Measuring People’s Thoughts, or Corrupt Transactions?

I ended my last blog by observing that questionnaires on corruption related surveys are often cut and paste jobs from earlier surveys, with little thought given to the particular context or environment in which a survey is proposed to be conducted. This is particularly harmful when attempting to measure corruption, because of wide ranging perceptions of which transactions constitute ‘corruption’, held by different cultures, legal systems and nations.

A researcher from Europe once observed in a panel discussion that I was part of, that there is a North/South divide in the definition of corruption. She averred that the distinction between ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption is an artificial one created by the North and is, for the most part, applied to monitor behaviour in the South. There are double standards, she said. Therefore, anti-Corruption campaigns in the South single out relatively less harmful or merely dysfunctional behaviour in the South as ‘corruption’, when such acts are merely controversial in the North. Thus global corruption barometer surveys, comparison of civil society practices and such like, only reveal very broad trends across countries, she said, and could never provide solutions for reducing corruption, process by process.

That was quite a thought provoking statement for me, and took me back to understanding the value of what one had attempted to do, whilst running the ipaidabribe.com website.

For those who don’t know, I used to work in an NGO named Janaagraha that started a website named ipaidabribe.com, in 2010. For two years, I led the team that ran the site and played a key role in designing, rolling out and upscaling the efforts of the site. What the site did was to solicit experiences relating to corruption, from citizens, on a condition of anonymity.

Citizens’ reports were collected under three broad heads, namely, ‘I paid a bribe’, ‘I didn’t pay a bribe’ and ‘I did not have to pay a bribe’ (now named as ‘I met an honest officer’).

Apart from a drop-down menu that covered about 20 departments, 50 plus services and a column for indicating the volume of the bribe paid, the website did not prescribe any format for recording citizens’ experiences. People who logged into the site were able to write in as much detail as they wished. When public reports began to accumulate, we discovered that unstructured reporting had its advantages. People were writing in, describing their emotions when they paid the bribe. Those who successfully resisted corruption wrote in detail about the tactics that they used to beat corruption. Those who had the good fortune to meet an honest officer wrote in volubly about the honest attributes of these officers.

From the haze of the unstructured reports, trends and patterns began to emerge, once there were enough reports available for research. For example, from the multitude of reports – about 85 percent of all reports received – of people paying bribes, we began to recognise that those who paid bribes justified their action through reasoning that fell into a pattern. Most of those who paid bribes, felt a need for speed, which was tied to the idea of undertaking a process ‘conveniently’. Some paid because they were ignorant of processes and were unwilling to learn about them. They were taken in by misinformation by middlemen and agents. Many paid out of fear and nervousness, and even out of relief; they were generous when a major transaction in their lives were completed – such as the purchase of a flat – that they generously ‘tipped’ the government staff involved. Some paid in fear of justified, unjustified or excessive punishment. They were often persuaded by peers and mentors (Children who obtained driving licences said that their parents persuaded them to bribe, in order to avoid ‘trouble’).

The worst form of corruption was when people paid to avoid business loss, or paid for mutual benefit, to the detriment of the government’s interests – as in the case of undervaluation of properties to avoid payment of registration fees or property tax. Similarly, from the reports of those who successfully resisted corruption, we distilled 10 behaviour patterns or tactics that were effective in stopping the corrupt in their tracks. We termed these, the ‘Ten Commandments for Fighting Corruption’.

The emergence of patterns in why people paid bribes would not have happened if the crowdsourcing of reports was not through an unstructured manner. The very nature of ipaidabribe.com, as a forum where one could unburden oneself of one’s frustration and confusion at having been compelled to pay bribes, enabled the rich documentation of peoples’ emotional state while they paid bribes. From a survey standpoint, ipaidabribe.com probably unwittingly, stumbled upon the realisation that the indicators for corruption need not be structured, but they could themselves emerge through the process of crowdsourcing. Besides, because the site was a continuous collector of experiences, it enabled a real time monitoring of citizens expectations and experiences. It also had the potential to emerge as a tool by which those involved in process change could constantly obtain feedback on whether their reform efforts in cutting red tape or streamlining processes, were actually bearing fruit.

However, the question is whether the rich database in ipaidabribe.com was actually used to undertake a range of analyses that was possible. That is not for me to judge, but for users of the site. What is beyond doubt is that the potential of crowdsourcing as a survey methodology, remains as huge as it was, when the site was launched.

