruling party – as is the case with every mainstream party – is considerable. They were able to maintain pressure on the government to announce more reforms to strengthen peoples’ participation and local governments. A Committee to suggest amendments to the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act was set up by the government, under the Chairpersonship of a senior MLA, Mr. Ramesh Kumar. He was subsequently elevated as the Cabinet Minister for Health, after he completed and submitted the report. This author served as a member of the Committee.

At first, I must admit, I was sceptical about the effectiveness of the committee. Initially, we seemed to be saying the same things over and over again; of how Panchayats were to be strengthened, and they in turn were to be kept in check and monitored by the Grama Sabhas. Nobody seemed to realise, in my opinion that many of these visions had been envisaged earlier, but had fallen by the wayside. However, soon, my cynicism gave way to hope. As the participants in the committee began to get into the details with the chairpersons encouragement, we began to focus on the real implementation issues. One of the key questions that generated a debate was how participation ought to be facilitated for the selection of beneficiaries for various programmes. The Grama Sabhas and Ward Sabhas created in 2003 were not very effective; that was the general consensus. So, the approach of configuring Neighbourhood or Habitation sabhas as the feeder system for decision making in the Gram Sabhas, was suggested. This made eminent sense; the earlier Grama Sabha decisions were usually tilted in favour of the main village in each Panchayat, where the relatively prosperous people lived, leaving the poor who lived on the village fringes untouched by welfare programmes. Neighbourhood sabhas would bring these people into the fold of decision making and enable them to espouse their cause further.

Due to the dedication and political adroitness of the Chairperson, a few other dedicated members with political connects, and the Rural Development Minister’s support, the recommendations of the Committee found expression in the enactment of a new Act altogether, the Gram Swaraj Act of Karnataka. On the issue of beneficiary selection, the act reiterated the finality of the selection process through the Grama Sabhas; with the only change being that the selection process would start even below the wards, in each habitation.

As is always the case, political support for the act was unequivocal. Sometimes it makes me wonder if legislators actually read the fine print in all the laws they pass.

Then, the second thoughts began to emerge. However, the battles for empowerment are a seesaw one; attempts to turn the clock back don’t always result in status quo ante. In this case, with respect to the selection of beneficiaries for housing, the conundrum was addressed in an intelligent way. To wrest away the powers of selection of beneficiaries from the Grama Sabha would have shown up the government in a bad light, and in any case, any instruction of this nature would have been contradictory of the law.

So the government brought in the MLAs through a different route. While MLAs were not involved in the selection of individual beneficiaries, they were empowered by government instruction to decide upon how many houses allotted to the constituency could be allocated to each village and panchayat.

Law, Technology and Tensions

This is the fifth part of the Raghu Bytes series on ‘Avoiding Accountability’.

The decision of the government to give MLAs the power to decide how many houses could be allocated to each village, caused a great deal of gnashing of teeth amongst Panchayat elected representatives. However, by the letter of the law, this allocation of responsibility by the government was not wrong. After all, the MLAs were not going to select beneficiaries, but were only allocating targets. Little did it matter that the MLAs now had powers to favour those villages that voted for them and harass those that did not.

Even as the government were walking the tightrope, other measures to increase the accountability of participatory processes were put in place. One of them – which I thought could be crude and effective – was to mandatorily video graph all meetings of the Grama Sabhas. Thus, if beneficiary selection was being done by the Grama Sabhas, a visual record of these would be available for all of them to see. It seemed to be a measure that would end all irregularities in beneficiary selection.

However, there is no point in video graphing the proceedings of Grama Sabha meetings, if nobody watches these videos afterward.

Once selections of beneficiaries are done by the Grama Sabhas, these lists have to enter the official system. And who does that? A worthy named the data entry operator.

Let me introduce to you the new power broker in the village, the data entry operator. Over the past decade, computerisation of the Grama Panchayat offices has been a buzzword for ambitious and well-meaning bureaucrats. They have launched upon time bound programmes for completing computerisation. Internet connections have been provided to Panchayats, new extensions for buildings constructed, and spanking new computer systems installed. Software has been developed for each of the Panchayats needs and there has been visible change in how Panchayats transact their business.