T R Raghunanadan, an advisor to the Accountability Initiative (AI) at Centre for Policy Research, is a pioneer on corruption work and was the programme head of the first website launched to address the issue called ipaidabribe.com. Understand corruption systemically; break down the different types of corruption and the various ways in which both the state and citizens can tackle it through this podcast

 

Empowering Grassroots Governance Institutions

Ever wondered how government initiatives such as the Swachh Bharat Mission are implemented at the village and district levels?

Accountability Initiative’s PAISA Survey tracks the plans, budgets, fund flows, and decision making systems of these schemes.

As a senior official in the Elementary Education Department of Purnia district, Bihar, puts it: ‘The flow of funds through various levels of the government is very similar to the flow of blood from the heart to the various parts of the body. If there is blockage somewhere, it affects the entire body, so in that regard PAISA studies do the work of a physician’.

In late 2016, Accountability Initiative, as part of the PAISA Dialogues, took the results of the survey back to the district-level bureaucracy in 5 key states. These states were Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.

The objective of the PAISA Surveys and PAISA Dialogues have been to help find solutions to pressing challenges faced by ICDS, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM)

Here are 3 reasons why this process has been so unique:

The PAISA survey is the country’s largest citizen-led expenditure tracking survey. It is based on rigorous research methods that focus on making the government process in delivering these 3 critical social sector schemes transparent. Many citizen volunteers take part in this effort. Backed by solid research from the PAISA Survey, the PAISA dialogues thus act as a catalyst of change by sparking discussions with the bureaucracy on how implementation of the welfare schemes can be made stronger in their regions.

Are the schemes reaching the intended beneficiaries: By identifying implementation bottlenecks and the reasons that are contributing to making the schemes weak, the PAISA survey also asks critical questions such as – does the present structure ensure government allocated benefits are reaching the people? If not, what are the challenges and who is accountable to make right?

Finding solutions, where it counts: Governance has a complex structure in India, and consequently the answers to where the roadblocks lie are not always obvious or simple. By looking at this system and following a bottoms-up approach, the PAISA studies process helps find sustainable solutions.

‘For instance, when we do the PAISA dialogue, we first talk to the teacher, cluster and block officer and then go to the district magistrate or state project director. By doing so, we take suggestions from all of these people to the higher levels of government. That along with our research has a great impact,’ says Dinesh Kumar, a senior PAISA Associate in Bihar.

If there is blockage somewhere, it affects the entire body, so in that regard PAISA studies do the work of a physician.

To know more about the PAISA Dialogues click here. Interested in governance, public policy and decentralisation? Tell us what you think by leaving a comment below!

The Corruption Survey – a Critical Analysis

Recently, the newspapers extensively covered the survey undertaken by the Centre for Media Studies, New Delhi on the prevalence of corruption in India. The Study, titled Perception and Experience with Public Services (Corruption Study 2017), will set the news media and political parties abuzz. They will be licking their chops at the prospect to taking pot shots at each other, based on – usually, a selective – reading of the contents of the report. The Media will profit from this as well, as hysterically sanctimonious anchors will grill panellists for from various political parties and ask embarrassing questions, with little hope of obtaining substantive answers. TV advertising revenues will increase, as viewership will hopefully increase with the free entertainment provided by all. 

However, for someone who wishes to delve a bit deeper into the issue of corruption, a critical analysis of the study is useful. In this regard, several points are to be kept in mind. The first concerns the scope of the Study and the second, its actual focus of investigation.

The Corruption Study 2017 covers the delivery of services from the government to the citizens. The services covered in the Study are the Public Distribution System (PDS), Banking Services, Electricity, Police, Health/Hospital, Judicial services, School Education, Land/Housing, Water Supply and Tax services in urban areas (income/sales/excise). The States covered are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The States of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Telangana, and Tripura are not covered; so those governing these States can heave a sigh of relief. Second, the survey covers both the perception of corruption that citizens hold, as also the incidence of corruption that they have had to personally face. This is an important distinction that will need to be remembered when the results of the Study are appreciated.

In each state, the sample for the study comprised of around 150 households from at least 2 districts, with one of the districts covered being the state capital. Interviews and questionnaires were used to capture information from the interviewees. In simple words, to ascertain the perception of corruption, people were asked whether they thought if corruption existed in any of the services covered under the Study. In order to ascertain the incidence of corruption, they were asked a more pointed question; whether in the past year they had ever had to pay a bribe. Since this last time a similar study was conducted by the CMS was in 2005, sample households were also asked if they thought corruption had undergone an increase, or whether it was on the wane.

Since the Study ranks States on a scale from the most corrupt to the least, it puts many people involved in governance in the hot seat. Politicians and the media are likely to make sweeping remarks about the state of corruption in India and as is the case with most reports, come to reductionist conclusions that stray so far away from what the report has said that they end up being falsehoods.

The first question to be asked then, is whether this report constitutes a conclusive and wide enough band of evidence, to conclude that one State is more corrupt than another. The answer is a clear ‘no’. The reason is that corruption – even if limited to bribery alone – covers a wide range of transactions than the delivery of public services in a few departments. In all fairness, the study also does not claim to make sweeping judgments, and confines its application to a few selected government to citizen services. Thus, declining levels of corruption in these services may also mean that corruption has migrated up the supply chain of service delivery. While local services may be corruption free, public procurements by the Government may have become much more corruption prone.

The brief conclusion is that the Study does not provide scope for either gloating over successes, accusation of the States that show bad or worsening performance, or complacence with the overall reduction in the incidence of corruption in the country.

Beginning with this blog, I will take a critical look at some of the results of the Study and also explore the larger question of how reliable such Studies are and how best they might be designed and conducted.

Ends over Means – Questions on the Implementation of the Swachh Bharat Mission

Bill Gates recently wrote that India is winning its war against waste. It is perhaps too soon to predict outcomes, but there is no denying that a strong start has been made to the efforts. The ten days between 21st April and 2nd May, 2017 saw 1400 villages and 2 districts declared free of the menace of open defecation, taking the total to 1,93,374 and 136 respectively. Over 39 million toilets have already been built under the mission. These are almost unbelievable numbers.

The fury with which toilets are being constructed is evident on the ground. Doubts as to whether these toilets are usable and sustainable are occasionally, but reasonably voiced. There are however other equally important questions which merit consideration but remain largely unexamined. Not least of which is, how are these toilets being built?

Any government has three means to implement its policies, namely, Mandates (decrees and coercive power), Incentives (and disincentives), and Information. Each of these has a different underlying assumption, and implementation of most policies requires combinations of them to be employed. The use of Mandates assumes that people are able but unwilling to change a certain behaviour, and therefore must be forced to do so in the larger interest. Incentives hinge on the assumption of economic rationality, shaping behaviour with rewards and penalties. The use of Information presupposes the inherent benevolence of people which requires only that they be shown the correct path.

So how is implementation taking place in the SBM? It aims to follow variants of the celebrated Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) approach which depends on Information to bring behaviour change. The CLTS categorically states that it is a means of facilitating change at the community level, and that toilet construction is not by itself the panacea. It also requires that demand for toilets be generated from the bottom up, and that change be driven and sustained by the community itself once it has been “triggered”. The SBM guidelines too proclaim that coercion is against the spirit and intent of the mission, although the scheme is more pragmatic, combining the use of information with incentives. That is, at least in theory.

Reality appears as a top down enforcement of large scale toilet construction. The process of reaching 100% toilet coverage in a Gram Panchayat is often effected through threats of exclusion from critical social welfare schemes including the PDS and NREGA, public naming and shaming of villagers caught defecating in the open, and most worryingly, the segregation and targeting of children in schools. Such stories have been reported from districts across the country, suggesting that these aren’t isolated cases of overzealous local officials exercising discretion, but a template of activities that has been received by them.

The result is that families are often compelled to take loans at usurious rates to construct toilets they cannot afford, and which may or may not be usable, and may or may not be used. This approach to total sanitation with all its ‘maybes’ raises two worries. One, that the issue of sanitation is being relegated to technicality, with ODF declarations being based on construction targets. And two, that the manner of implementing these technical solutions is violating rights.

Forcing people to construct toilets is only half the task. Enforcement of use needs to resort to policing. Local led policing is purportedly meant to empower the community. But with the panchayats leading the effort, the monitoring teams are usually comprised by the village elite. The perpetrators, on the other hand, come primarily from the marginalised sections of society, who lack the means and resources to construct workable toilets.