The computerisation of the Panchayats has also led to new power relations being set up. Suddenly, the power of the Panchayat president, the elected representatives and the Panchayat and the Panchayat secretary, have paled before the presence of the data entry operator; he of the password and the fingerprint.

The data entry operator in a Panchayat is a powerful individual. He operates in dark and mysterious ways. He is a very busy man; much of his power is derived from his overwork. Many schemes and programmes, with their rapid transition to a semi computerised mode of functioning, now vitally depend upon the data entry operator for their smooth implementation. Most data entry operators have been appointed in the wake of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme; a programme that has depended on a computer based system of keeping records, right from its inception a decade back. Quite often, the data entry operator, burdened as he is by the workload of the NREGA, is hard pressed for time to do other data entry operations, including for the housing programmes.

The time lag between the actual meetings of the Grama Sabhas for beneficiary selection and the entry of these lists in the Panchayat computer provides plenty of scope for manipulation. It is at this level that pressures are applied, I am told, by both MLAs and Panchayat elected representatives, to manipulate the beneficiary lists. While this was always suspected, I heard that recently, a sincere officer at the district level decided to check the veracity of the beneficiary lists entered in the computer. He did this the hard way, by watching the videos of the Grama Sabhas. His diligence paid off; beneficiary lists were found to be roughly thirty percent at variance with the decisions of the Grama Sabhas.

I spoke to a senior officer dealing with housing programmes as to how such distortions could be avoided. He proposed to launch an app that would enable data on beneficiary selection to be uploaded in real time, even as the Grama Sabha meetings were held. I thought that would be a good idea overall, though I still had doubts about whether manipulation would end; the ingenuity of the crooked mind is limitless.

However, a politician that I know had a better idea and he went ahead and implemented it. He made a promise in his constituency that all beneficiaries would be covered in all villages, turn by turn. Villages were prioritised on the basis of the intensity of the houselessness problem. Using this method, the politician was able to get far more homes built at a double quick time, by avoiding disputes in beneficiary selection and concentrating money flows and supervision on each village, turn by turn. According to him, others waited for their turn, assured by the fact that when it came, their problem of houselessness would be fully addressed, once and for all.

 

Budget data for accountability

It isn’t easy to understand budgets in India today. A citizen who looks at a budget website out of curiosity will be bewildered by the number of documents and jargon. Should one look at the Annual Financial Statement, Expenditure Budget or Demands for Grants? What are the differences between Budget Estimates, Revised Estimates and Actuals; and how do supplementary budgets fit into this picture?

Even if the intrepid citizen overcomes these hurdles in comprehension, she faces many difficulties in interpreting available data. Several programmes are broken up across many line items. Finding out how much the government spends on subjects such as ‘education’, ‘nutrition’, or ‘women’ is an exercise which demands lots of time and patience. Often, data presented are misleading – for instance, expenditure on building roads under the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, is accounted as revenue expenditure instead of capital expenditure.

But there exists a bigger problem. A key reason budgets are presented publicly is to enable ordinary citizens to judge the priorities and performance of the government. Indian history supplies many examples of how the budgets of the British Raj were used to challenge government policy. Gopala Krishna Gokhale in 1902 produced a sensation when he challenged the Government’s budget, using their own data to tell a compelling story about the misplaced priorities of the British Raj. Similarly, Dr. Ambedkar’s MA thesis, published in 1925, was on the evolution of provincial finance in India, and used budgets as its primary data source.

Since then, the functions and size of government has expanded, and budgets have also grown more complicated and unwieldy. There are a large number of ambitious government programmes in a number of specialised sectors, but the problems they aim to address seem to persist. Today, we all intuitively understand that it isn’t enough to judge the government on allocations alone. How, then, can we evaluate the government on the results of its efforts, not just the amounts spent?

Changes introduced in this year’s Union Budget mark a step towards this goal. The removal of the distinction between plan and non-plan expenditure has been widely reported. In addition, budget documents are now much more compact and understandable. Schemes are presented as one line item instead of being disaggregated across many; and are neatly categorised so that the reader can distinguish between different types of schemes. New statements on Centrally Sponsored Schemes, Railways, and so on bring together information which was scattered across multiple documents. Suyash Rai of NIPFP covers these changes quite exhaustively here.

But the most promising change is the publication of an Outcome Budget for 2017-18. While budgets traditionally display expenditure, evaluating a program requires data also on outputs – what the program is producing, and outcomes – the ultimate benefit which the program produces. For example, an agriculture scheme might have outputs as seeds and fertiliser distributed, and outcomes as improvements in soil fertility and agricultural GDP. For every scheme of the Union Government, this year’s Outcome Budget presents the allocation, expected outputs and outcomes.

This effort is not wholly new. Outcome Budgeting was introduced by the then Minister of Finance, P. Chidambaram, in 2004-05. Every ministry and department was asked to publish documents stating policy changes, outputs and outcomes. However, this effort failed to take root: outcome documents were often unavailable publicly, voluminous, or of poor quality.

For example, look at the Department of School Education and Literacy. It published outcome budgets which were more than a hundred pages long in 2011-12, 2013-14, and 2016-17 – documents for the remaining three years are unavailable online. Outputs and outcomes for the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) in previous years were often vague, and kept changing. In 2016-17, for example, one of the outputs of the SSA was declared to be “Recruitment of teachers to attain ideal PTR”, which would lead to the outcome of “Enhanced learning levels and retention”. How many teachers were to be recruited? What did “enhanced” learning levels mean? The document was silent on these questions.

The consolidated Outcome Budget avoids many of these pitfalls, by presenting a comprehensive view the outputs and outcomes of all government programmes in one central document.

Look again at the Department of School Education and Literacy, we find a concise two pages in the Outcome Budget 2017-18. All SSA outputs are quantified – gross enrolment of 98.5, 9.5 crore textbooks to be distributed, and so on. The outcome, however, is less clear – it says “GER at elementary level will be increased to 97.5 in 2016-17; efforts to improve quality and retention at the elementary level”. Similar problems with the outcomes exist for other programmes – a common pattern seen is that the outcome of a programme is said to be “improvement” or “enhancement” in some area, whether infrastructure or AYUSH services or fertiliser usage. Such statements bereft of concrete, measurable targets do not help meet the goal of holding the government accountable for its performance.

Indians have grown accustomed to using budget allocations to understand how the government is trying to improve things, but using perceptions and personal experiences to judge success. Putting numbers to the government’s good intentions would help make this more concrete. The next step would be to integrate these outcomes and outputs into the cycle of budgeting and planning. Though this Budget marks an important first step, much more needs to be done to make budgets truly an instrument of public accountability.

To watch our series of learning videos on ‘Breaking Down the Budget’ click here. 

सामाजिक क्षेत्र के लिए आवंटित बजट का असल हश्र

Original article was published in Huffington Post India available here.

1 फरवरी 2017 को वित्त मंत्री ने अपनी सरकार का चौथा बजट पेश किया। हर वर्ष की भांति इस वर्ष भी बजट भाषण के बाद राजनीतिक दलों और टिप्पणीकारों ने बजट में घोषित प्राथमिकताओं और आवंटनों पर खूब तर्क-वितर्क किया। खासकर सामाजिक क्षेत्र की योजनाओं के लिए आवंटन पर सबसे तीखी बहस हुई क्योंकि राजनेताओं और टिप्पणीकारों के लिए इस बात पर सहमत होना बड़ा मुश्किल है  कि इस क्षेत्र के लिए आवंटित राशि बहुत कम है या बहुत ज़्यादा। लेकिन किसी सामान्य नौकरशाह और सामाजिक क्षेत्र की इन योजनाओं की वास्तविक लाभार्थी आम जनता के लिए बजट अनुमानों पर होने वाले ये बहस-मुबाहिसे बेमानी हैं।