Paternalism is not a new approach in the sanitation space, in India or elsewhere.  Such an approach implies a sense of superiority, exasperation at the ignorance of the uneducated villager, and the insistence that such yokels must be forced to do things for their own good. India’s complicated history of segregation and social sanctions based on notions of cleanliness only raises the possibility of unintended outcomes. Even an oblique endorsement of such means without considering all their implications is worrisome.

Whether the ends justify these means is a difficult question, one for which there is no straightforward answer. But it is more pertinent here to ask, will all of this even work? What if coercion leads to resistance? It might work if we intend to perpetually surveill defecation practices, so that resentment does not eventually lead to relapse. But as the Sarpanch of an ODF Panchayat said to me, “how long can we keep monitoring people, now that we are already ODF?”

It is likely that as villages receive their accolade, the efforts will cease, the mission will end, and self-congratulatory victory celebrations will begin. Yet even now, civil disobedience is not uncommon among owners of recently constructed toilets. Those wishing or having to defecate in the open have braved the inconvenience of avoiding their favourite haunts. A reassessment of tactics may not be inopportune at this juncture in our war.

Life Hacks to Avail Government Benefits and Services

Knowing about government schemes, their benefits and how to avail basic public services should be essential courses taught in schools, especially in a large welfare State like India. In the absence of formal education on these topics, we must turn to one another to learn the how-tos and mistakes to be avoided when trying to navigate this very complicated maze.

In this 7 part blog series, we share stories of brave Indians who took on the mighty Indian bureaucracy to avail benefits and services that were rightfully owed to them. Some were successful in their journey while some continue to fight the good fight. However, all of them have come away with battle scars and life lessons that the reader could learn from.

In her debut blog, Kriti Seth will share the experience of a Delhi based Anganwadi Worker’s struggle to gain access to clean drinking water in the city. This story becomes all the more interesting as Kriti herself was made to chase around Delhi Jal Board (DJB) officials in her attempt to get to the bottom of it!

In another blog, I will pen down the ongoing story of a man’s mission to get his child admitted to a private school under the quota reserved for students from economically weaker sections under the Right to Education Act (RTE Act 2009). The story will trace how, despite having the requisite documents and support from the right people, the path to gain admission in the school continues to be beset with frustrating hurdles.

In his blog Dinesh Kumar, my colleague in Bihar, will share the story of his relative who fought against a nexus of corrupt ration dealers and a hostile bureaucracy to successfully retrieve ration that was rightfully due to him, through the Public Distribution System (PDS).

From rural Bihar we shall travel to the hills of Solan, Himachal Pradesh, where Indresh Sharma, will describe how his motivated friend got tangled up in a road construction related dispute with panchayat and land department officials, and how he was made to pay the price for demanding information through the Right to Information (RTI) Act.  

In the penultimate blog, Taanya Kapoor will take up a story of the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh, where the mandatory requirement of Aadhaar enrolment to avail key public services and direct benefit transfers has affected the most marginalised, particularly by restricting their access to cash for daily use.

The contexts in which these stories are set may appear disparate at first, but the emergent themes and struggles of these citizens are what unifies them. Through this blog series we also hope to throw light on some of the institutional reasons which make access to public services for the common man a frequently difficult process. What is it that stops us from accessing what is rightfully ours? The last blog in the series will briefly discuss these issues, apart from summing up the lessons learnt, tips and tricks that can make working with the system a bit easier.

After all, why should accessing something as basic as clean drinking water in a city as developed as Delhi be a herculean task? Watch out for the next blog in this series to know!

Perceptions and Incidence of Corruption – a Critical Analysis

The Corruption Study 2017 has covered both the perceptions of corruption that citizens have and the incidence of corruption that they face. Simply put, a study on perception – whether of corruption or anything else – is essentially an opinion poll. The base survey question is, ‘Do you think if corruption exists or whether it has increased?’ On the other hand, a study of the incidence of corruption would be based upon responses to a more pointed question, whether the interviewee has experienced corruption personally in the period of time the survey covers, say, for example, whether she has paying a bribe in the previous year.  Incidence of corruption studies have a much greater value for both consumers and providers of public services. If the study were one only of perception, then the message going out to the public service provider concerned would be that measures to improve people’s perception would suffice, to cure the problem. However, if incidence of corruption data is available, then the focus is directly on cleaning up corruption prone services. There is no room for merely restricting oneself to good public relations, which is what one would do, to improve citizens’ perceptions.