सच तो यह है कि आवंटित राशि को नौकरशाही के विभिन्न स्तरों के जरिये तेजी से और कुशलतापूर्वक लाभार्थियों तक पहुंचा पाना भारत सरकार के लिए बेहद कठिन रहा है। नतीजा यह होता है कि स्थानीय प्रशासन और नागरिकों के पास कोई गारंटी नहीं होती कि इन बजट आवंटनों में से कितनी राशि उन तक पहुंचेगी और कब तक पहुंचेगी। अधिकतर पाठकों को यह जानकार हैरानी होगी कि बजट-घोषणा के दो वर्ष बाद जब पूरी जानकारी मिलती है तो पता चलता है कि सरकार द्वारा व्यय की गयी राशि प्राय: बजट के वास्तविक अनुमानों से बेहद कम थी। ऐसा होने की एक महत्वपूर्ण वजह है निधियों के प्रवाह की धीमी गति। स्थिति तब और खराब होती है जब पैसा स्थानीय स्तर तक इस तरह पहुंचता है कि उसे स्थानीय जरूरतों और प्राथमिकताओं पर खर्च करना मुश्किल हो जाता है।

व्यय तंत्र की ये कमियाँ विशेषकर इसलिए भी गंभीर हैं क्योंकि कागजों पर भारतीय राज्य बेहद सहभागितापूर्ण है। महज यह सुनिश्चित करने के लिए कि सरकारी व्यय जरूरतों और प्राथमिकताओं के मुताबिक हो, नागरिकों को नियमित तौर पर सरकारी कार्यक्रमों में भागीदारी करने, उनकी निगरानी और ऑडिट करने के लिए आमंत्रित किया जाता है। मसलन, 73वें और 74वें संवैधानिक संशोधनों के द्वारा स्थानीय प्रशासन को योजनाएँ बनाने का अधिकार देकर और लोगों की सीधी भागीदारी सुनिश्चित कर शक्तियों के विकेन्द्रीकरण द्वारा सहभागिता को संस्थागत रूप दिया गया। इसके अलावा, सामाजिक क्षेत्र की हर योजना के तहत ऐसी समितियां बनाना ज़रूरी है जिनके जरिये नागरिक योजना निर्माण और सरकार की निगरानी में भागीदारी कर सकें। लेकिन वास्तविकता काफी  अलग है।

आइये समझते हैं, कैसे। विकास के एजेंडे के महत्वपूर्ण घटकों की ज़िम्मेदारी स्थानीय सरकारों को सौंपने के बाद, उन्हें अधिकारों का वास्तविक अंतरण न हो, इसके लिए राज्य  और केंद्र की सरकारों ने हर मुमकिन कोशिश की है। अधिकांश विकास गतिविधियों के लिए आवंटित राशि स्थानीय निकायों की बजाय समानान्तर संस्थाओं को अंतरित की जाती है। परिणामस्वरूप स्थानीय प्रशासन में कई संस्थाएं  हो जाती हैं, और जिम्मेदारियों में दोहराव होता है। उदाहरण के लिए, एकाउंटेबिलिटी इनिशिएटिव के एक ताजा अध्ययन के मुताबिक कर्नाटक में, 2014-15 के बजट का 11 प्रतिशत अंश, जो पंचायतों को आवंटित किया जाना था, राज्य के प्रशासनिक विभागों को आवंटित किया गया। साथ ही, जो राशि पंचायतों को आवंटित की भी गयी, उसमें से 23 प्रतिशत राशि सरकारी कर्मचारियों के वेतन के लिए थी। लेकिन पंचायतों का इन कर्मचारियों पर कोई प्रशासनिक नियंत्रण नहीं होता, और ज़्यादातर की नियुक्ति राज्य का सरकारी तंत्र करता है। इस वजह से पंचायतों को आवंटित राशि पर उनकी स्वायत्ता बेहद सीमित हो जाती है।