Much of the initial part of the study – the first nine pages of the 20 page report (excluding abstracts and extracts) – is focused on the results of the perception surveys and are of little value to those interested in curing public services of corruption.

It is in the data availability on incidence of corruption that the report falls short of expectations. The report, while it gives service wise details at the national level of the incidence of corruption, is unable to give similar details at the State level. To illustrate, while the study has enough data to say that overall for the country as a whole, citizens reported the greatest incidence of corruption with the police services (34 per cent), land and housing services (24 per cent) and judicial services (18 per cent), it does not reveal the same level of detail State wise. Thus, while those interviewed reported high incidence of corruption in Karnataka (77 per cent), Andhra Pradesh (74 per cent) and Tamilnadu (68 per cent), a departmental break up of these figures were not provided. The report admits that state wise variation for each public service was not measured by the study as a lesser proportion of surveyed households at the state level had reported interacting with a particular public service during the last one year, while asserting that the sample was significant to draw a conclusion about a public service at national level. This admission then begs the conclusion that the sample sizes for the study were too small to address the key questions attempted to be probed.

According to the report, in each State, a sample of around 150 households was covered from at least 2 districts (one of these districts covered was the state capital) spread across 10-12 locations (rural and urban). In all, more than 200 clusters were covered during the study. Thus, only around 3000 households were covered in the study. Furthermore, the number covered in each cluster were just 15 households, on an average. If a more reliable measure of the incidence of corruption is to be obtained, a much larger sample size ought to have been covered, in the nature of 3000 individuals in each State at the very least. If on an average, only 150 households were surveyed in each State, it provides a pitifully small base on which serious conclusions about the incidence of corruption cannot be built.

The quandary is that if a State is concerned about the results of the survey and wants to do something concrete about curing corruption, it cannot draw any conclusions from the survey to focus on areas of priority, such as a few corruption prone services. All India data on department wise incidence of corruption is of no use for a State intent on cleansing its system.

The focus of the survey on the easier task of gauging the perception on corruption, draws it into making premature conclusions about certain policy measures aimed, amongst other things, on reducing corruption. For example, the report finds it pertinent to mention that the period from November 2016, following demonetisation, did not have much effect on the main findings. Yet, later on in the report, it dwells a great deal on reporting the perception of people that demonetisation is predominantly beneficial in reducing corruption. As reiterated, this is nothing more than an impression, and has little value in real governance. If the study felt that it was premature to investigate whether demonetisation has had any effect on the incidence of corruption, reporting citizens perceptions that demonetisation would hit corruption is nothing more than kite flying.

This report focuses only on a few services to citizens by governments; however there are several transactions of the government, such as the sale of the rights to exploit natural resources, or the procurement of goods and services by the government, that are much more corruption prone. How does one measure the extent of corruption in such cases and the success of process changes that limit discretion and increases transparency? More of that in my next blog.

Water Problems in a South Delhi Slum – Challenges of Access, Usage and Awareness

This is the second part of an eight-part series on the challenges and life hacks in experiencing and accessing government benefits and services. 

The problem of acute shortage of clean drinking water is old for the streets of Gola Kuan, Okhla Industrial Area. Supriya (name changed) who works as an Asha (Anganwadi) worker in the community of Gola Kuan has been a witness to this problem since the past five years. The Tanker which is supposed to supply water in that community (a facility which started since Aam Aadmi Party came to power) caters to the basic needs of only twenty families out of a hundred, she explained. “The quality of water is poor and cannot be used for drinking purpose as there are foreign particles in it and it tastes bitter. Also, the water received through the pipeline is contaminated.”

Housewives have to walk some long distances to get water from the bore well. This also increases the economic burden on their families as they have to spend approximately Rs. 1000-1200 per month to buy clean drinking water from private shops. Families thus have to resort to adding chlorine tablets in the water as an alternate measure to keep their water clean (procured and distributed by Asha Workers under ‘family planning’).

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The difference between “access to water” and “access to clean drinking water” is often not very well acknowledged by the Babus. ­Further, the issue is compounded by the fact that there is a lack of awareness on the right departments and authorities to approach in order to register complaints. 