जमीनी स्तर पर, पंचायत वित्त के संबंध में राज्य के एक ज़िले में किए गए हमारे एक सर्वेक्षण से पता चला कि किसी ग्राम पंचायत के राजनीतिक क्षेत्राधिकार में खर्च होने वाले कुल 6 करोड़ रुपयों में से ग्राम पंचायत महज 3 प्रतिशत यानी 20 लाख रुपये ही अपनी मर्ज़ी से खर्च कर सकती है! इससे न केवल ग्राम पंचायतों द्वारा स्थानीय स्तर पर किए जाने वाले योजननिर्माण का कोई अर्थ नहीं रह जाता- आखिरकार जब अपने इलाके में होने वाले ज़्यादातर खर्च पर आपका कोई नियंत्रण ही नहीं है तो आप योजना  कैसे बनाएँगे; – बल्कि इससे निधियों के प्रवाह की निगरानी भी असंभव हो जाती है। क्योंकि किसी ग्राम पंचायत में कितनी राशि आती है, इसकी जानकारी के लिए आपको गाँव की हर सरकारी संस्था और गाँव में चलने वाले हर सरकारी कार्यक्रम के लिए बजट आवंटन और व्यय के लेखे-जोखे का पता राज्य सरकार तक लगाना होगा। और यह देखते हुए कि हर योजना का रिपोर्टिंग और वित्त प्रबंधन का तंत्र अलग है, यह एक नामुमकिन काम हो जाता है। सार्वजनिक वित्त की निगरानी करने वाले हमारे अनुभवी लोगों की टीम को भी इन आकलनों तक पहुँचने में डेढ़ वर्ष लगा! ऐसे मामलों में सूचना का अधिकार जैसे उपाय भी काम नहीं करते क्योंकि सरकार के पास ऐसा कोई तंत्र ही नहीं है जो किसी पंचायत के सम्पूर्ण राजनीतिक क्षेत्राधिकार  में आने वाले व्यय आंकड़ों को इकट्ठा कर सके – कितना ही सदाशय सूचना अधिकारी हो, उसके लिए यह सूचना उपलब्ध कराना कठिन है।

राज्य सरकारों और केंद्र सरकार द्वारा चलायी जाने वाली योजनाओं का हाल भी कुछ अलग नहीं है। शिक्षा क्षेत्र को लीजिये। स्थानीय भागीदारी के सिद्धांतों के अनुसार, केंद्र सरकार की प्रमुख योजना सर्व शिक्षा अभियान के तहत अपेक्षित है कि बजट निर्माण स्कूल की योजनाओं के मुताबिक हो। ये योजनाएँ ज़िला प्रशासन और राज्य सरकारों से होते हुए अंत में भारत सरकार के मानव संसाधन विकास मंत्रालय के पास अनुमोदन के लिए पहुँचती हैं।

लेकिन जैसा कि एकाउंटेबिलिटी इनिशिएटिव के अध्ययनों से पता चलता है वास्तव में योजना निर्माण बेहद अलग ढंग से होता है। सर्व शिक्षा अभियान का बजट बेहद केंद्रीकृत है। स्कूल, कुल शिक्षा बजट का 1 प्रतिशत से भी कम अपने विवेक से खर्च कर सकते हैं, ऐसे में योजना और बजट निर्माण में स्कूलों की योजनाओं का कोई महत्व नहीं रह जाता। ज़िला प्रशासन वार्षिक योजनाएं बनाते हैं। लेकिन ऐसा करते समय उनके पास महत्वपूर्ण जानकारियाँ, जैसे किसी वर्ष में उपलब्ध संसाधनों की जानकारी नहीं होती। परिणामस्वरूप, ज़िला प्रशासन की योजनाएँ इच्छाओं की फेहरिस्त भर रह जाती हैं और अंत में जो बजट अनुमोदित होता है, उसका ज़िला योजनाओं से बहुत कम लेना-देना रह जाता है। जैसे, 2012-13 की ज़िला योजनाओं के हमारे विश्लेषण से पता चला कि बिहार के नालंदा ज़िले हेतु प्रस्तावित बजट का सिर्फ 59 प्रतिशत ही अनुमोदित हुआ। इसी प्रकार, 2011-12 में हिमाचल प्रदेश के कांगड़ा ज़िले द्वारा प्रस्तावित बजट का 79 प्रतिशत ही अनुमोदित हुआ। राज्यों को भी यह समस्या झेलनी पड़ती है और प्राय: अंतिम अनुमोदित बजट केंद्र सरकार द्वारा निर्धारित प्राथमिकताओं के मुताबिक ही होता है। नतीजतन  ऐसा बजट बनता है जिसका स्थानीय जरूरतों और प्राथमिकताओं से बहत कम लेना-देना होता है। इस परिदृश्य में, स्थानीय प्रशासन की कार्य संस्कृति ऐसी हो जाती है कि वे निर्देशों का इंतज़ार करते रहते हैं, और जैसा कि एक कर्मचारी ने कहा, “आरामदायक परिस्थितियों में पूरा आराम करते हैं”।

कमजोर सार्वजनिक वित्त प्रबंधन तंत्र समस्या में और इजाफा करता है। मौजूदा व्यय प्रबंधन तंत्र का प्रारूप आदेशों की पदानुक्रमिक श्रृंखला द्वारा वितरण पर आधारित है। जहां प्रत्येक व्यय प्राधिकारी के पास अपने से अगले स्तर को धनराशि की एकमुश्त किस्तें जारी करने का अधिकार होता है। इन किस्तों को जारी किए जाने के लिए, प्राधिकार और मंजूरी के कई स्तर होते हैं। किसी भी एक स्तर पर देरी का असर पूरे तंत्र पर पड़ता है और ज़्यादातर ऐसा होता है कि योजनाएँ और बजट अनुमोदित होने के बावजूद भी निधियाँ शायद ही कभी समय पर आगे पहुँचती हों। उत्तर प्रदेश में राष्ट्रीय स्वास्थ्य मिशन के संबंध में किए गए एक हालिया अध्ययन में एकाउंटेबिलिटी इनिशिएटिव के शोधकर्ताओं ने पाया कि नवंबर 2014 तक राज्य के कुल वार्षिक बजट बजट का महज 10 प्रतिशत ही जारी किया गया था। चूंकि वित्त वर्ष मार्च में समाप्त होता है, इसलिए धनराशि देर से जारी होने का परिणाम होता है आखिरी समय में किसी भी तरह पैसा खर्च करने की हड़बड़ी। चार जिलों में व्यय के विश्लेषण से हमें पता चला कि कुल वार्षिक बजट का 56 प्रतिशत जनवरी से मार्च के बीच खर्च किया गया।

शिक्षा क्षेत्र की स्थिति भी ज़्यादा अच्छी नहीं है। जैसा कि हमने भारत के 50 प्रतिशत से अधिक स्कूलों के अपने सर्वेक्षण में पाया कि ज़रूरी खरीद के लिए स्कूलों को जो छोटे-मोटे वार्षिक अनुदान मिलते हैं, वे भी स्कूल के बैंक खातों में नवंबर-दिसंबर तक पहुँचते हैं – तब तक स्कूल का सत्र आधे से ज़्यादा बीत चुका होता है।

इस देरी से भारत को बहुत नुकसान उठाना पड़ता है। निधियों के इस धीमे प्रवाह का नतीजा होता है कम व्यय। खर्च न किया गया यह पैसा बैंकों में पड़ा रहता है – डॉ॰ संतोष मैथ्यू के एक आकलन के मुताबिक विभिन्न स्तरों पर विकास निधियों का लगभग एक लाख करोड़ रुपया बैंकों में जमा रहता है, बैंक उस पर ब्याज कमाते है, लेकिन देश के लिए उसका कोई उपयोग नहीं हो पाता।

इससे भी दुखद यह है कि जब वित्त वर्ष के अंत में आवंटित राशि पहुँचती है तो वित्त-वर्ष की   समाप्ति से पहले उसे खर्च करने और कागजी कार्रवाई पूरी करने का बड़ा दबाव रहता है। इसकी वजह से ऐसी अफरा-तफरी होती है कि व्यय का जमीनी जरूरत से कोई संबंध नहीं रह जाता। गत वर्षों में, हमें ऐसे उद्यमी प्रधानाध्यापक मिले हैं जिन्होंने आवंटित राशि का उपयोग करने के लिए बिना भवन वाले स्कूल के लिए अग्निशमन यंत्र खरीद लिए; मेज कुर्सियों के होते हुए और मेज कुर्सियां खरीदीं, साफ़सुथरी दीवारों पर फिर से पुताई करवाई ताकि लेखापरीक्षकों के निरीक्षण के समय और अगले साल की किस्त जारी होने के लिए उनके उपयोग प्रमाणपत्र तैयार हों।