“..Vidhayak ke paas jaate hein. AAP sarkaar ke vidhayak ke paas mei 2 baar gayi thi. Likhit roop se kuch nahi diya tha bas bola tha unhe ki dikkat bohot hai. Unhone kaha ‘hum dekhenge’.”

(We went to the MLAs office. I went to AAP Party’s MLA who is in power to register the complaint. I did not submit any letter or form. I verbally communicated the problem and he said that he will look into the problem.)

Yes, approaching the Delhi Jal Board (DJB) would have crossed most of our minds. However, there were some crucial factors that the people of Goal Kuan had to weigh before settling for a course of redressal in this case. Instead, they approached the MLA in the area as a way to navigate the risks and bureaucratic hassles that came with the DJB (such as spending the whole day at the adhikaari’s office without the assurance of getting redressal and losing a day’s wage).

“..Vidhayak yahi ilaake mei rehte hein. Unke paas jana zyada araamdayak lagta hai. Vaise bhi madam itne saal hogaye koi dhang se toh kuch karta hai nahi. Agla MLA aayega toh election ke time pe suvidhayein mil jayengi uske baad ka koi nahi dekhta. Tanker ki suvidha bhi election ke baad AAP Party ke aane par hue thi. Usse pehele kabhi kuch nahi hua.”

(The MLA lives in this area. It is more convenient to approach him. Madam, it’s been so long since anyone addressed this problem – no one takes proper action to address it. We’ll get some services around elections but no one looks after the service once the election phase passes. The tanker facility also started after elections when AAP Party came to power.)

Where is the solution?

The Delhi Jal Board promises to supply sufficient quantity of water to its people. Approximately 1000 liters  of water is to be provided to each family at a gap of 2 days or a week depending on the requirement, explained the DJB ‘helpline’ spokesperson when I phoned in. Talking about this particular area, pipelines are spread across the whole zone and tankers have been sent ‘hamesha se’ to cater to the needs of its people, explained an adhikari of DJB.

Well, it might sound easy at first to just pick up your phone, dial the toll free number and reach out to the authorities, as it has been advertised. But is it as convenient as it sounds? When I finally got through to the Delhi Jal Board’s ‘helpline’ the spokesperson suggested that I contact the Executive Engineer of that area. Navigating the matrix of zones and departments (like Water, Water sewer, Water maintenance etc.) listed on the DJB website and deciphering the confusing acronyms to finally get the appropriate phone number was a challenge to a comparatively technically sound person like me. The Executive Engineer further directed me to contact the Junior Engineer, without fully acknowledging the concern and information that I needed. On learning that I was no victim of this problem the Junior Engineer nullified the questions raised by saying:

“..Madam kya baat kar rahe ho aap. Yahan koi dikkat nahi hai. Paani properly supply hota hai. Aap office mei jaake baat karo.”

(Madam, what are you saying? There is absolutely no water problem (with respect to quality or quantity) in this area. Sufficient water is supplied. You please go to the office and have a conversation with the concerned person.)

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Can a family of five living in a small room with an open drain right at the entrance of the room struggling to meet the need of ‘do waqt ki roti’ be expected to go through this whole maze for a ‘quick and easy  redressal’? The lack of awareness on  the ‘redressal systems’ and the problem of approachability attached to it ­­doesn’t make for a very clear cut and convenient option for many. This is especially so for those who have to anyway fight daily battles of managing ‘dihaadi’, ‘paisa’ and ‘beemari’.


Possible measures to address water woes in Delhi

  • DJB Helpline Number:  1091 (Toll-free)
  • DJB Website: Homepage – http://bit.ly/1BqF6uh Contact address –  http://bit.ly/2rWWixc
  • Other links: Citizen’s Charter charting out all possible procedural steps to be undertaken in case of water related troubles – http://bit.ly/2shyL7F
  • DJB representatives actively acknowledge problems and respond to complaints on their social media page (Facebook) – https://www.facebook.com/delhijalboardofficial/
  • In case the Citizen is aware of the ‘Zone Number’ of his/her area, then he/she can directly contact the ‘Junior Engineer’ associated with that area (number available on http://bit.ly/1CrOvAN)
  • Other contact persons: MLA or local representative of that area can be personally contacted regarding such issues.