दुखद वास्तविकता यह है कि यह समस्या सर्वविदित है और इसका समाधान भी मौजूद है। निधियों के त्वरित प्रवाह की व्यवस्था वाले व्यय तंत्र को विकसित करने के लिए आसानी से प्रौद्यिगिकी की मदद ली जा सकती है। इस बारे में कई समितियां बनी हैं, जिनमें नवीनतम है 2011 में नन्दन नीलकेणी की अध्यक्षता में बना प्रौद्यिगिकी  सलाहकार समूह जिसने निधियों के प्रवाह के लिए व्यय सूचना तंत्र बनाने की सिफ़ारिश की थी। लेकिन इनमें से किसी भी समिति की रिपोर्ट से जमीनी स्तर पर कोई बदलाव नहीं आया है।

विमुद्रीकरण (नोटबंदी) के जरिये प्रधानमंत्री मोदी ने जनता में अपनी भ्रष्टाचार विरोधी छवि को और मजबूत बनाने का प्रयास किया है। लेकिन अगर वे वास्तव में उस भ्रष्टाचार को खत्म करना चाहते हैं जिसका अधिसंख्य भारतीय अपने रोज़मर्रा के जीवन में सामना करते हैं तो शुरुआत यह सुनिश्चित करने से होनी चाहिए कि सरकारी पैसा सही जगह और सही व्यक्ति तक, पारदर्शी ढंग से और समय पर पहुंचे। उपाय मौजूद हैं-बस उन्हें लागू करने की देर है।

Saturation and Collaborative Construction; a Way Out of the Conundrum

This is the sixth part of the Raghu Bytes series on ‘Avoiding Accountability’.

The example that I gave in my last blog of how a politician attempted to rid the rural housing programme for the poor of its high potential for manipulation, has much more to it than meets the eye. Ridding programmes for the poor of the constraints of annual targets and aiming for hundred percent saturation, can reduce the premium on queue jumping, or wrong prioritisation of beneficiaries. If everybody is going to get houses in a village, then why would anybody bribe new power brokers such as computer operators, to have their names recorded electronically? Would not the problem be solved?

But then, such approaches, to be effective, have to be backed up by other improved processes as well. For example, even if all the poor in a village were to be given houses, construction of homes might become a bottleneck. That would shift the power-broking potential from the computer operators to the contractors. Furthermore, money has to flow regularly to the contractors if their construction activities are not to grind to a halt.

For long, the housing programme has been a leader in decentralised implementation. It was one of the first programmes to involve beneficiaries directly in implementation. Even if they had to pay bribes to get selected in the first place, once selected, beneficiaries were permitted to build homes for themselves and payments were made to them at different stages of house construction. Thus, to a large extent, contractors skimming off bribes from beneficiaries and passing them upwards, was reduced as compared to what happens in other programmes.

However, did that eliminate corruption in implementation? Not by a long shot.

Even though beneficiaries were building homes for themselves, they still had to run the gauntlet of meeting officials to collect their entitled payments. The process was manual and involved many stages; all of which provided ample scope for bribery. Thus, if a beneficiary family’s home had reached the plinth stage – a trigger for the first payment of subsidy – that needed to be certified by an engineer from the Block Development Office (BDO), as also by the Villlage Panchayat Secretary. Then, the bill had to be cleared by the accounts section in the BDO’s office, which meant that beneficiaries had to waste time traveling to the Block Headquarters, and paying speed money to get their payments expedited. The payment was cashless; which meant more visits to bank branches, to encash cheques and withdraw money. All these processes were corruption prone, to say the least.

None of these would undergo the slightest difference, even if well-meaning politicians and bureaucrats were able to ensure 100 percent coverage of all beneficiaries.

The solution could be technology, as a friend of mine who works in the subsidised housing sector suggests. If the process of recording progress in construction is through photographs that accurately captures both time and location, and that automatically triggers payments into the bank account without human intervention, then beneficiaries need not grease the palms of those who sanction payments. However, the first question that arises, is that technology could be hacked and false records created to show progress. My friend says that such possibilities, whilst they will always exist, could be overcome by immediately placing all payment progress in the public domain. Thus, if Panchayat elected representatives, officials and beneficiaries all have access to real-time data on payments made to beneficiaries for construction, based upon photographic records, then a system of public checks and balances might be put in place.

The idea is thought provoking. The best way to check if it is an effective solution to the problem is to implement it. If it raises howls of protest from currently empowered computer operators, block level accountants, BDOs and MLAs, then it can be presumed that it would be an effective measure in reducing corruption in housing programmes.