 

The ‘Avoiding Accountability’ Series – A Case Study of Public Housing in Karnataka

In his series, T.R Raghunandan, author of Raghu Bytes (a collection of blogs on bureaucracy, governance and accountability) unpacks the successes and failures of accountability measures in the public housing sector in India. He does this by investigating how housing policies are designed, passed on and finally reach the beneficiary.

In his first blog, The Public Housing Sector – A Case Study of Karnataka, Raghu takes off the series by setting the context of public housing in Karnataka and the existing housing demands in the state. Further, he describes the subtle politics involved in decision-making for housing programmes and its impact on   the programme itself.

The second blog, Beneficiary Selection for Housing Programmes, describes the actual process of beneficiary selection and the various powers at play at the local and state levels.

Rural Housing Wars in Karnataka; the Empire Strikes Back and Gets Shot Down, talks about the battle between Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and local governments in deciding the scale and character of who should benefit from the programme.

This conversation continues in the next blog, Frontal Assault Turns to Stealth: MLAs Sneak Back, building on how politics intrudes the intentions and implementation of the programme. It also speaks on the counter actions that emerged as a result, enabling a more participatory model of implementation.

The next blog, Law, Technology and Tensions, brings to light measures of accountability put in place, especially with new technology mediums. He offers the mixed impact this has had on the governance of the programme and the potential it could serve.

In his final blog, Saturation and Collaborative Construction; A Way Out of the Conundrum, Raghu brings the story to its finality by sharing learnings on the entire exchange between and within government that eventually led to way in which this programme was delivered at the last mile. He further presents the challenges to expect for this programme bringing the series to a close.

The series serves as an example of prominent factors that influence the delivery of public programmes (including the power play inherent in its application) as well as gives insight on the importance of participation, efficiency and accountability for publically run welfare programmes in the country.

Rural Housing Wars in Karnataka; the Empire Strikes Back and Gets Shot Down

This is the third part of the Raghu Bytes series on ‘Avoiding Accountability’.

The genesis of the war between the Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) and the local governments (Gram Panchayats) on the issue of selection of beneficiaries for rural housing programmes, goes back to October 2003. The Panchayat Raj Act of Karnataka was amended to strengthen Grama Sabhas – assemblies of the people – and left no room for doubt that the latter had the final word in identification and selection of beneficiaries and prioritization of beneficiary lists. Section 3(3)(b) of the amended Act provided that Ward Sabhas would identify the most eligible persons from its area for beneficiary-oriented schemes on the basis of previously stated out criteria and prepare lists of eligible beneficiaries in order of priority and forward it to the Grama Panchayat. These lists were then to be placed by the Grama Panchayat before the Grama Sabha, which under Section 3A (3) (c) would consider the Ward Sabha lists and prepare the final lists of eligible beneficiaries in order of priority. For good measure, the law also provided that once such detailed beneficiary lists were prepared by the Grama Sabha; they could not be changed by any higher authority. By positioning the Grama Sabha as the sole platform that protects the right of every citizen to participate in decision making, a major step towards realising self-governance was achieved.

It was significant that these amendments were passed unanimously by the State Assembly after detailed scrutiny by an all-party Select Committee. So, the MLAs knew very well what they were doing.

However, through a process of slow cerebration by which MLAs realized they were shortchanged, the Government turned the clock back in April 2007 by amending Sections 3(3) (b) and 3A (3) (c), stating that if the Grama Panchayat fails to discharge its duties in respect of housing schemes or programmes, then a committee headed by the member of the legislative assembly of the constituency shall select the beneficiaries from the list prepared by the Grama Panchayat.

At one stroke, the law made the local legislator the final arbiter over decisions of the Grama Sabha. The proviso to the law was dangerously open ended. Who was to decide that a Grama Panchayat has failed to discharge its duties? Who would constitute the committee? What was the need to specifically mention housing schemes? Would this proviso be expanded to take away all the powers of the Grama Sabha in respect of all Schemes of the Government? What makes the MLAs or government official, who are far removed from village citizens, better able to decide who should benefit from a scheme, that the rural voter who knows intimately every resident of her/his village?

The amendment of the law, piloted hurriedly through the legislature and passed unanimously without discussion, triggered widespread protests across the State, by NGOs and Panchayat elected representatives. The local press front- paged the protests in a big way. That in turn influenced the Governor, to whom the State government had sent the law for final approval. Delegations of aggrieved NGOs and Panchayat representatives petitioned the Governor to return the law to the Government for reconsideration, which he did with alacrity.

By then, other political development escalated in the government. The coalition that ruled in the State broke down, and Presidents rule was imposed. The amendment fell by the wayside.

While those who protested against the amendment gloated at the unlikely victory, some of us who looked ahead were sure that the matter would not end here. Any new government would also push for such amendments. The power of patronage that MLAs would gain by distributing houses to the poor was too precious to be relinquished.

It was a friend running an NGO who came up with a good idea on how to prevent further such incursions into the powers of the Grama Sabha. ‘We must propagate the notion that anybody who dares to diminish the powers of the Grama Sabha is destined to lose power’, he said, in all seriousness. ‘Its bad vaastu in case you touch the Panchayat Raj Act’. He wagged his finger at me threateningly. Vaastu is, loosely put, an Indian system of Feng Shui.

I agreed with him heartily. Government should also have a Tantrik appointed as Deputy Secretary in the Panchayat Raj Department, fully equipped with Voodoo dolls of individual MLAs and stick pins into them in case they cast covetous eyes on the powers of the Grama Sabha, I suggested.

Frontal Assault Turns to Stealth: MLAs Sneak Back

This is the fourth part of the Raghu Bytes series on ‘Avoiding Accountability’.

When a new government took charge in Karnataka in 2013, the ethos of the ruling party remained the same as before. There was an outward commitment to decentralisation and empowering of the Panchayats, but behind the scenes, the compulsion was to give MLAs more powers of decision making locally.

This parallel stream of thought continues till this day. The Panchayat supporters in the ruling party – as is the case with every mainstream party – is considerable. They were able to maintain pressure on the government to announce more reforms to strengthen peoples’ participation and local governments. A Committee to suggest amendments to the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act was set up by the government, under the Chairpersonship of a senior MLA, Mr. Ramesh Kumar. He was subsequently elevated as the Cabinet Minister for Health, after he completed and submitted the report. This author served as a member of the Committee.

At first, I must admit, I was sceptical about the effectiveness of the committee. Initially, we seemed to be saying the same things over and over again; of how Panchayats were to be strengthened, and they in turn were to be kept in check and monitored by the Grama Sabhas. Nobody seemed to realise, in my opinion that many of these visions had been envisaged earlier, but had fallen by the wayside. However, soon, my cynicism gave way to hope. As the participants in the committee began to get into the details with the chairpersons encouragement, we began to focus on the real implementation issues. One of the key questions that generated a debate was how participation ought to be facilitated for the selection of beneficiaries for various programmes. The Grama Sabhas and Ward Sabhas created in 2003 were not very effective; that was the general consensus. So, the approach of configuring Neighbourhood or Habitation sabhas as the feeder system for decision making in the Gram Sabhas, was suggested. This made eminent sense; the earlier Grama Sabha decisions were usually tilted in favour of the main village in each Panchayat, where the relatively prosperous people lived, leaving the poor who lived on the village fringes untouched by welfare programmes. Neighbourhood sabhas would bring these people into the fold of decision making and enable them to espouse their cause further.

Due to the dedication and political adroitness of the Chairperson, a few other dedicated members with political connects, and the Rural Development Minister’s support, the recommendations of the Committee found expression in the enactment of a new Act altogether, the Gram Swaraj Act of Karnataka. On the issue of beneficiary selection, the act reiterated the finality of the selection process through the Grama Sabhas; with the only change being that the selection process would start even below the wards, in each habitation.

As is always the case, political support for the act was unequivocal. Sometimes it makes me wonder if legislators actually read the fine print in all the laws they pass.

Then, the second thoughts began to emerge. However, the battles for empowerment are a seesaw one; attempts to turn the clock back don’t always result in status quo ante. In this case, with respect to the selection of beneficiaries for housing, the conundrum was addressed in an intelligent way. To wrest away the powers of selection of beneficiaries from the Grama Sabha would have shown up the government in a bad light, and in any case, any instruction of this nature would have been contradictory of the law.

So the government brought in the MLAs through a different route. While MLAs were not involved in the selection of individual beneficiaries, they were empowered by government instruction to decide upon how many houses allotted to the constituency could be allocated to each village and panchayat.